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Ab s t r a c t  
User Authentication is the process of  estab lishing conf idence in the User identities presented to an 
inf ormation system.   This thesis estab lishes a method of  assigning a conf idence level to the output of  
a user authentication process b ased on what attack s and threats it is vulnerab le to.  Additionally, this 
thesis describ es the results of  an analysis where the method was perf ormed on several dif f erent 
authentication systems and the conf idence level in the authentication process of  these systems 
determined.  Final conclusions f ound that most systems lack  conf idence in their ab ility to authenticate 
users as the systems were unab le to operate in the f ace of  compromised authenticating inf ormation.  
Final recommendations were to improve on this inadeq uacy, and thus improve the conf idence in the 
output of  the authentication process, through the verif ication of  b oth static and dynamic attrib utes of  
authenticating inf ormation.  A system that operates conf idently in the f ace of  compromised 
authenticating inf ormation that utiliz es voice verif ication is describ ed demonstrating the ab ility of  an 
authentication system to have complete conf idence in its ab ility to authenticate a user through 
sub mitted data.  
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Ch a p t e r  1  
Us e r  Au t h e n t i c a t i o n  
1.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n  
A f undamental concern in inf ormation systems is the authentication of  local and remote entities.  This 
concern arises f rom the necessity to verif y that an entity attempting to gain access to the system is 
indeed who or what they claim to b e to ensure the protection and privacy of  the data inside the 
system.  In the case of  user authentication the system must b e ab le to provide assurances that the user 
is who they claim to b e in order to grant access privileges to the user: this process is k nown as the 
user authentication process.   
User authentication supports f urther security services b eyond access control including privacy, data 
authentication and non-repudiation.  Privacy, similar to access control, is accomplished b y ensuring 
that only authoriz ed individuals can view the data.  Data authentication and non-repudiation are 
accomplished b y saving the identity of  the user along with the data.   These services depend on the 
ab ility of  the system to ensure that a user is authenticated correctly and that there are no f alsely 
authenticated users.  
Almost all inf ormation systems today provide a means of  attempting to authenticate a user b ef ore 
allowing him or her access to the system.  This thesis examines remote user authentication as it 
occurs in privacy critical systems.    
In Chapter 1, this thesis will f irst provide a b rief  overview of  cryptography b ef ore it will explore 
user authentication as it is understood today b y identif ying the entities involved and estab lish what 
will b e ref erred to as the Generaliz ed User Authentication Process.  Chapter 1 will continue on to 
describ e the three k nown f actors of  authentication: “something you k now”, “something you have”, 
and “something you are”; special emphasis will b e placed on “something you are”, commonly k nown 
as b iometric authentication.    
Chapter 2 will def ine the req uirements that are needed in the authentication process of  a remote 
privacy critical system.  Chapter 2 will f irst explore the weak nesses in the three dif f erent 
authentication f actors b ef ore highlighting the weak nesses of  the Generaliz ed User Authentication 
Process and def ining attack s on the process. Af ter exploring and categoriz ing the attack s an 
understanding of  the req uirements f or a privacy-critical system to have conf idence in the output of  the 
authentication process will b e estab lished. 
Chapter 3 will contain case studies on several well k nown and f req uently used privacy-critical 
systems with remote user authentication.  The case studies will contain an analysis of  the user 
authentication process highlighting any weak nesses and apply the measures assigned in Chapter 2 to 
estab lish the conf idence level in the output of  the authentication process.  Recommendations will b e 
made as necessary on how to improve the conf idence level.   
The f inal chapter, Chapter 4, will summariz e the f indings of  the analysis and propose and analyz e 
an authentication system that meets the req uirements to have complete conf idence in its output.  
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1.2  O v e r v i e w  o f  C r y p t o g r a p h y  
Cryptography is the “study of  mathematical techniq ues related to aspects of  inf ormation security such 
as conf identiality, data integrity, entity authentication, and data origin authentication.” [ 1]  The 
f undamental goal of  cryptography is to address these issues and allow f or the “protection and 
detection of  cheating and other malicious activities.” [ 1]  This section will provide a very b rief  
def inition and overview of  the cryptographic primitives used in user authentication and how these 
primitives aid the process.  
 
1.2.1 C r y p t o g r a p h i c  G o a l s  
The inf ormation security ob j ectives contained within the def inition of  cryptography f orm a 
f ramework  upon which other inf ormation security ob j ectives can b e derived.  The f ollowing 
def initions of  the f our ob j ectives were ob tained f rom the Handb ook  of  Applied Cryptography. [ 1] 
1. Confidentiality is a service used to k eep the content of  
inf ormation f rom all b ut those authoriz ed to have it. Secrecy 
is a term synonymous with conf identiality and privacy.  
There are numerous approaches to providing conf identiality, 
ranging f rom physical protection to mathematical algorithms 
which render data unintelligib le. 
2. D ata integ r ity is a service which addresses the unauthoriz ed 
alteration of  data. To assure data integrity, one must have the 
ab ility to detect data manipulation b y unauthoriz ed parties. 
Data manipulation includes such things as insertion, 
deletion, and sub stitution. 
3. A u th entic ation is a service related to identif ication. This 
f unction applies to b oth entities and inf ormation itself . Two 
parties entering into a communication should identif y each 
other. Inf ormation delivered over a channel should b e 
authenticated as to origin, date of  origin, data content, time 
sent, etc. For these reasons this aspect of  cryptography is 
usually sub divided into two maj or classes: entity 
authentication and data origin authentication. Data origin 
authentication implicitly provides data integrity (f or if  a 
message is modif ied, the source has changed). 
4. N on-r ep u diation is a service which prevents an entity f rom 
denying previous commitments or actions. W hen disputes 
arise due to an entity denying that certain actions were tak en, 
a means to resolve the situation is necessary. For example, 
one entity may authoriz e the purchase of  property b y another 
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entity and later deny such authoriz ation was granted. A 
procedure involving a trusted third party is needed to resolve 
the dispute. 
 
1.2.2 E n c r y p t i o n  
Figure 1.1 illustrates two parties, Alice and B ob , who are communicating over an unsecured channel.  
Alice and B ob  however req uire that their communication b e conf idential; to accomplish this goal 
encryption is used.   
In Figure 1.1 Alice has a plaintext message (m) she wishes to conf identially send to B ob , so b ef ore 
transmission it is passed through an encryption algorithm (Ee) to produce a ciphertext (c) which is 
then transmitted to B ob .  B ob  then passes the ciphertext through a decryption algorithm (Dd) to 








A l i c e
encryption
Ee(m)  =  c




U N S E C U R E D  C H A N N E L
E v e
(A d v e r s a r y )
S ec u r e C h annel
 







1 . 2 . 2 . 1  S y m m e t r i c -K e y  C r y p t o g r a p h y  
D efinition:  Consider an encryption scheme consisting of  the sets of  
encryption and decryption transf ormations { Κ∈eEe : }  and 
{ Κ∈dDd : } , respectively, where Κ  is the k ey space.  The 
encryption scheme is said to b e symmetric-k ey if  f or each associated 
encryption/ decryption k ey pair (e, d), it is computationally “easy” to 
determine d k nowing only e, and to determine e f rom d.  Since e= d 
in most practical symmetric-k ey encryption schemes, the term 
symmetric-k ey b ecomes appropriate.  [ 1] 
 
Figure 1.1 is an illustration of  a symmetric k ey encryption scheme.  In Figure 1.1 Alice and B ob  
f irst agree upon a symmetric k ey through an of f line k ey exchange protocol.  Alice and B ob  then use 
that k ey to encrypt and decrypt messages passed b etween each other.  A prob lem that is immediately 
ob vious in symmetric k ey cryptography is how Alice and B ob  can ef f iciently agree upon the 
symmetric k ey: this is k nown as the k ey distrib ution prob lem.   
Symmetric k ey encryption schemes are divided into two classes: b lock  ciphers and stream ciphers.  
A b lock  cipher is an encryption scheme which divides the plaintext message into multiple b lock s of  
f ixed length and encrypts one b lock  at a time.  A stream cipher is an encryption scheme that converts 
a plaintext message to ciphertext one b it at a time.  
Stream ciphers operate through the use of  a k eystream generator, which is delivered to Alice and 
B ob  b ef ore the communication.  The k eystream generator generates the next b it of  the k ey which is 
comb ined with the next b it of  the plaintext in an exclu s i v e-O R  f unction.   The security of  the scheme 
depends entirely on the implementation of  the k eystream generator: if  the next b it of  the k eystream is 
predictab le with prob ab ility greater than 50%  then the encryption is weak .  
Most well-k nown symmetric-k ey encryption techniq ues are b lock  ciphers. [ 1]  Claude Shannon in 
his landmark  paper Communication Theory of  Secrecy Systems def ined two characteristics of  b lock  
ciphers: conf usion and dif f usion. [ 2] 
Conf usion, also k nown as sub stitution, is the process of  mak ing the relationship b etween the 
ciphertext and k ey as complex as possib le b y replacing symb ols in the plaintext with other symb ols to 
f orm the cipher text.  Dif f usion, also k nown as transposition, is the process of  spreading the ef f ect of  
the plaintext or k ey as widely as possib le over the ciphertext b y permutating the symb ols in a b lock  of  
ciphertext.  A good b lock  cipher should have b oth conf usion and dif f usion properties, as a result most 
b lock  ciphers are compositions of  several rounds of  conf usion and dif f usion techniq ues. Common 
b lock  ciphers used in practice are: the Data Encryption Standard (DES), Triple-DES, and the 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). 
The security of  symmetric k ey encryption is b ased on the idea of  mak ing the ciphertext appear as 
random as possib le.  Essentially this means that ideally the only method f or the adversary (Eve) to 
recover the plaintext f rom the ciphertext is to perf orm an exhaustive search on the k eyspace.  
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Theref ore “a necessary, b ut usually not suf f icient, condition of  the encryption scheme to b e secure is 
that the k ey space b e large enough to preclude an exhaustive search.” [ 1] 
In an authentication system, “cryptography is used to guarantee the authenticity of  the message to 
the receiver.” [ 3]  This means that an adversary must b e prevented f rom adding, deleting or 
modif ying messages b etween the sender and receiver.   
 
1 . 2 . 2 . 2  P u b l i c -K e y  C r y p t o g r a p h y  
The most signif icant limitation in symmetric-k ey cryptography is the req uirement that b oth Alice and 
B ob  must possess a shared k ey b ef ore communication b egins.  In many situations this is unf easib le: 
Alice may not k now B ob  b ef ore the communication and/ or there is no secure method of  exchanging 
k eys.  Additionally in a system of  n users each user must maintain a set of  ( n-1) k eys, leading to a 
total of  2
)1( −nn  k eys in the system.  These limitations in symmetric-k ey cryptography can b e 
addressed through pub lic k ey cryptography.  
In a pub lic-k ey cryptosystem, f irst describ ed b y Dif f ie and Hellman [ 3] in 1976,  two 
communicating users exchange a k ey b y communicating b ack  and f orth across an unsecured channel 
until arrive at a k ey in common;  a third party eavesdropping on this exchange must f ind it 
computationally inf easib le to compute the k ey f rom the inf ormation overheard.  Currently there are 
two prob lems that are considered viab le to provide the necessary computational inf easib ility of  
pub lic-k ey cryptosystems: 
1. the f actoring prob lem 
2. the discrete logarithm prob lem 
The f actoring prob lem is “b ased on the b elieved dif f iculty of  f actoring the product of  two large 
primes” [ 4] while the discrete logarithm prob lem is “b ased on the dif f iculty of  f inding logarithms in a 
f inite f ield.” [ 4] 
Figure 1.2 illustrates encryption using pub lic-k ey techniq ues.  Figure 1.2 dif f ers noticeab ly f rom 
Figure 1.1 through the ab sence of  the secure channel where the symmetric k ey was previously 
exchanged.  In Figure 1.2 the encryption k ey (e) is sent b y B ob  to Alice through an unsecured 
channel, Alice then uses that k ey to encrypt the message (Ee( m)) and B ob  decrypts the ciphertext 
(Dd( c)) using the decryption k ey (d).  The pub lic-k ey cryptosystem illustrated in Figure 1.2 gives rise 







D efinition:  Consider an encryption scheme consisting of  the sets of  
encryption and decryption transf ormations { Κ∈eEe : }  and 
{ Κ∈dDd : } , respectively.  The encryption method is said to b e a 
pu bli c-key encr ypti o n s cheme if  f or each associated 
encryption/ decryption pair (e, d), one k ey e (the pu bli c key) is made 
pub lically availab le, while the other d (the pr i v ate key) is k ept secret.   
For the scheme to b e s ecu r e, it must b e computationally inf easib le to 
compute d f rom e. [ 1] 
 
Figure 1.2 - P ub l ic -K ey  E n c ry p t io n   
Authentication is necessary in pub lic-k ey cryptosystems due to the man-in-the-middle attack  
illustrated in Figure 1.3.  In this attack  Eve positions herself  b etween Alice and B ob  and impersonates 
Alice to B ob  and B ob  to Alice; as f ar as Alice and B ob  are concerned they are communicating only 
with each other and have no k nowledge of  Eve’ s presence.  Elegant solutions to the authentication 
issues in pub lic-k ey cryptosystems are addressed through a Pub lic-Key Inf rastructure (PKI) and 





Figure 1.3 - M a n -in -t h e-M id d l e A t t a c k  o n  a  P ub l ic -k ey  C ry p t o s y s t em  
RSA is “prob ab ly the most widely used pub lic-k ey cryptosystem in the world.” [ 5]  However, RSA 
cryptosystems can b e computationally intensive and restrictive in low power environments.  Systems 
using a version of  the discrete logarithm prob lem using a f ield of  the f orm GF(2n), can provide “very 
f ast and very secure pub lic-k ey systems.” [ 6] 
1 . 2 . 2 . 3  R S A  P u b l i c -K e y  E n c r y p t i o n  
The RSA pub lic-k ey cryptosystem is named af ter its inventors R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman 
was f irst proposed in 1977 [ 7] and is b ased on the assumed intractab ility of  the f actoring prob lem.  
This section will b rief ly describ e the k ey generation algorithm and the encryption/ decryption 
algorithms used in this cryptosystem.  The f ollowing algorithmic descriptions were ob tained f rom the 












1.2.2.3.1 RSA Key Generation Algorithm 
Summary: each entity creates an RSA pub lic k ey and a corresponding private k ey. 
Each entity A should do the f ollowing: 
1. Generate two large random (and distinct) primes p and q, each roughly the same siz e. 
2. Compute pqn =  and )1)(1( −−= qpφ  
3. Select a random integer e, φ<< e1 , such that 1),gcd( =φe . 
4. Use the extended Euclidean algorithm to compute the uniq ue integer d, φ<< d1 , such 
that )(mod1 φ≡ed  
5. A ’ s pub lic k ey is (n, e); A ’ s private k ey is d. 
1.2.2.3.2 RSA Pub lic Key Encryption Algorithm 
Summary: B encrypts a message m f or A, which A decrypts 
Encryption: 
1. Ob tain A ’ s authentic pub lic k ey (n ,e) 
2. Represent the message as an integer m in the interval [ 0, n-1] 
3. Compute )(mod nmc e≡  
4. Send the ciphertext c to A. 
D e cryption 
To recover plaintext m f rom c, A should do the f ollowing: 
1. Use the private k ey d to recover )(mod ncm d≡  
 
1 . 2 . 2 . 4  D i s c r e t e  L o g a r i t h m  C r y p t o s y s t e m s  
The very f irst discrete logarithm system was proposed b y Dif f ie and Hellman in 1976 and describ ed 
in their k ey exchange algorithm [ 3] while the b asic pub lic-k ey encryption scheme utiliz ing discrete 
logarithms was proposed in 1984 b y ElGamal. [ 8]  This section b rief ly describ es the b asic ElGamal 
pub lic-k ey encryption scheme using discrete logarithms; the algorithmic descriptions b elow were 
ob tained f rom the Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography. [ 9] 
In discrete logarithm systems, a k ey pair is associated with a set of  pub lic domain parameters 
),,( gqp .  Here, p is a prime, q is a prime divisor of  )1( −p , and ]1,1[ −∈ pg and has order q. The 
private k ey x is an integer randomly selected f rom the interval ]1,1[ −q  and the corresponding pub lic 
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k ey is pgy x mod= .  The discrete logarithm prob lem is the prob lem of  determining x given 
domain parameters ),,( gqp  and y. 
 
1.2.2.4.1 Discrete Logarithm Domain Parameter Generation 
IN PUT: Security parameters l, t. 
OUTPUT: Discrete Logarithm domain parameters ),,( gqp . 
1. Select a t-b it prime q and an l-b it prime p such that q divides p-1 
2. Select an element g of  order q: 





b . If  1=g then go to step a 
3. Return ),,( gqp  
 
1.2.2.4.2 Discrete Logarithm Key Pair Generation 
IN PUT: Discrete Logarithm domain parameters ),,( gqp . 
OUTPUT: Pub lic k ey y and private k ey x. 
1. Select ]1,1[ −∈ qx R  
2. Compute pgy x mod=  
3. Return ),( yx  
 
1.2.2.4.3 B asic ElGamal Encryption 
IN PUT: Discrete Logarithm domain parameters ),,( gqp , pub lic k ey y, plaintext ]1,1[ −∈ pm  
OUTPUT: Ciphertext ),( 21 cc  
1. Select ]1,1[ −∈ qk R  
2. Compute pgc k mod1 =  
3. Compute pymc k mod2 ⋅=  




1.2.2.4.4 B asic ElGamal Decryption 
IN PUT: Discrete Logarithm domain parameters ),,( gqp , private k ey x, ciphertext ),( 21 cc  
OUTPUT: Plaintext m 
1. Compute pccm x mod12 −⋅=  
2. Return m  
 
1 . 2 . 2 . 5  E l l i p t i c  C u r v e  C r y p t o s y s t e m s  
Elliptic curve cryptosystems are discrete logarithm cryptosystems describ ed in the ab stract setting of  
a f inite cyclic group. [ 9]  This section provides a b rief  description of  elliptic curve cryptosystems and 
assumes an elementary k nowledge of  group theory; the algorithmic descriptions b elow were ob tained 
f rom the Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography. [ 9] 
A multiplicative cyclic group ),( ⋅G  of  order n with generator g can b e used to describ e the discrete 
logarithm prob lem.  In the setting of  G the domain parameters are g and n, the private k ey is an 
integer x selected randomly f rom the interval ]1,1[ −n  and the pub lic k ey is xgy = .  The prob lem of  
determining x, given g, n and y is the discrete logarithm prob lem in G. 
The cyclic sub group of  elliptic curve groups can b e used to f orm G.  An elliptic curve E over pF  
(where pF denotes the f ield of  integers modulo p) is def ined b y 
baxxy ++= 32 , 
W here pFba ∈,  satisf y )(mod0274 23 pba ≠+ .  A pair ),( yx , where pFyx ∈, is a point on 
the curve E if  ),( yx satisf y the ab ove eq uation def ining the curve E.  
If  E is an elliptic curve def ined on the f inite f ield pF  and P has prime order n and is a point in 
)( pFE then the cyclic sub group )( pFE generated b y P is 
{ }PnPPPP )1(,,3,2,, −∞= K  
The prime p, the eq uation of  the elliptic curve E, and the point P and its order n, are the pub lic 
domain parameters.  The private k ey is an integer d that is selected unif ormly at random f rom the 
interval ]1,1[ −n and the corresponding pub lic k ey is dPQ = .  The prob lem of  determining d given 
the domain parameters and Q is the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Prob lem (ECDLP).   
A plaintext m is f irst represented as a point M, and then encrypted b y adding it to kQ where k is a 
randomly selected integer, and Q is the intended recipient’ s pub lic k ey.  The sender transmits the 
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points kPC =1  and kQMC +=2 to the recipient who uses their private k ey d to compute 
kQdPkkPddC === )()(1  and thereaf ter recovers kQCM −= 2 . 
1.2.2.5.1 Elliptic Curve Key Pair Generation 
IN PUT: Elliptic Curve domain parameters ( )nPEp ,,, . 
OUTPUT: Pub lic k ey Q and private k ey d. 
1. Select ]1,1[ −∈ nd R  
2. Compute dPQ =  
3. Return ),( dQ  
1.2.2.5.2 B asic ElGamal Elliptic Curve Encryption 
IN PUT: Elliptic Curve domain parameters ( )nPEp ,,, , pub lic k ey Q, plaintext m. 
OUTPUT: Ciphertext ),( 21 CC  
1. Represent the message m as a point M in )( pFE  
2. Select ]1,1[ −∈ nk R  
3. Compute kPC =1  
4. Compute kQMC +=2  
5. Return ),( 21 CC  
 
1.2.2.5.3 B asic ElGamal Elliptic Curve Encryption 
IN PUT: Elliptic Curve domain parameters ( )nPEp ,,, , private k ey d, plaintext ),( 21 CC  
OUTPUT: Plaintext m 
1. Compute 12 dCCM −= and extract m f rom M 
2. Return M 
 
1 . 2 . 2 . 6  K e y  S i z e  C o m p a r i s o n  
Tab le 1.1 illustrates estimates f or parameter siz es providing comparab le levels of  security f or RSA, 
Discrete Logarithm (DL) and Elliptic Curve (EC) cryptosystems.  The estimates were b ased on the 
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time tak en f or the b est k nown algorithms to solve the respective prob lems.  For instance the b est 
k nown algorithm to solve the integer f actoriz ation prob lem is the N umb er Field Sieve, while the b est 
k nown algorithms to solve the discrete logarithm prob lem are the N umb er Field Sieve and Pollard’ s 
rho algorithm.  Pollard’ s rho algorithm is also the b est k nown algorithm to solve the ECDLP.   
Table 1.1 - R S A ,  D L  an d  E C  k ey  si z es f o r  eq u i v alen t  sec u r i t y  lev els [ 9]  















DL parameter q 
EC parameter n 160 224 256 384 512 
RSA modulus n 
DL modulus p 1024 2048 3072 8192 15360 
 
 
1.2.3 D i g i t a l  S i g n a t u r e s  
Digital signatures are particularly usef ul in entity and data authentication, authoriz ation and non-
repudiation.  A Digital Signature is a transf ormation that “provides a means f or an entity to b ind its 
identity to a piece of  inf ormation.” [ 1]  Figure 1.4 illustrates a digital signature scheme in which Alice 
creates a signature (s) f or a message (m) through a signature f unction (SA) b ef ore transmitting the 
message and signature to B ob .  B ob  then computes a B oolean f unction ),( smVu A=  to verif y the 
signature on the message: B ob  will accept the signature as b eing created b y Alice if  the f unction 





Fi g u r e 1.4 - D i g i t al S i g n at u r e S c h em e 
Pub lic-k ey cryptography is especially usef ul in estab lishing the transf ormation f unctions )(mS A  
and )(mVA .  In a pub lic-k ey signature scheme the transf ormation )(mS A can b e represented 
as )()( mDmS
AdA = , where )(mD Ad  is the decryption f unction using Alice’ s private k ey.  In the 






 is the encryption f unction using Alice’ s pub lic k ey. 
 
1.2.4 H a s h  F u n c t i o n s  
 A has h f u ncti o n is “a computationally ef f icient f unction mapping b inary strings of  arb itrary 
length to b inary strings of  some f ixed length, called has h-v alu es .” [ 1]  A hash-value of  a string acts as 
a compact representation of  the string.  A cryptographic hash f unction h is one such that it is 
“computationally inf easib le to f ind two distinct inputs which hash to a common value (i.e. two 
colliding inputs x and y such that h( x)= h( y)), and that given a specif ic hash-value y, it is 
computationally inf easib le to f ind an input (pre-image) x such that h( x)= y.” [ 1] 
Cryptographic hash f unctions are most of ten used in conj unction with digital signatures f or data 
integrity.  In this situation a long message is hashed and the hash-value is digitally signed.  The 
receiving party then hashes the original message and verif ies that the digital signature on the received 
hash-value is correct.  This scheme is particularly usef ul as it saves time and space compared to 
signing the message directly using an encryption scheme and transmitting the original message and 




1.2.5  K e y  M a n a g e m e n t  a n d  P u b l i c -K e y  C e r t i f i c a t e s  
The k ey distrib ution prob lem, mentioned in Section 1.2.2.1, can b e addressed through the use of  
pub lic-k ey cryptography.  The Dif f ie-Hellman Key Exchange, [ 3] b ased on the intractab ility of  the 
discrete logarithm prob lem, is illustrated in Figure 1.5.  The Dif f ie-Hellman Key Exchange uses 
pub lic-k ey cryptography to estab lish a secret symmetric k ey b etween Alice and B ob .   
 
 
Fi g u r e 1.5 - D i f f i e-H ellm an  K ey  E x c h an g e 
 
In Figure 1.5 Alice possesses a pub lic k ey (x, p) and a private k ey a, while B ob  posses a pub lic k ey 
),( px and a private k ey b.  Alice computes px a mod and sends it to B ob .  B ob  computes 
px b mod  and sends it to Alice.  B oth compute the new shared k ey: pxpx baab mod)(mod)( = .  
Due to the intractab ility of  the discrete logarithm prob lem neither Alice or B ob  can compute the 
other’ s private k ey f rom the shared k ey and an eavesdropper cannot compute either a, b o r  
px ab mod)( .  Similar k ey exchange algorithms can b e developed using other pub lic k ey techniq ues.   
It can b e ob served in Figure 1.5 that the Man-in-the-Middle attack  is still possib le as there is no 
authentication of  either Alice or B ob .  A solution to the authentication prob lem is through the use of  a 
Trusted Third Party (TTP) and pub lic-k ey certif icates.  Figure 1.6 illustrates the concept b ehind a 





Fi g u r e 1.6 - P u bli c -k ey  C er t i f i c at es 
In the pub lic-k ey certif icate scheme illustrated in Figure 1.6 B ob  generates his own pub lic and 
private k ey pair, ),( BobBob de , which along with some identif ying inf ormation )( BobID is sent to the 
Certif icate Authority (CA).   The CA computes )),(( BobBobd eIDfDCERT CA=  where f ( ) is a 
f unction of  comb ining an ID, and a pub lic-k ey into a well-k nown structure; the result of  the f unction 
is then digitally signed b y the CA.   
Figure 1.7 illustrates an example protocol using pub lic-k ey certif icates to authenticate two 
communicating parties at the start of  the communication.  In Figure 1.7 Alice and B ob  b oth have 
assigned identities ( I DA, I DB) their own pub lic and private k ey pair [ (eA,dA) and (eB,dB)] and 
certif icates ob tained f rom the CA (CER T A and CER T B).  Additionally Alice and B ob  b oth have pre-
existing k nowledge of  the other’ s identity, pub lic k eys and the pub lic k ey of  the CA, illustrated with 




Fi g u r e 1.7- A u t h en t i c at i o n  u si n g  P u bli c -K ey  C er t i f i c at es 
In Figure 1.7 Alice f irst creates a random message, MA, which she encrypts with B ob ’ s pub lic k ey 
to compute CA; this message will b e used to verif y that B ob  is in possession of  his private k ey.  Alice 
then sends her certif icate and CA to B ob : it should b e noted that this transmission should have some 
f orm of  data integrity such as a hash of  the message signed b y Alice to prevent a man in the middle 
attack .  B ob  will then verif y that the received certif icate is legitimate using the verif ication f unction 

 == otherwisefalse
eIDfCERTEiftrueCERTeIDV AAAeAAAe CACA ,
),()(:,),( .  If  the verif ication passes B ob  will 
create his own random message MB, and compute CB using Alice’ s pub lic k ey and compute MA` using 
his own private k ey.  B ob  next sends his certif icate, MA`, and CB to Alice.  Alice then verif ies B ob ’ s 
certif icate, check s that MA` matches MA, and computes MB`.  Alice next sends MB` to B ob  who check s 
that it match MB. 
At the end of  the authentication protocol illustrated in Figure 1.7 Alice and B ob  are assured of  each 
other’ s identity through their demonstrated possession of  a certif icate issued b y the TTP and the 
corresponding private k ey.  Again it should b e noted that this assurance is only present if  a means of  
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data integrity is included in the protocol to ensure that an adversary has not modif ied any of  the 
messages in transit.   
 
1.2.6 S e c u r e d  C h a n n e l  
A secured channel b etween two parties is a b i-directional channel conveying inf ormation in which 
“an adversary does not have the ab ility to reorder, delete, insert or read” [ 1]  and is of  particular 
interest in privacy-critical systems.  The cryptographic primitives and techniq ues describ ed 
previously can b e used to create such a channel.  Figure 1.8 illustrates an example of  the steps 
involved in estab lishing a secured channel b etween Alice and B ob . 
Bob
Auth(Al i c e )
Calculate 
S y m m etr i c 
k ey :  e
Al i c e
Calculate 
S y m m etr i c 
k ey :  e
Auth(B o b )
Ee(s n , m, h(m))
C e r ti f i c a te  E x c ha n g e
Ke y  E x c ha n g e
S ecur ed  Ch an n el Ee(s n , m, h(m))
 
Fi g u r e 1.8 - S ec u r ed  C h an n el E st abli sh m en t  
In Figure 1.8 Alice and B ob  f irst authenticate each other using pub lic k ey certif icates exchanged 
with a means of  data integrity such as a signed hash of  the transmitted data.  Once the identities are 
authenticated Alice and B ob  invok e a k ey exchange method such as the Dif f ie-Hellman k ey exchange 
to calculate a shared k ey e.  Secrecy of  the communication b etween Alice and B ob  can is ob tained 
through the encryption of  the data b ef ore transmit.   
To ensure that an adversary cannot delete or reorder messages in the communication seq uence 
numb ers are also included in each message in the communication.  It should b e noted that these 
seq uence numb ers are also encrypted b ef ore b eing sent to ensure that an adversary does not discover 
them.  Alice and B ob  check  the seq uence numb er upon the receipt of  the message and if  it is not what 
expected will react accordingly.   
To ensure that an adversary cannot insert data into the communication a means of  data integrity is 
req uired.  A good method to ensure data integrity is to compute the hash value of  the message, and 
encrypt the hash value with the shared k ey b ef ore sending the hash value with the message.  
Communications b etween Alice and B ob  on the secured channel will b e of  the f orm: 
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1.3 O v e r v i e w  o f  U s e r  A u t h e n t i c a t i o n  
User Authentication is the process of  estab lishing conf idence in user identities presented to an 
inf ormation system. [ 10] This chapter will explore the authentication process estab lishing what will 
b e ref erred to as the Generaliz ed User Authentication Process, as well as understanding how the 
process estab lishes conf idence in user identities.   
The authentication process is divided into two separate phases: the Enrolment Phase (sometimes 
ref erred to as the Registration Phase) and the Authentication Phase (sometimes ref erred to as the 
Verif ication Phase).    
In the Enrolment Phase an individual (the User) applies to the Registration Authority (RA) to 
b ecome a registered user of  the Credential Service Provider (CSP).  If  approved b y the RA the user is 
issued with a credential, such as a user name, and is either issued or creates a tok en, such as a 
password, that b inds the credential to the user’ s identity.  The < credential, tok en>  pair are sub mitted 
b y the user during the Authentication Phase.   
The goal of  the Authentication Phase is to ensure that the party providing an identity and req uesting 
authentication, k nown as the Claimant, is correctly verif ied, b y a party k nown as the Verif ier, as 
possessing the claimed identity.   In the Authentication Phase the Claimant presents a < credential, 
tok en>  pair to the Verif ier; the Verif ier then check s if  the tok en is indeed the tok en that was 
registered to the credential in the Enrolment Phase.  If  the correct match is f ound b y the Verif ier the 
Claimant is assumed, through possession of  a correct < credential, tok en>  pair, to posses the identity 
associated with that pair. The Verif ier then passes an assertion ab out the identity of  the authenticated 
user to the Relying Party to allow f or authoriz ation and access control decisions to b e made. 
Access control and authoriz ation decisions made b y the Relying Party are b eyond the scope of  this 
thesis.  This thesis f ocuses on how the output of  the Authentication Process is determined rather than 
how it is acted upon b y the Relaying Party.    
Figure 1.9 illustrates the various entities and their interactions that are involved in the User 
authentication process.  The b ox on the lef t represents the entities involved in the Enrolment Phase, 
while the b ox on the right represents the entities involved in the Authentication Phase.   The 
interactions of  the illustrated entities are as f ollows: 
Enrolm ent  Ph a s e: 
1. An individual applies to an RA through the system’ s enrolment process. 
2. The RA identity proof s that Applicant. 
 
 19 
3. On successf ul identity proof ing, the RA sends the CSP a registration conf irmation 
message. 
4. A secret tok en and a corresponding credential are estab lished b etween the CSP and the new 
user. 
5. The CSP maintains the credential, its status, and the registration data collected. The user 
maintains his or her < credential, tok en>  pair. 
A u t h ent i c a t i on Ph a s e:  
1. The Claimant proves to the Verif ier that he or she possesses and controls the < credential, 
tok en>  pair through an authentication protocol. 
2. The Verif ier interacts with the CSP to validate the tok en and credential and conf irm that 
the Claimant is a user of  the CSP. 
3. If  the Verif ier is separate f rom the Relying Party (application), the Verif ier provides an 
assertion ab out the Claimant to the Relying Party, which uses the inf ormation in the 
assertion to mak e an access control or authoriz ation decision. 
4. An authenticated session is estab lished b etween the Claimant and the Relying Party. 
 
Fi g u r e 1.9 - A u t h en t i c at i o n  E n t i t i es [ 10 ]  
1.4  T h e  G e n e r a l i z e d  U s e r  A u t h e n t i c a t i o n  P r o c e s s  
The various entities and their interactions illustrated in Figure 1.9 cause rise to what will b e ref erred 
to throughout this thesis as the Generaliz ed User Authentication Process.  This so-called Generaliz ed 





Fi g u r e 1.10  - G en er ali z ed  U ser  A u t h en t i c at i o n  P r o c ess 
In Figure 1.10 the User/ Claimant entity is represented b y two devices: the End Devices and a Data 
Processing Unit (DPU).  End devices are any numb er of  devices that together f orm the ab ility to 
accept the < credential, tok en>  pair f rom a user or claimant.  Af ter an end device receives a 
< credential, tok en>  pair the pair is f orwarded to the DPU where they are converted to a f ormat that is 
understandab le to the other entities in the GUAP.  The processing can b e simple such as 
concatenating characters inputted f rom the k eyb oard into a string in the case of  a username and 
password or more complex such as extracting identif ying characteristics f rom a f ingerprint. 
During the Enrolment Phase inf ormation ab out the User is inputted through the End Devices and 
DPU b ef ore b eing f orwarded to the RA f or Enrolment Processing; in some systems the User may 
even select his or her own < credential, tok en>  pair.   The RA will then process the inf ormation and 
create the record that will serve as a matching template f or the < credential, tok en>  pair and will then 
f orward that record to the CSP who stores it in a datab ase.  
During the Authentication Phase the Claimant will use the End Devices to input a < credential, 
tok en>  pair which will then b e processed and f orwarded to the Verif ier.  The Verif ier consists of  a 
matching device which accepts the Claimant’ s < credential, tok en>  pair, extracts the credential and 
then q ueries to the CSP f or the template tok en corresponding to that credential.  Once the matching 
device receives the template tok en it will compare the Claimant’ s tok en to the template tok en and a 
matching score is calculated and f orwarded to the decision mak ing component of  the Verif ier. 
Depending on the type of  authentication f actors and how they are implemented in the tok en the 
matching b etween the sub mitted tok en and the template tok en could b e a simple yes or no decision or 
it could b e a more complicated decision involving statistics and threshold limits.  For this reason the 
device that mak es a decision regarding the matching score is considered to b e a separate component 
of  the Verif ier f rom the component that computes a matching score; although in several systems the 
two components reside within the same physical device.   
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It should b e noted that while it was describ ed that the User/ Claimant possesses a < credential, 
tok en>  pair this is not always the case.  There are in f act two dif f erent approaches to matching: One-
to-Many and One-to-One matching.  
One-to-One matching is the describ ed case, where a user of  the system has b een issued a 
< credential, tok en>  pair and when req uesting authentication sub mits the pair.  The matching device is 
then ab le to extract the sub mitted credential and tok en and compare the sub mitted to tok en to the 
template tok en in the datab ase corresponding to the sub mitted credential.   
One-to-Many matching is slightly dif f erent where instead of  a user possessing a < credential, 
tok en>  pair the user only posses a tok en.  A claimant will sub mit the tok en and the matching device 
will search the entire datab ase f or a template tok en matching the sub mitted tok en; if  a match is f ound 
the claimant will b e authenticated as having the identity corresponding to the matching template 
tok en.  
It should b e noted that in One-to-One matching the Claimant identif ies his or her self  and the 
system authenticates that claim; while in One-to-Many matching the system perf orms b oth the 
identif ication and the authentication.  As a result the One-to-Many scheme should only b e used in 
systems where the uniq ueness of  the tok en can b e guaranteed. 
 
1.5  T o k e n s  
It is important to understand exactly what the tok en in the < credential, tok en>  pair is and a suitab le 
def inition is provided b y N ational Institute of  Standards and Technology (N IST): “Tok ens generally 
are something the Claimant possesses and controls that may b e used to authenticate the Claimant’ s 
identity.” [ 10]  User Authentication is b ased on the assumption that if  a claimant is ab le to prove the 
possession of  a tok en associated with an identity the claimant is in possession of  that identity; as a 
result the tok en must b e something secret and/ or uniq ue that can allow possession of  the tok en to 
reside only with the correct user and not allow an impostor to b e f alsely authenticated as a legitimate 
User.  
The req uirement f or the secrecy and/ or uniq ueness of  authentication tok ens led to the recognition 
of  what is considered to b e the three dif f erent f actors of  authentication: 
1. something you k now 
2. something you have 
3. something you are 
In the f irst f actor, “something you k now,” there exists some secret inf ormation that is shared 
b etween the user and the authenticating entity that is estab lished during the Enrolment Phase.  A very 
common example of  the < credential, tok en>  pair in this scheme is a < user id, password>  pair. During 
the Authentication Phase a claimant will provide the < credential, tok en>  pair and verif ication consists 
of  check ing a match b etween the sub mitted tok en and the template tok en.  A system using this type of  
f actor usually will req uire an exact match b etween the two tok ens to allow authentication to occur.  
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Authentication in this system is b ased on the assumption that only the correct user is aware of  the 
shared inf ormation.   
Authenticating a user b ased on inf ormation shared b etween the system and the user is considered to 
b e the weak est f orm of  authentication.  This is largely due to the f act that it is dif f icult f or the system 
to ensure the inf ormation is only in the possession of  the user.  W hile it is possib le f or the system to 
ensure the protection of  the secret inf ormation and prevent it f rom b ecoming availab le to an attack er 
the system has no way of  controlling the inf ormation once it is in a user’ s possession.   
The second f actor, “something you have,” uses a uniq ue item issued to a user f or authentication.  
This f actor is very f amiliar as government issued identif ication cards, such as a passport, b irth 
certif icate or drivers license, have b een issued to most people in the world.  Computer systems have 
expanded on this and a very common method of  electronic user authentication using this f actor is an 
identif ication card with a magnetic strip that allows a card reader to extract the < credential, tok en>  
pair; in this case the tok en is of ten a secret cryptographic k ey that was placed onto the card along with 
the credential during the Enrolment Phase.  Through possession of  the physical identif ying ob j ect the 
system assumes that a claimant possesses the claimed identity.   
Authenticating a user b ased on something they have is considered stronger than authenticating 
b ased on something they k now since the system has control over the issuance of  the identif ying 
possessions.  The previous prob lem of  a user b eing ab le to share their authenticating inf ormation is 
eliminated using this measure, however, the system is still not authenticating the individual, merely 
the item they posses. 
The third f actor, “something you are,” is considered the strongest authentication f actor since the 
f actor actually seek s to determine identif ying physical characteristics that mak e the individual uniq ue.  
The previous two measures did not authenticate the individual: the f irst authenticated secret 
inf ormation and assumed since only the individual k new the inf ormation the claimant must b e the 
individual; while the second method authenticated the tok en issued to the individual and assumed that 
since the tok en had b een issued to the individual the claimant must b e the individual.  Authentication 
schemes using the third measure are k nown as b iometric authentication systems; b iometric b eing a 
word derived f rom the Greek  b ios, meaning lif e and metric meaning measure.   
It is possib le f or an authentication system to use any comb ination of  the three f actors.  If  an 
authentication system incorporates two of  the f actors, f or example “something you are” and 
“something you k now”, it is k nown as a two-f actor authentication system and similarly if  it involves 
all three types it is called a three-f actor authentication system.  Generally speak ing the more f actors 
an authentication system incorporates the more secure it is.   It should b e noted however that adding 
additional levels of  the same f actors (ex. req uiring two passwords) is still considered to b e a single-
f actor authentication system and not considered as secure as a two-f actor authentication system (ex. 
req uiring one password and one smart card) 
1.5 .1 T o k e n  A t t r i b u t e s  
A tok en, b ased on some comb ination of  the three authentication f actors, possess attrib utes that are 
used in the matching phase to authenticate a claimant.  The attrib utes are some measurab le q uality 
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that is extracted f rom the sub mitted tok en and compared to the template tok en f or a matching score.  
A password-b ased tok en, f or example, has the attrib ute that it is a uniq ue string of  characters: the 
sub mitted password is compared against the template password and if  they are a perf ect match the 
claimant is authenticated as b eing in possession of  the claimed identity.  The attrib utes that comprise 
a tok en f all into two categories: static or dynamic.   
Static attrib utes of  a tok en do not change b etween authentication sessions and always req uire a 
perf ect match to the template tok en stored in the CSP.  Some examples of  tok ens consisting entirely 
of  static attrib utes are:  
• Pa s s w ords : A secret passphrase that is shared b etween the user and the system consisting 
of  a uniq ue string of  characters that is estab lished during enrolment.  The string is 
unchanged during the authentication phase and the sub mitted string must match the 
template string perf ectly. 
• M a g net i c  K ey  C a rd: A uniq ue identif ying b inary k ey is emb edded on the card when 
issued to the user at enrolment; the k ey is also k nown to the system and stored in the CSP.  
At authentication the k ey is read f rom the card and compared to the template k ey, if  a 
perf ect match is f ound the claimant is authenticated.   
• F i ng erp ri nt s : At enrolment a user’ s f ingerprints are recorded into the CSP.  At 
authentication a claimant will mak e an identity claim and press a f inger or f ingers to a 
f ingerprint scanner.  The image collected f rom the scanner is compared to the template 
image and if  a perf ect match is f ound the claimant is authenticated.   
The unchanging property of  static attrib utes adds the ab ility f or the system to support b oth 
identif ication and verif ication.  Static attrib utes provide a measure that can b e considered uniq ue to a 
User.   
Dynamic attrib utes of  a tok en can change b etween authentication sessions and do not req uire a 
perf ect match to a template tok en stored in the CSP.  Some examples of  tok ens consisting of  dynamic 
attrib utes where the sub mitted tok en will not match the template tok en are: 
• Voi c e S a m p les : Due to the nature of  human speech no two voice samples of  the same 
spok en word and f rom the same person are exactly the same.  Measurab le q ualities of  the 
voice are the same however and these measurab le q ualities are used in voice 
authentication.   
• S i g na t u res : Handwritten signatures b y the same person are never completely identical; 
however, measurab le q ualities are discernab le.  
In these examples the dynamic attrib utes of  a tok en help to validate a sub mitted tok en: if  a tok en is 
sub mitted that is completely identical to the template tok en or a previously sub mitted tok en then with 
extremely high prob ab ility it can b e concluded that the tok en is b eing f raudulently sub mitted b y an 
attack er.  
Sometimes a tok en could consist of  dynamic attrib utes that change b etween authentication sessions 
b ut still match the template tok en.  An example of  this is a smart-card where an emb edded processor 
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constantly changes the k ey that will b e read f rom it in the authentication phase; the template tok en in 
this situation is sof tware that determines what the valid k ey at the time of  authentication is.   
Strong tok ens contain b oth static and dynamic attrib utes allowing them to support b oth 
identif ication and authentication of  the claimant.  The static attrib utes are important to provide 
identif ication support as well as verif ication support.  Dynamic attrib utes provide additional 
verif ication support b y ensuring that a previously sub mitted < credential, tok en>  pair that was 
captured b y an attack er can not b e used to successf ully pass authentication.   
1.6  P a s s w o r d s  
The most commonly used authentication f actor used in tok ens is the “something you k now” f actor, 
and manif ested in what is k nown as a password: a secret shared b etween the User and the 
authentication system. [ 11]  Passwords have b een used as authentication tok ens f or years and most 
people are f amiliar in their use and have accepted them as normal authentication mechanisms.   
Passwords-b ased tok ens consist solely of  static attrib utes.  Either the password itself  or an 
algorithmic transf orm, such as a cryptographic hash, of  the password is stored in the CSP to act as the 
template tok en.  At authentication the Claimant provides the password and if  necessary the transf orm 
is calculated and compared to the template.  If  the provided password perf ectly matches the one 
stored in the CSP a passing match score is returned.   
There are dif f ering types of  passwords and rules associated with them.  In a normal computing 
system where the User uses a standard k eyb oard to enter inf ormation a password can b e a seq uence of  
any comb ination of  numb ers, letters or symb ols.  In a system where the User only has a numb er pad 
to enter inf ormation, such as at a b ank  machine or over the phone, the password can only consist of  
numb ers: this numb er-b ased password is of ten k nown as a Personal Identif ication N umb er (PIN ).   
Inherent to the idea of  “something you k now” authentication and thus passwords is that the 
authentication is b ased on the Claimant’ s k nowledge of  the inf ormation.  In the case of  passwords the 
inf ormation is a secret that is shared b etween the User and the system resulting in two common 
dif f iculties: the User f orgetting their password and the purposef ul or accidental disclosure of  the 
password.   
A f orgotten password is a common prob lem in password-b ased authentication systems.  As a result 
many of  these systems implement some policy of  handling f orgotten passwords and allow some f orm 
of  password reset.  A password reset is usually accomplished through a separate means of  
authentication, such as e-mailing a new password to a registered address or through k nowledge b ased 
authentication.  
Disclosure of  a password represents a complete b reak  in the authentication mechanism.  Disclosure 
violates the assumption that only the User and the CSP k now that password.  Passwords can b e 
disclosed in a variety of  ways, including b ut not limited to: 
• The user voluntarily giving their password to an acq uaintance 
• An Attack er accesses the < credential, password>  datab ase 
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• A user, af raid of  f orgetting their password, writes it on a piece of  paper which f alls into the hands 
of  an Attack er 
W hile the idea of  passwords is simple, straightf orward easily and passwords widely deployed 
authentication mechanisms there are many attack s and weak nesses associated with passwords.  These 
attack s and weak nesses will b e explored in Chapter 2. 
 
1.7  K n o w l e d g e  B a s e d  A u t h e n t i c a t i o n  
Knowledge B ased Authentication (KB A) is the process of  verif ying an identity b ased on inf ormation 
provided b y a claimant.  During the KB A Enrolment Phase a collection of  inf ormation is provided b y 
the User to the RA and then saved in a ref erence datab ase.  During the Authentication Phase the 
claimant is ask ed some, or all, of  the same q uestions ask ed during the Enrolment Phase; acceptance of  
the claimed identity depends upon satisf actory consistency b etween the ref erence data and the 
answers provided b y the claimant. 
The generic model of  KB A is illustrated in Figure 1.11.  In this model the Claimant, who possesses 
specif ic k nowledge, provides the Service Provider with the inf ormation specif ic to the Service 
Provider’ s verif ication of  the Claimant’ s identity such as account inf ormation and provides the 





Fi g u r e 1.11 - G en er i c  I d eal K B A  M o d el [ 12]  
The generic model illustrated in Figure 1.11 is the “ideal” generic model where there is no specif ic 
prior relationship b etween the Claimant and the Verif ier.  In practice, however, this ideal model is 
rarely the case as of ten the Service Provider assumes the role of  the Verif ier and the most commonly 
deployed KB A systems are similar to the one illustrated in Figure 1.12. 
 
Fi g u r e 1.12 - D ep lo y ed  G en er i c  K B A  M o d el 
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Unlik e most authentication systems b ased on the “something you k now” authentication f actor, 
where a secret is of ten shared b etween the User and the CSP, the inf ormation used in KB A is not 
necessarily secret; of ten the inf ormation is personal b ut not secret.  Common examples of  q uestions 
posed in KB A include: 
• W hat street did you grow up on? 
• W hat city where you b orn in? 
• W hat is your mother’ s maiden name? 
• W hat is your f irst pet’ s name? 
• W hat was the mak e of  your f irst car? 
The list of  potential q uestions is endless as the list is simply composed of  q uestions ab out f acts in 
the personal lif e of  the user.   
A single q uestion in a KB A scheme is k nown as one f actoid.  Since the inf ormation used in KB A is 
not secret the security of  KB A is b ased on the ab ility to add several f actoids to the process.  This 
means that a KB A scheme must seek  to have a numb er of  q uestions whose answers can b e considered 
independent f rom each other.  The b asic premise b ehind KB A is that the more details that the 
Claimant k nows ab out the personal lif e of  the owner of  the claimed identity the more lik ely the 
Claimant possess that identity.   
The previously mentioned independence req uirement arises f rom the idea that f or additional 
f actoids to have an integer multiplicative increase on the level of  authentication the f actor must b e 
completely independent f rom other f actoids.  However, in the case of  KB A it is impossib le f or the 
answers to the q uestions to b e truly independent f rom each other sine the answers all relate to the 
personal lif e of  the User.  As a result KB A q uestions can b e considered to b e independent if  the 
answer to one q uestion can not lead to an answer to another q uestion. 
KB A is an authentication system that seek s to address a common dif f iculty in the “something you 
k now” authentication employed systems which is the User f orgetting some or all of  their < credential, 
tok en>  pair, such as a f orgotten user ID and/ or password.  The f orgotten credentials prob lem is 
addressed through the idea that a user would not f orget certain personal f acts ab out themselves and 
authentication is no longer b ased on k nowledge of  an arb itrarily selected shared secret b ut on f acts 
ab out the User’ s lif e. 
1.8  B i o m e t r i c s  
B iometrics is the “automated approach to authenticate the identity of  a person using the individual’ s 
uniq ue physiological or b ehavioural characteristics such as f ingerprint, f ace, voice, signature, etc.” 
[ 13] Of  the three authentication f actors “a b iometric is the most secure and convenient authentication 
tool. It can’ t b e b orrowed, stolen, or f orgotten, and f orging one is practically impossib le.” [ 14]  A 
b iometric measures an individual’ s “uniq ue physical or b ehavioural characteristic to recogniz e or 
authenticate their identity.  Common physical b iometrics includes f ingerprints; hand or palm 
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geometry; and retina, iris or f acial characteristics.  B ehavioural characteristics include signature, 
voice (which also has a physical component), k eystrok e pattern, and gait.” [ 14] 
 There are many dif f erent b iometrics that can b e used to identif y a person, f or example: Facial 
Recognition, Fingerprints, Hand and Finger Geometry, Iris Scans, Retinal Scans, and Voice 
Recognition.  W hile each of  these technologies measures a dif f erent b iometric there is a general 
process f or f eature extraction, seen in Figure 1.13 that is common to all of  them.   
 
Fi g u r e 1.13 - C o m m o n  B i o m et r i c  P r o c ess Flo w  [ 13]  
In Figure 1.13 the f irst step is to “Acq uire B iometric Data” this is done through a sensor such as a 
camera or a microphone.  Once the b iometric data is acq uired it is then sent f or processing.  The 
processing generally consists of  enhancing the data and removing noise and then extracting the 
uniq ue f eatures of  the b iometric data sample.   
In the Enrolment Phase the uniq ue f eatures are extracted f rom the b iometric data and a template is 
generated.  The template is then associated with the identity of  a user and stored in a secure datab ase.  
B y extracting the uniq ue f eatures out of  the b iometric sample the template f orms the b asis f or f uture 
comparison when a claimant sub mits a b iometric sample f or authentication during the authentication 
phase.   
As previously mentioned there are several dif f erent b iometrics that can b e used to identif y an 
individual.  Since there is such an extensive list of  b iometric technologies availab le a b rief  overview 
of  several of  the most commonly used is presented in the f ollowing sub sections. 
1.8 .1 F a c i a l  R e c o g n i t i o n  
For humans f acial recognition is the most common b iometric; we identif y and recogniz e people b y 
look ing at their f aces every day.  As such it is only natural that a technology b e developed to allow a 
computer to authenticate a person b y their f acial f eatures.   There are two main approaches used to 
perf orm f ace recognition, namely holistic or glob al approach, and f eature-b ased approach. [ 13] 
Facial recognition using a f eature-b ased approach relies on the identif ication of  certain points on 
the f ace that are less susceptib le to alteration such as the points at the eyes, the side of  the nose and 
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the mouth and the points surrounding the cheek b ones.  A f acial recognition system will acq uire an 
image of  the person’ s f ace through a camera and then compute geometric relationships b etween the 
points on the person’ s f ace.  It should b e noted that since detection of  the f eature points occurs b ef ore 
the analysis the system is capab le of  adapting to position variations in the image, however, automatic 
detection of  the points is not accurate and consistent enough to yield a high accuracy rate f or the f ace 
recognition. [ 13] 
The holistic approach dif f ers f rom the f eature-b ased approach b y processing the entire f ace 
simultaneously without attempting to localiz e the individual points.  B y processing the whole f ace 
simultaneously the holistic approach does not lose inf ormation b y only processing certain points as 
the f eature-b ased approach does.  The holistic approach thus generally “yields more accurate 
recognition results, however, such a techniq ue is sensitive to variations in position and scale.” [ 13] 
1.8 .2 F i n g e r p r i n t  
Fingerprint identif ication is a very common, well understood and accepted b iometric.  The sample 
f ingerprint seen in Figure 1.14 illustrates the main f eatures of  a f ingerprint and how its uniq ue 
f eatures are used to identif y an individual. 
 
 
Fi g u r e 1.14 - S am p le Fi n g er p r i n t  [ 13]  
Every f ingertip has a uniq ue pattern of  ridges that give rise to f eature points, called minutiae, which 
are used to identif y it.  There are “two main technical approaches to f ingerprint recognition: minutia 
matching and pattern matching.” [ 13] Minutia matching locates the minutia in the f ingerprint and 
compares their geometric inf ormation, type, direction and relationship to those of  the template 
f ingerprint’ s minutia to determine a match or not.  Pattern matching extracts data f rom the regions 
surrounding the minutia and matching is perf ormed b y trying to f ind the same area in the template.   
Fingerprint recognition can generally “achieve good accuracy suf f icient f or b oth verif ication and 
identif ication.” [ 13] Due to its f amiliarity among the population it is also a generally accepted 
b iometric and is viewed as b eing relatively unob trusive and easy to use.  However, the sensors can 
not always recogniz e a f ingerprint, f or example the captured image of  the f ingerprint is unusab le f rom 
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people with very wet or very dry sk in.  Additionally people tend to inj ure their f inger f req uently (f or 
example a cut on the tip) and thus leading to a rej ection during the authentication process. 
1.8 .3  H a n d  G e o m e t r y  
In hand geometry authentication a user places their hand on a large surf ace and a camera which is 
under the surf ace look ing up acq uires an image of  the hand.  A side view image of  the hand is also 
acq uired.  The two images are then processed measuring the length, width, thick ness and curvatures 
of  the f ingers and hand and their relative geometry (Figure 1.15).  The processed data is then 
compared to the template data and if  a match occurs the User is authenticated. 
 
 
Fi g u r e 1.15 - H an d  an d  Fi n g er  G eo m et r y  M easu r em en t s [ 13]  
The drawb ack  in the system is that the eq uipment can b e rather b ulk y and expensive.  Additionally 
health prob lems such as arthritis and aging may cause prob lems with the image.   
1.8 .4  I r i s  
The coloured part of  the eye, k nown as the iris, is composed of  a tissue that gives the appearance of  
layered radial lines or mesh when examined closely.  The visib le mesh consists of  characteristics that 
are uniq ue to an individual eye and is stab le throughout an individual’ s lif etime.  An image of  the iris 
is acq uired “using a monochrome camera with visib le and near inf ra red light (700-900nm).” [ 13]  
The processing stage then extracts f eatures f rom the image and is ab le to “reveal 266 independent 
degrees-of -f reedom of  textural variation, mak ing it a very accurate b iometric.” [ 13] 
Iris recognition is a very accurate b iometric availab le.  It is f ast, ef f icient and a template req uires 
very little storage space.  However, the eq uipment used to scan an eye is very expensive, b ulk y and 
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not readily availab le to the average user.  Additionally, an iris scan is a very invasive and time 
consuming method of  authentication.   
1.8 .5  R e t i n a l  S c a n s  
W hereas an iris scan uses the uniq ue patterns of  a person’ s iris f or identif ication, a retinal scan uses 
the uniq ue patterns of  a person’ s retina.  Lik e the iris the retina is stab le f rom b irth to death.  The 
patterns in the retina are the uniq ue arrangements of  b lood vessels at the b ack  of  the eye, a scan 
“involves a low intensity light source and coupler that are used to read the b lood vessel patterns.” [ 13] 
Retinal Scans are the most accurate b iometric measure availab le. [ 13]  However, lik e the iris scan, 
they req uire sophisticated and expensive eq uipment that is not readily availab le.  A retinal scan is also 
a very invasive and time consuming method of  authentication.  
1.8 .6 V o i c e  B i o m e t r i c s  
N ext to f acial recognition voice recognition is the most natural and common f orm of  recognition f or 
humans.  Almost daily humans practice voice recognition when they receive a telephone call and 
recogniz e the voice of  the caller on the other end; this recognition is possib le b ecause of  uniq ue 
f eatures contained within a person’ s voice such as timb re, f req uency, and rate of  speech.  “At the 
primary level, speech conveys a message via words, b ut at other levels speech conveys inf ormation 
ab out the language b eing spok en and the emotion, gender and generally the identity of  the speak er.” 
[ 15]  An ef f ective voice b iometric system will receive a speech signal f rom a Claimant and then 
extract, characteriz e and recogniz e the various levels of  inf ormation contained in the signal and use 
this inf ormation to authenticate the Claimant’ s identity.  
Voice b iometrics dif f ers f rom other b iometrics b y comb ining b oth static (physical trait) and 
dynamic (b ehavioural trait) attrib utes into a single b iometric template.  This comb ination occurs 
b ecause voice is a comb ination of  the “anatomical structures of  the vocal tract and learnt b ehaviour – 
the hab itual way we speak .” [ 16] Additionally voice b iometrics can comb ine b oth b iometric 
(something you are – your physical voice attrib utes) and personal inf ormation (something you k now 
such as a password – the spok en message) into a single credential.   
There are two f undamental approaches to implementing a voice b iometric system:  speak er 
identif ication and speak er verif ication.  In speak er identif ication the Claimant only presents a voice 
sample f or verif ication, mak ing no identity claim, and the system searches the template datab ase f or a 
match and if  f ound identif ies the Claimant.  In speak er verif ication the Claimant provides an 
< identity, voice sample>  pair and the system compares the voice sample to the claimed identity.  In 
general, most compelling applications of  speak er recognition technology use speak er verif ication. 
[ 15] 
In these two approaches the speech used can range f rom pure text-dependent to text-independent.  
In a pure text-dependent system the User will recite a pre-determined message, that the system has 
k nowledge of , during the enrolment and verif ication phases. A less pure text-independent system, 
k nown as a text constrained system, is one in which the User can only recite text f rom a limited 
vocab ulary, the system has k nowledge of  the constrained vocab ulary; an example of  this is prompting 
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the User to recite a random text f rom one of  f ive possib le pre-determined texts.  In b oth text-
dependent and text constrained systems “it is expected that the User will cooperatively speak  the 
f ixed text or words f rom the prescrib ed vocab ulary.  The prior k nowledge and constraint of  the text 
can greatly b oost perf ormance of  a recognition system.” [ 15]  In a text-independent system the User 
will b e ab le to speak  whatever text they desire as the system has no k nowledge of  the text that is to b e 
spok en.  A voice recognition in a text-independent system is much more dif f icult b ut more f lexib le.  
“Of  the two b asic task s, text-dependent speak er verif ication is currently the most commercially viab le 
and usef ul technology, although there has b een much research conducted on b oth task s.” [ 15] 
1 . 8 . 6 . 1  O p e r a t i o n  o f  a  V o i c e  B i o m e t r i c  A u t h e n t i c a t i o n  S y s t e m  
As was previously discussed an authentication system has two phases of  operation, the Enrolment 
Phase and the Authentication Phase, this is no dif f erent f or a b iometric system.  Figure 1.16 is an 
illustration of  the operation involved in the two phases of  a voice b iometric system.   
 
 
Fi g u r e 1.16 - H o w  a v o i c e bi o m et r i c  sy st em  w o r k s [ 16]  
In the Enrolment Phase, illustrated in Figure 1.16, a user will provide a speech sample to the 
system which will then create a model of  the User’ s voice and add it to the voiceprint datab ase.  This 
will allow the system to authenticate the User at a later date.  
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In the Verif ication Phase the Claimant mak es an identity claim and provides a speech sample 
which the system will then compare against the recorded voiceprint in the datab ase and apply the 
appropriate rules and mak es a decision.  The Verif ication Phase, illustrated in Figure 1.16, is an 
instance of  speak er verif ication since the Claimant (Sally) has identif ied herself  through her identity 
claim when she provided a speech sample.   
The Verif ication Phase dif f ers slightly b etween the two dif f erent approaches to a voice b iometric 
system.  The b asic structure of  a speak er identif ication system can b e seen in Figure 1.17(a) while the 
b asic structure of  a speak er verif ication system can b e seen in Figure 1.17(b ).  In b oth systems the 
f eatures are f irst extracted f rom the voice sample through the f ront-end processing. 
 
Fi g u r e 1.17 - B asi c  st r u c t u r e o f  ( a) sp eak er  i d en t i f i c at i o n  an d  ( b) sp eak er  v er i f i c at i o n  sy st em s [15] 
For a speak er identif ication system, lik e the one illustrated in Figure 1.17(a), the speak er identity 
that b est matches the sample inf ormation is selected as the identif ied speak er through a maximum 
lik elihood classif ier.   
In the speak er identif ication system of  Figure 1.17(b ) af ter the voice sample is processed the 
inf ormation is then compared to all the voice templates in the datab ase that had b een previously 
determined during the Enrolment Phase.  It is essentially “a lik elihood ratio test to distinguish 
b etween two hypotheses: the test speech comes f rom the claimed speak er or f rom an imposter.” [ 15]  
The lik elihood ratio statistic (Λ ) b etween the speak er and imposter models is then compared to a 
threshold value (θ ) to decide whether to accept or rej ect the speak er.    
Figure 1.18 shows several dif f erent ways of  interacting with a speak er verif ication system.  Figure 
1.18 (a) and (b ) are b oth text dependent systems which strengthens the authentication process b y 




Fi g u r e 1.18 - Ty p es o f  sp eak er  v er i f i c at i o n  [ 17]  
Figure 1.18 (c) is a text-prompted voice authentication system.  In a text-prompted system the 
system ask s the User to speak  a series of  randomly selected numb ers or phrases.   
Figure 1.18 (d) is an example of  a text independent verif ication system.  In a text independent 
verif ication system it is possib le to design an unob trusive verif ication system b y verif ying the User’ s 
voice regardless of  what they are saying.  It is even possib le in a text independent system to 
authenticate a user without them even k nowing they are b eing authenticated.  This uniq ue ab ility of  
the text independent system mak es it very attractive f or customer related applications as it does not 
distract the User f rom their primary ob j ective b y f orcing them to go through rigorous security check s. 
1.9  A c c u r a c y  o f  B i o m e t r i c s  
One of  the most ob vious req uirements of  a b iometric system is that it needs to b e accurate; meaning 
that the system does not f alsely authenticate an imposter and grant them access (k nown as a False 
Accept) or deny a legitimate user access to the system (k nown as a False Rej ect).  To evaluate the 
accuracy of  a b iometric system there are several important criteria to consider: 
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• F a ls e A c c ep t  R a t e ( F A R ) :  This is also k nown as Type I error.  It measures the percentage of  
impostors b eing incorrectly accepted as genuine user.  Since almost all b iometric systems aim to 
achieve identity authentication, this numb er should b e as low as possib le. [ 13] 
• F a ls e R ej ec t i on R a t e ( F R R ) :  Also k nown as Type II error, this measures the percentage of  
genuine users b eing incorrectly rej ected.  In order to minimiz e the inconveniences (or 
emb arrassment) to the genuine user, this numb er should also b e low.  N evertheless, in general, 
this error is more acceptab le as usually the User can mak e a second attempt.  [ 13] 
• Eq u a l Error R a t e ( ER R ) :  FAR and FRR are related.  A stringent req uirement f or FAR (as low 
as possib le) will inadvertently increase the FRR. [ 13] The ERR is the point where the FAR eq uals 
the FRR as is illustrated in Figure 1.19.  A small ERR indicates a good b alance in the sensitivity 
of  the system.   
• F a i lu re t o Enrol ( F T E) :  The FTE is the percentage of  people who cannot register themselves on 
the system.  B iometric systems have certain physical req uirements that some users simply cannot 
meet, f or example, someone with severely scarred f ingertips cannot register in a f ingerprint 
b iometric system as a suitab le model cannot b e created f or the User.   
 
Fi g u r e 1.19 - E q u al E r r o r  R at e [ 18]  
Figure 1.20 is a tab le containing measurements of  interest when evaluating b iometric systems of  
some common b iometrics: Fingerprint scan, voice recognition, Iris scan and f ace recognition.  It can 
b e ob served in Figure 1.20 that the FRR of  voice recognition f alls third in the while the FAR is the 




Fi g u r e 1.20  - B i o m et r i c  C o m p ar i so n  Table [ 18]  
Further examination of  Figure 1.20 will reveal that while voice recognition has a very low FTE 
rate, the FTE rate of  f ace recognition is q uite a b it lower and is in f act approximately z ero.  However, 
as was previously discussed, the true ef f ectiveness is measured b y the EER and it can b e ob served in 
Figure 1.20 voice recognition has an EER that is much lower than the EER of  any of  the other 
b iometrics.   
An investigation [ 13] into b iometrics created the tab le seen in Figure 1.21 which is a comparison of  
many dif f erent b iometric technologies.  The f ollowing list of  dif f erent aspects was measured in this 
investigation: 
• Universality - how common the b iometric is f ound in each person 
• Uniq ueness - how well the b iometric separates one person f rom another 
• Permanence - how well the b iometric resists aging  
• Collectab ility - how easy it is to measure the b iometric 
• Perf ormance - its accuracy, speed and rob ustness 
• Acceptab ility - willingness of  the pub lic to use it 





Fi g u r e 1.21 - B i o m et r i c  C o m p ar i so n  Table [ 13]  
1.9 .1 A c c u r a c y  o f  V o i c e  B i o m e t r i c s  
Figure 1.22 contains the results of  an investigation in [ 15] and depicts a detection error trade-of f  
(DET) plot which shows the trade-of f  b etween f alse rej ects and f alse accepts as the decision threshold 
changes in a speak er verif ication system.  In this investigation “a verif ication system is mak ing a 
single comparison of  test speech to a claimed speak er model, so results are not a f unction of  speak er 
set siz e.” [ 15]  This DET shows f our eq ual error rate points f or f our dif f erent verif ication 
experiments. 
1. Text-dependent using comb inations lock  phrases (e.g., 35-41-89). Clean data recorded 
using a single handset over multiple sessions. Used ab out 3 min of  training data and 2 s test 
data. (0.1%  – 1% ) 
2. Text-dependent using 10 digit strings. Telephone data using multiple handsets with 
multiple sessions. Two strings training data and single string verif ication (1% -5% ) 
3. Text-independent using conversational speech. Telephone data using multiple handsets 
with multiple sessions. Two minutes training data and 30 s test data. (7% -15% ) 
4. Text-independent using read sentences. Very noisy radio data using multiple military 








Fi g u r e 1.22 - R an g e o f  sp eak er  v er i f i c at i o n  p er f o r m an c e [ 15]  
It was ob served in [ 15] f rom Figure 1.22 that “perf ormance tends to improve with increasing 
constraints on the application (more speech, less noise, k nown channels, text-dependent).  It was 
f urther concluded that “determining acceptab le perf ormance f or a particular application will depend 
on the b enef it of  replacing any current verif ication procedure, the threat model (claimant to imposter 
attempts) and the relative costs of  errors.”    
1.9 .2 F u r t h e r  B e n e f i t s  o f  V o i c e  B i o m e t r i c s  
Perhaps the greatest b enef it of  voice b iometrics is its f amiliarity to the Users.  People are accustomed 
to recogniz ing and authenticating other people through their voice, f or example when mak ing or 
receiving a phone call.  Among other b enef its of  voice b iometrics [ 18] lists “User Friendly” as a chief  
b enef it solely due to its “natural f eeling” and that it “does not req uire b ehavioural changes;”  [ 15] 
expands on this argument b y saying that “speech is a natural signal to produce that is not considered 
threatening b y users to provide.  In many applications speech may b e the main (or only, e.g. telephone 
transactions) modality, so users do not consider providing a speech sample f or authentication as a 
separate or intrusive step.”   
The ab ove ob servations can b e evidenced b y a study [ 19], the results of  which can b e seen in 
Figure 1.23.  The study f ound that while the acceptance rate of  b iometrics was increasing (69%  at the 
time of  the study) voice recognition had one of  the highest acceptance rates (84% ).  The primary 
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reason that the study f ound f or the acceptance of  voice b iometrics was convenience f ollowed b y f aster 
transactions and increased security.   
 
Fi g u r e 1.23 - A c c ep t abi li t y  o f  B i o m et r i c  Ty p es [ 19]  
An additional b enef it to voice b iometrics is that it is cost-ef f ective to implement.  Unlik e other 
b iometrics types which all req uire imaging eq uipment and/ or scanners the only eq uipment req uired 
f or a user to access a system with voice access control system in place is a relatively inexpensive 
microphone.   Additionally, it is f airly simple to integrate a voice b iometric system into existing 
authentication inf rastructure. [ 18] 
A voice b iometric system is well suited f or a phone channel.  In most phone communications voice 
is in f act the only method of  exchanging inf ormation thus mak ing it only natural and in f act more 
convenient f or a user to authenticate his or herself  using their voice.  A phone b ased voice b iometric 
system: “doesn’ t req uire specializ ed client hardware; it supports mob ility; and it work s well f rom any 
phone.” [ 18] 
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1.10  C h a p t e r  S u m m a r y  
In this chapter the concept of  the Generaliz ed User Authentication Process was introduced, as well as 
the three dif f erent authentication f actors.  Additionally, three dif f erent technologies that are 
commonly used f or authentication in privacy critical systems were discussed.  In the next chapter the 
GUAP will b e examined to highlight the points of  weak ness and attack s as well as attack s and 




R eq u i rem en ts  o f  an  A u then ti c ati o n  S y s tem  
2 .1 C h a p t e r  O v e r v i e w  
As introduced in Chapter 1, User Authentication is the process of  estab lishing conf idence in user 
identities presented to an inf ormation system.  In privacy-critical systems this conf idence in user 
identities is crucial to the system’ s operation.  For instance, remote-b ank ing depends on the ab ility f or 
the b ank ’ s system to remotely authenticate a client b ef ore allowing them to access their account; 
otherwise anyone could access and mak e changes to any of  the accounts at that b ank .   
In addition to privacy and access control user authentication is important f or non-repudiation in 
privacy-critical systems.  For example, in remote b ank ing the b ank  needs to b e ab le to prove that it 
was indeed their client that remotely transf erred the contents of  their account to a dif f erent b ank  
account, otherwise, their client could actually do that and then claim they did not and if  the b ank  is 
unab le to provide a means of  non-repudiation they would b e held responsib le f or the missing f unds.   
In the previous chapter the concept b ehind user authentication and the entities involved were 
introduced, the f actors involved explained, and the general process def ined.  This chapter f irst 
explores the weak nesses in the three dif f erent authentication f actors b ef ore f urther exploring the 
GUAP, highlighting its weak nesses, and def ining attack s on the process. Af ter exploring and 
categoriz ing the attack s an understanding of  what is req uired f or a privacy-critical system to have 
conf idence in the output of  the authentication process will b e estab lished.   
2 .2  P o i n t s  o f  A t t a c k  o n  t h e  G U A P  
Figure 2.1 re-illustrates the GUAP, introduced in the previous chapter, and the f low of  data in the 
authentication process; additionally, Figure 2.1 highlights the transmission lines b etween the entities 
in the process.  This section will b egin with highlighting the attack s and weak nesses of  the 




Fi g u r e 2.1 - Tr an sm i ssi o n s i n  t h e G U A P  
2.2.1 T r a n s m i s s i o n -B a s e d  A t t a c k s  
At any point where data is in transit f rom one entity to another it is sub j ect to a Transmission-B ased 
attack .  Transmission-B ased attack s are well k nown and studied attack s on conventional security 
systems and can vary f rom b eing passive attack s, where an attack er j ust ob serves and captures data as 
it passes, to active attack s where the attack er manipulates the transmitted data in some manner.   
2 . 2 . 1 . 1  E a v e s d r o p p i n g  
Eavesdropping is a passive transmission b ased attack  where the Attack er simply listens to the 
transmission line to capture the inf ormation b eing transmitted.  If  an eavesdropping Attack er happens 
to capture important data, such as the < username, password>  pair the Attack er can masq uerade as a 
legitimate user in a sub seq uent attack . 
It should b e noted that there are many dif f erent methods availab le to an Attack er to passively 
capture the < credential, tok en>  pair, the easiest to understand b eing the one describ ed ab ove.  Other 
methods vary with the type of  authentication f actors deployed in the system, examples include: 
ob serving a user enter a password over their shoulder; installing a k eystrok e capturing device on the 
User’ s system; installing an additional card reader in f ront of  the system’ s legitimate card reader; and 
f ingerprinting a f ingerprint scanner f or residual f ingerprints. 
The threat of  an Eavesdropping attack  can b e reduced b y either eliminating the transmission 
channel or b y protecting it.   A transmission channel can b e eliminated b y incorporating the 
communicating entities into the same tamper proof  device.  The most ef f ective way of  protecting the 




2 . 2 . 1 . 2  R e p l a y  A t t a c k  
A replay attack  is a Transmission Attack  that b egins with the passive Eavesdropping attack  on the 
communication channel.  In a replay attack  the Attack er passively monitors a transmission channel, 
such as the link  b etween the User/ Claimant and the Verif ier entities and records the data as it is 
transmitted.  Later, the Attack er will “replay” the captured data, meaning that the Attack er will pose 
as the legitimate user and simply send all the captured data to the Verif ier and since the captured data 
contains legitimate credentials the Verif ier will f alsely authenticate the Attack er.  
A very common and successf ul method of  preventing a replay attack  is to incorporate the current 
time into the inf ormation sub mitted to the Verif ier; this method is k nown as “time-stamping.”  It is 
important to note that in order f or time-stamping to b e ef f ective the time must b e incorporated in such 
a way that an Attack er cannot capture the data as b ef ore, modif y the time f ield, and replay the data.  
To prevent the Attack er f rom modif ying the time f ield time-stamping of ten involves the time and 
credentials b eing hashed together and/ or encrypted b ef ore transmission.   
An additional prob lem with time-stamping is clock  synchroniz ation b etween the End Device and 
the Verif ier.   Very of ten the internal clock s within the two entities are not synchroniz ed resulting in 
legitimate timestamps created b y end devices that do not match the current time within the Verif ier. 
As a result the Verif ier implements a window that def ines acceptab le variation b etween the sub mitted 
timestamp and its own clock .  If  the window is designed to b e too large an attack er with k nowledge of  
the window siz e could b e ab le to perf orm the necessary processing inside the window to successf ully 
perf orm a replay attack ; on the other hand if  the window is too small legitimate users may b e unab le 
to pass authentication.      
2 . 2 . 1 . 3  S e s s i o n  H i j a c k i n g  
Session Hij ack ing “is intercepting and carrying on a session b egun b y another entity.” [ 11]  In this 
attack , the Attack er waits until af ter two entities have entered into a session and then intercepts the 
traf f ic and continues to carry on the session masq uerading as the other entity. 
A prime example of  session hij ack ing is an Attack er will wait until af ter the Claimant sub mits his 
or her < credential, tok en>  pair to the Verif ier and intercept the response f rom the Verif ier.  At this 
point the Attack er can enter into a session with the Relaying Party, masq uerading as an authenticated 
user of  the system.   
Methods to reduce the threat of  a Session Hij ack ing Attack  are discussed in section 2.2.1.4. 
2 . 2 . 1 . 4  M a n -i n -t h e -M i d d l e  A t t a c k  
Another f orm of  a hij ack ing attack  is ref erred to as the Man-in-the-Middle Attack .  In this situation, 
similar to the previously describ ed Session Hij ack ing, the Attack er positions themselves in the middle 
b etween the communicating entities in a protocol.  However, in the Man-in-the-Middle Attack  the 
Attack er intercepts all transmissions b etween the entities, generating and f orwarding their own 
responses to each entity.  
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There are several technologies that can b e implemented to reduce the risk  of  a Man-in-the-Middle 
Attack .  The f irst, and perhaps most ef f ective, is to incorporate all components into a single tamper-
proof  device thus eliminating the vulnerab ility of  data in transmission.  This f irst method however is 
not always possib le.  
In situations where it is inf easib le to incorporate the components into one device and a data 
transmission is necessary the data should b e transf erred over a secure and mutually authenticated 
channel.  Meaning that when the two entities involved in the data transmission estab lish the 
connection they mutually authenticate each other through the use of  pub lic-k ey certif icates and a 
challenge response mechanism.  Additionally, af ter mutually authenticating each other the two 
entities agree upon a shared secret session k ey to encrypt the data with b ef ore transmission.   Having 
every entity involved in the session authenticate each other, estab lish a shared secret k ey and 
encrypting the data is an ef f ective way of  reducing the threat of  b oth passive and active transmission 
b ased attack s.     
2.2.2 V e r i f i e r  I m p e r s o n a t i o n  
A Verif ier Impersonation attack  is one where the Attack er f raudulently acts as the Verif ier and a 
legitimate User of  the system b elieving they are communicating with the actual Verif ier voluntarily 
provides their < credential, tok en>  pair to the f raudulent Verif ier.  The Attack er can then sub mit the 
< credential, tok en>  pair to the actual Verif ier to b e f alsely authenticated. Verif ier Impersonation 
attack s generally f all into two categories: Phishing and Pharming.  
In a Phishing Attack  the Attack er generally sends an of f icial look ing email to a user that identif ies 
the Attack er as the Verif ier.  The email of ten highlights some made up prob lem with the User’ s 
account and ask s them to log in to f ix the prob lem; the email will then contain a link  to a f raudulent 
web page that resemb les the authentic Verif ier and the User will authenticate themselves to the 
f raudulent Verif ier using their authentic < credential, tok en>  pair.  Of ten at this point the f raudulent 
Verif ier will return a server error to the User ask ing them to return later, and the User will continue 
ab out their day unaware that they have mistak enly given out their < credential, tok en>  pair.   
In a Pharming Attack  the Attack er creates a f raudulent Verif ier, much lik e he did in the Phishing 
Attack , only instead of  sending emails to users he attempts to redirect users intending to go to the 
authentic Verif ier to his f raudulent one.  The most common ways of  causing this redirection is b y 
corrupting the Domain N ame Service (DN S) through a techniq ue called DN S poisoning or b y 
corrupting the User’ s local routing tab les.  Once the User has b een redirected to the f raudulent site the 
User, b elieving they are at the authentic Verif ier, will b egin the authentication process b y providing 
their < credential, tok en>  pair to the f raudulent Verif ier.   
The most common way of  preventing Verif ier Impersonation is to incorporate a two-way 
authentication mechanism into the authentication process.  In this two-way authentication mechanism 
b ef ore supplying their < credential, tok en>  pair the User ensures that they are indeed communicating 
with an authentic Verif ier.  On the web  this is of ten done through the use of  Pub lic-Key certif icates.   
In some systems, such as telephone b ank ing, the User is unab le to ensure they are talk ing to the 
authentic Verif ier without providing some inf ormation f irst.  A techniq ue that is sometimes used in 
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this situation is f or the User to provide only the credential portion of  the < credential, tok en>  pair to 
the system, the system will respond with the time the User was last authenticated and the User will 
choose whether or not to proceed b ased on the correctness of  that inf ormation.  W hile not ideal, this 
approach does provide some means of  protection f rom Verif ier Impersonation attack s to the User, 
however, the method is not widely deployed and in many systems it is up to the User to ensure that 
they have f or instance dialled the correct numb er and are connecting to the correct Verif ier without 
any assistance f rom the Verif ier.   
2.2.3  A t t a c k s  o n  t h e  E n d  D e v i c e s  
An attack  on an End Device is an attempt to exploit a weak ness in the manuf acture of  the physical 
device that reads the < credential, tok en>  pair f rom the Claimant.  Usually these attack s f ocus on the 
Attack er attempting to capture the < credential, tok en>  pair as it is inputted b y the User.  Examples 
include:  
• an over-the-shoulder attack , where the Attack er watches the User input their < username, 
password>  comb ination 
• installing a k eystrok e logger  to capture any inputted < credential, tok en>  pairs 
• installing a phony card reader on top of  a legitimate card reader 
• dusting a f ingerprint scanner f or residual f ingerprints 
The b est way to reduce the threat of  End Device Attack s is to b uild the components that accept 
inputs into a tamper-proof  device.  Additionally, they should b e constructed in such a way that 
inputted < credential, tok en>  pairs are not visib le to, or ob tainab le, outside of  the device without the 
exclusive permission of  the device.   
2.2.4  A t t a c k s  o n  t h e  D a t a  P r o c e s s i n g  U n i t  
The Data Processing Unit is where user inputted < credential, tok en>  pairs are processed into a f ormat 
that can b e understood b y the Verif ier.  An attack  at this point consists of  the Attack er gaining access 
to the DPU and simulating the data b eing sub mitted to the Verif ier. 
  This type of  attack , k nown as a Data Simulation attack , is very applicab le to b iometric 
authentication.   In the case of  b iometrics the attack  is made possib le b ecause b iometric f eatures are 
not secret and an Attack er can f or example simulate a legitimate user’ s physical signature or mimic 
their voice to attack  a system.  A Data simulation attack  is more lik ely to b e successf ul on 
authentication systems that rely on b ehavioural characteristics, such as signature verif ication, than 
physiological characteristics, such as a f ingerprint, due to the complexity of  simulating a 
physiological trait.    
The success of  a Data Simulation attack  relies on the ab ility of  the Attack er to inj ect their simulated 
data into the DPU.  Preventing the Attack er f rom inj ecting their simulated data can b e accomplished 
moving the DPU onto the same device that the End Device is located on.   
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2.2.5  R e g i s t r a t i o n  A u t h o r i t y  A t t a c k s  
An attack  on the Registration Authority entity is an attempt to exploit a weak ness in the RA that will 
allow an Attack er to create a user account with suf f icient privileges to pass through access controls to 
accomplish their ob j ectives.  In attack s discussed thus f ar an Attack er was attempting to gain enough 
inf ormation to pass authentication as a previously registered user, even attack s at the transmission 
points into and out of  the RA can accomplish this, however the RA attack  is an attempt to create a 
user that shouldn’ t b e created.   
RA attack s can b e something along the lines of  the Attack er connecting remotely to the RA and 
creating an account with privileges that allows it to pass through all access controls.  Another 
example, in a physically operated RA, the Attack er f orcing an Agent of  the system to create an 
account, or the Attack er may even b e an Agent and creates a f raudulent account to allow them to 
mount attack s at a later time.   
To prevent an Attack er f rom connecting to the RA and creating an account on their own the RA 
should not have the ab ility to have remote connections made to it, except through the input f rom the 
device registering a user and the internal account creation tools.   It is dif f icult to prevent the 
discussed insider attack  since it is necessary that the system trust its Agents, the most successf ul way 
of  reducing the threat of  insider attack s on the RA is req uiring multiple Agents to create a single 
account.   
2.2.6 C r e d e n t i a l  S e r v i c e  P r o v i d e r  A t t a c k s  
 An attack  on the CSP is an attempt to capture the any portion of  the datab ase of  < credential, 
tok en>  pairs, allowing the Attack er to later sub mit the stolen pairs to an End Device and b e f alsely 
authenticated.  The success of  this attack  hinges on an Attack er b eing ab le to gain access to the CSP 
and then once having gained access b eing ab le to retrieve and decipher the contents of  the datab ase. 
The success of  an Attack er b eing ab le to use a < credential, tok en>  pair f rom the captured datab ase 
depends on the authentication f actors deployed in creating the tok en.  For instance, in the case of  
voice b iometric authentication the tok en in the datab ase is a voice template and creating a suitab le 
voice sample to sub mit to the Verif ier f rom the template req uires a great deal of  computing resources 
as well as specif ic k nowledge ab out the voice verif ication system.  However, in the case of  the tok en 
b eing a password the Attack er can very easily sub mit a captured < credential, tok en>  pair.  
  An attack  on the CSP can b e thwarted b y eliminating the ab ility of  remote connections to the CSP 
f rom b eing.  The CSP can still maintain its f unctionality of  responding to q ueries f rom the Verif ier b y 
presenting an interf ace that f irst estab lishes a mutually authenticated connection with the Verif ier and 
then accepts a req uest f or a single set of  credentials b ut does not allow a remote connection to access 
the entire datab ase.  To improve security even f urther it is recommended that the Verif ier and CSP are 
incorporated into the same tamper-proof  device, ensuring that none of  the < credential, tok en>  pairs 
are availab le outside of  the two entities that use them.   
Enrolment and modif ications of  users in the CSP can b e accomplished b y the administrators b y 
only allowing connections to the CSP through terminals connected only to the CSP.  This will reduce 
the threat of  an Attack er b eing ab le to remotely access the CSP and the datab ase.   
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Encrypting the datab ase is recommended to reduce the threat of  an attack  in the case that an 
Attack er is ab le to ob tain access to and copy the datab ase.  It is important to note that in some cases 
encryption of  the < credential, tok en>  pairs datab ase does not necessarily mean an Attack er must 
b reak  the encryption to ob tain a valid pair if  he or she has a copy of  the encrypted datab ase; 
particularly if  the tok en b eing used is a secret password: if  the Attack er k nows the type of  encryption 
he or she can guess passwords and encrypt them until a match in the datab ase is f ound.  
2.2.7  V e r i f i e r  A t t a c k s  
A successf ul attack  on the Verif ier entity involves the Attack er gaining access to the matching or 
decision mak ing devices inside the Verif ier.  Once the Attack er has inside access to the entity he or 
she may record all authentication sessions in an attempt to capture < credential, tok en>  pairs and 
matching scores.  An Attack er may even inj ect an artif icial match into the device allowing the 
Attack er to pass through the device to the decision mechanism which accepts the artif icial match and 
f alsely authenticates the Attack er as a legitimate user. 
Preventing a successf ul attack  on the Verif ier is similar to preventing a successf ul attack  on the 
CSP in that the Verif ier should b e constructed in such a way that an Attack er can not estab lish a 
connection with the entity and inj ect an artif icial matching score or ob tain inf ormation f rom the 
Verif ier other than an authentication pass or f ail response.   
2 .3 T o k e n  a n d  A u t h e n t i c a t i o n  F a c t o r  W e a k n e s s e s  
In addition to the attack s against the GUAP explored in the previous section attack s against the 
authentication tok en itself  are also possib le.  In the previous chapter it was explained that during the 
Enrolment Phase the User receives a < credential, tok en>  pair that is later sub mitted f or verif ication 
during the Authentication Phase and that the req uirement f or the secrecy and/ or uniq ueness of  the 
tok en led to the recognition of  the three dif f erent authentication f actors: something you k now, 
something you have and something you are.   
If  an Attack er can gain control of  a tok en he or she may b e ab le to masq uerade as and b e f alsely 
authenticated as the owner of  the tok en.  The attack s and threat to the tok en are dependent on the 
types of  authentication f actors that comprise the tok en.  Assuming that the owner of  the tok en is not 
colluding with the attack er, Tab le 2.1 lists the threats to the tok ens used in user authentication along 








Table 2.1 - To k en  Th r eat s [ 10 ]  
T oken T h rea t s  /  
A t t a c ks  
D es c ri p t i on Ex a m p les  
Thef t A tok en with a physical manif estation is 
stolen b y an Attack er 
• Hardware cryptographic device 
stolen 
• One-time password device stolen 
• Look up tok en stolen 
• Cell phone stolen 
Duplication The Sub scrib er’ s tok en has b een copied 
with or without his or her k nowledge 
• Passwords written on paper 
disclosed 
• Passwords stored in electronic f ile 
copied 
• Sof tware PKI tok en (private k ey) 
copied 
• Look up tok en copied 
Eavesdropping The tok en secret or authenticator is 
revealed to the Attack er as the 
Sub scrib er is sub mitting the tok en to 
send over the network  
• Shoulder surf ing of  passwords 
• Keystrok e logging on k eyb oard 
• PIN  captured f rom PIN  pad device 
• Fingerprint data captured f rom 
reader 
Of f line Crack ing The tok en is exposed using analytical 
methods outside the authentication 
mechanism 
• Dif f erential power analysis on 
• Stolen hardware cryptographic 
tok en 
• Sof tware PKI tok en is sub j ected to 
dictionary attack  to identif y 
correct PIN  to use the private k ey 
within tok en 
Phishing or 
Pharming 
The tok en secret or authenticator is 
captured b y f ooling the Sub scrib er into 
think ing the Attack er is a Verif ier or 
Relying Party 
• Password revealed b y Sub scrib er 
to web site impersonating as the 
Verif ier 
• Password revealed b y b ank  
Sub scrib er in response to an email 
inq uiry f rom a Phisher pretending 
to represent the b ank  
• Password revealed b y Sub scrib er 
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at a b ogus Verif ier web site 
reached through DN S re-routing 
Social 
Engineering 
The Attack er estab lishes a level of  trust 
with a Sub scrib er in order to convince 
the Sub scrib er to reveal his or her tok en 
or tok en secret 
• Tok en revealed b y Sub scrib er to 
of f icemate ask ing f or password on 
b ehalf  of  B oss 
• Tok en revealed b y Sub scrib er in 
telephone inq uiry f rom 
masq uerading system 
administrator 
Online guessing The Attack er connects to the Verif ier 
online and attempts to guess a valid 
tok en authenticator in the context of  
that Verif ier 
 
• Online dictionary attack s to guess 
passwords 
• Forging Claimant' s handwriting 
b ased on stolen handwriting 
sample 
• Online guessing of  secret tok en 
registered to legitimate Claimant 
 
It can b e ob served in Tab le 2.1 that the most common threat to the “something you k now” and 
“something you have” authentication f actors are the thef t and/ or duplication of  the tok en.  This threat 
is the result of  the authentication depending on the verif ication of  the possession of  the static 
inf ormation that comprises the tok en or the possession of  the physical tok en itself .  Verif ying the only 
static attrib utes of  the tok en allows f or an attack er that can seiz e that inf ormation and sub mit it f or 
verif ication to b e f alsely authenticated as a legitimate user.  
W hile the attack s in Tab le 2.1 exploit weak nesses in the authentication f actors that comprise the 
tok en, some of  the attack s, such as Phishing and Pharming, can b e considered attack s on the entities 
or transmission lines of  the GUAP.  The remainder of  this section will examine the weak nesses of  
two of  the most commonly deployed types of  “something you k now” tok ens in privacy-critical 
systems: password or PIN -b ased tok ens and KB A.  Additionally this section will explore the 
weak nesses in b iometric authentication.     
 
2.3 .1 P a s s w o r d  a n d  P I N  W e a k n e s s e s  
The security concept b ehind a password is that the password is considered to b e a random string of  
characters. For instance if  a password is a random string of  characters f rom the set of  94 printab le 
ASCII characters (space is not included), than the set of  all possib le passwords is calculated b y the 
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W h er e n  an d  m  ar e t h e m i n i m u m  an d  m ax i m u m  allo w ed  p assw o r d  len g t h  r esp ec t i v ely . 
For example in a system that req uires a password to b e b etween the lengths of  six and eight 
characters than the set of  all possib le passwords is: 
52876 2949494 ≈++  
However, several dif f erent studies into password security over the last thirty years of  computing 
history have f ound that the assumption that a password is a random string of  characters is simply not 
true as users tend to f ind it dif f icult to rememb er random strings such as t^ 4 M$ z qg and are more 
lik ely to use easy to rememb er passwords such as cat.  Tab le 2.2 and Tab le 2.3 summariz e results 
f rom two such studies that measured the statistics of  what composes user selected passwords.  The 
f irst study [ 20] f ound that a dictionary attack , which took  f ive minutes to complete, produced ab out 
one third of  the passwords, while the second study [ 21] f ound that approximately 20%  of  the 
passwords were f ound using simple dictionary and wordlist attack s.  
Table 2.2 - D i st r i bu t i o n  o f  P assw o r d s [ 20 ]  
C h a ra c t ers  C ou nt  Perc ent  
W ere a single ASCII character 15 0.5 
W ere strings of  two ASCII characters 72 2 
W ere strings of  three ASCII characters 464 14 
W ere strings of  f our alphanumeric characters 477 14 
W ere f ive letters, all upper-case or all lower-case 706 21 
W ere six letters, all lower-case 605 18 
W ere in dictionaries or word lists 492 15 










Table 2.3 – C h ar ac t er  D i st r i bu t i o n s [ 21]  
C h a ra c t ers  C ou nt  Perc ent a g e 
Lower-case only 3988 28.9%  
Mixed case 5259 38.1%  
Some upper-case 5641 40.9%  
Digits 4372 31.7%  
Meta-characters 24 0.2%  
Control characters 188 1.4%  
Space and/ or tab  566 4.1%  
.,; 837 6.1%  
-_ =+  222 1.6%  
! # $ % ^ & * () 654 4.7%  
Other non-alphanumeric 229 1.7%  
 
Some studies have even b een ab le to develop common password lists and these lists are availab le 
f or download on the internet.  It has b een reported, f or instance, that the f our most common 
passwords are Go d, s ex, lo v e, and mo ney. [ 11] Sometimes users don’ t even change their password 
f rom the def ault one provided b y the system.   
The weak nesses in a user selected passwords has led to the creation of  the steps that an Attack er 
might perf orm to derive a password: 
1. no password 
2. the same as the User ID 
3. is, or is derived f rom, the User’ s name 
4. common word list (f or example “password,” “secret,” “private”) plus common names and 
patterns (f or example, “asdf g,” “aaaaaa”) 
5. short college dictionary 
6. complete English word list 
7. common non-English language dictionaries 
8. short college dictionary with capitaliz ations (PaSsW orD) and sub stitutions (0 f or O, and so 
f orth) 
9. complete English with capitaliz ations and sub stitutions 
10. common non-English dictionaries with capitaliz ations and sub stitutions 
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11. b rute f orce, lowercase alphab etic characters 
12. b rute f orce, f ull character set 
W hile the last step will always succeed, the steps preceding it are so time consuming that they will 
deter all b ut the dedicated Attack er.  [ 11] 
To prevent some of  these attack s some password b ased authentication systems have introduced 
rules to limit user selected choices f or their passwords.  These rules are generally b rok en into two 
categories: 
1. D i c t i ona ry  ru les : The system maintains word lists that the User selected password is 
compared against, and if  the selected password is in the list it is not allowed. 
2. C om p os i t i on ru les : Req uire the Users to select passwords that include some comb ination 
of  lowercase and uppercase letters, symb ols, and numb ers.  
N IST uses password entropy has a way to measure the security of  passwords in their authentication 
guidelines. [ 10]  Figure 2.2 summariz es their estimates of  b its of  entropy in a password of  a given 
length, f ull estimated password guessing entropy can b e seen in Appendix A.  
 
Fi g u r e 2.2- E st i m at ed  U ser  S elec t ed  P assw o r d  E n t r o p y  v s. L en g t h  [ 10 ]  
In addition to guessing a password there are other ways the password may b e disclosed to an 
Attack er.  Other common attack s include: 
• Social engineering – the User is somehow trick ed into divulging a password to the Attack er 
• Purposef ul discloser – this is a sub set of  social engineering where the User voluntarily gives the 
password to an acq uaintance to accomplish some task , allowing the acq uaintance complete access 
to the User’ s account  
• W ritten down – Users af raid of  f orgetting their passwords will of ten write them down and leave 
them in an easily accessib le location 
• CSP attack  – the Attack er may ob tain the Username and password list f rom the CSP 
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• Password reuse – Users will of ten use the same passwords in multiple systems, meaning that an 
Attack er may only have to ob tain the password f or a person’ s home computer or web mail account 
to guess the password to their b ank  account.  
2.3 .2 K B A  W e a k n e s s e s  
Since KB A authenticates a claimant b ased on the correctness of  their answers to q uestions ab out the 
lif e of  the claimed identity the authentication is b ased on the claimant’ s k nowledge of  those f acts and 
not the claimant.  Thus KB A is considered to b e a f orm of  “something you k now” authentication.  
However, unlik e other authentication f actors of  this type, the inf ormation is not secret.  
KB A tends to f ocus itself  around f acts ab out the personal lif e of  an individual.  However, 
sometimes the q uestions used in KB A are not necessarily “f acts.”  Examples of  such q uestions 
include q uestions such as: 
• W hat is your f avourite colour? 
• W hat is your f avourite drink ? 
• W ho is your b est f riend? 
At the time of  enrolment when these q uestions are f irst posed to the individual the individual provides 
an answer that may b e true at the time.  Since the answers to these types of  q uestions are not 
necessarily f acts and the answers may vary over time during the Authentication Phase a legitimate 
user may not k now the answer provided during enrolment leading to the legitimate user b eing f alsely 
rej ected. 
An interesting weak ness in KB A is that it is time consuming, b oth during the enrolment phase and 
the authentication phase.  This time consuming nature of  KB A can cause users to z ero out and not 
think  ab out their answers to the q uestions.   If  there are too many q uestions in the enrolment phase a 
user may provide silly or untrue answers j ust to f inish enrolment and this can lead to the User’ s 
inab ility to correctly answer the same q uestions during the authentication phase.  The same is true 
during the authentication phase the User may f ind the numb er of  q uestions ridiculous and b e 
f rustrated with the system and provide answers without think ing ab out them leading to a f alse 
rej ection.   
The responses to the q uestion in KB A are of ten not secret.  A numb er of  these q uestions can b e 
considered “out-of -wallet” q uestions where the correct responses can b e f ound in a legitimate user’ s 
wallet or k nown b y someone with some f amiliarity with the user.  A determined attack er can 
conceivab ly with some ef f ort ob tain all the inf ormation necessary to successf ully pass authentication.  
This data-mi ni ng attack is possib le through the non-secrecy of  the inf ormation used in KB A, the 
attack er can ob tain this inf ormation through various f orms of  social engineering with the user 
themselves or through the user’ s f riends and f amily (the attack er may even b e a f riend or f amily 
memb er); examining pub lic records of  the user such as b irth certif icates, driver licenses, credit 
history; and b y intercepting and examining the User’ s mail b oth electronic and physical.   
Since the inf ormation used b y KB A is not secret it is important that the inf ormation can not b e 
f ound b y an Attack er in a single place: such as look ing in a user’ s wallet or b y eavesdropping on an 
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un-encrypted KB A session.  However, since the same inf ormation may b e used in KB A systems at 
multiple dif f erent service providers such as an individual’ s b ank , health services provider, phone and 
utility providers as well as various online services and retailers, there is an ab undance of  places where 
all the inf ormation req uired to successf ully impersonate a user resides.  W ith these multiple 
inf ormation repositories in existence an attack er has an ever increasing numb er of  opportunities to 
gain access to that inf ormation allowing an attack er to possib ly seiz e that inf ormation f rom one 
service provider and impersonate a user not only at that service b ut at a dif f erent service.  
Of ten, f or example in telephone b ank ing, KB A is perf ormed b y an Agent of  the service provider.  
The Agent will receive the Claimant’ s identity and q uery the verif ication system f or a set of  q uestions 
to ask  the Claimant.  The Agent could possib ly record the q uestions and the correct responses and 
either provide that inf ormation to an Attack er or act as an Attack er.  
A criticism of  KB A is that it can alienate certain individuals.  Of ten a KB A system will have a set 
list of  q uestions that an enrolling user must provide responses f or, however, sometimes due to the lif e 
experiences of  the User they may b e unab le to provide suitab le answers f or example an individual 
who moved f req uently as a child could not provide a suitab le answer to the q uestion “what street did 
you grow up on.”   
Lik e in all systems that use “something you k now” authentication, the answers to the q uestions can 
b e guessed.  The ab ility of  an Attack er to successf ully guess an answer depends on who the Attack er 
is and their relationship with the User and what the q uestion is (i.e. how personal the inf ormation is to 
the User).   Santosh Chok hani [ 22] f ormulated a measure f or the “Guessab ility of  KB A”, seen in 
Appendix B . 
2.3 .3  B i o m e t r i c  W e a k n e s s e s  
Ideally, a b iometric is measurab le, uniq ue to an individual, doesn’ t change over time and not easily 
duplicated or f orged; however, it is possib le to exploit weak nesses in the collection and processing 
methodologies implemented in the system to successf ully attack  the system.  For example, recent 
research has shown that it is not very dif f icult to steal a b iometric trait, create its copy and use the 
f ak e trait to attack  b iometric systems, particularly f ingerprint b iometrics.  [ 22] 
Lik e tok ens employing either of  the other authentication f actors a tok en employing b iometric 
authentication is susceptib le to attack s at any point in the authentication process.  Figure 2.3 
illustrates a typical b iometric authentication process and the common attack s at the entities and 




Fi g u r e 2.3 - A t t ac k s o n  B i o m et r i c  A u t h en t i c at i o n  
Many of  the attack s highlighted in Figure 2.3 are attack s on the authentication process rather than 
an attack  specif ic to the b iometric and were discussed in the previous section.  However, some of  
these previously discussed attack s may b e more severe or have longer lasting ef f ects when applied to 
b iometric-b ased tok ens.  
Of  particular interest is the Template Attack , where an Attack er manages to steal the b iometric 
templates: once an individual’ s b iometric template is stolen the individual will f orever lose the use of  
that b iometric.  Additionally a stolen b iometric template can b e used to reverse engineer the system to 
create synthetic b iometric samples to use during the authentication phase.  W hile the threats to a 
b iometric CSP has a longer lasting ef f ect than to a CSP in a password-b ased system, the attack s, 
threats and protection methods remain the same. 
Of  the attack s illustrated in Figure 2.3 a Spoof  Attack  is of  particular interest in b iometric-b ased 
authentication since it is a special attack  on the b iometric authenticator.  Since b iometrics are not 
secret they can not b e protected lik e passwords or smartcards and since people can leave a b iometric 
trail without k nowing it and that inf ormation can b e captured, copied and f orged. [ 22]  A b iometric 
spoof  attack  occurs in two stages: “f irst, capturing the b iometric sample b elonging to the enrolled user 
and then creating a copy of  the captured sample b y means of  an artef act.” [ 22] 
For example, in order to spoof  attack  a voice authentication system an attack er must ob tain a copy 
of  a user’ s voiceprint.  This voiceprint can b e ob tained through social engineering f airly easily: an 
example presented in [ 22] is of  a user receiving a phone call inf orming them of  technical dif f iculties 
and then b eing ask ed to read some phrases, numb ers and words several times and thus allowing the 
attack er to successf ully capture a voiceprint without the user’ s k nowledge.       
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It is, however, “f airly dif f icult to def eat a good commercial speak er-verif ication system with a 
recording.  The voice signal input into a microphone or telephone held close to the speak er’ s mouth 
dif f ers mark edly f rom a signal captured even as close as a f oot away f rom the speak er.  Moreover, 
many commercial speak er-verif ication systems look  f or telltale auditory signals, distortions, exact 
matches, and other indications that a recording has b een used. As a result, creating a recording that 
can f ool these systems is a dif f icult and costly challenge.” [ 17] 
A common approach to prevent spoof ing in a b iometric system is to incorporate a method k nown 
as liveness detection.  In liveness detection the system attempts to detect whether the sample is b eing 
provided b y a live human b y check ing the physical properties of  the live b iometric.  In the case of  
voice examples of  liveness detection include using a text-dependent system that randomly selects 
what text the User is to speak  and verif ying that the correct phrase was spok en and measuring the 
f low, pitch and timb re of  the phrase as well as statistically analyz ing the voice sample to detect if  it 
had b een digitally altered or pre-recorded.   
A recent United State patent [ 24] describ es a method of  conversational data mining.  This method 
is ab le to extract uniq ue acoustic f eatures of  a speech wavef orm and correlate the f eatures to attrib utes 
such as “gender, age, accent, native language, dialect, social economic classif ication, educational 
level and emotional state.” [ 24]  W hile the original intended use of  this voice system was f or data 
mining to support b usiness logic the ab ilities of  this system can b e used to support liveness detection 
and spoof ing resistance.  This system demonstrates the ab ility of  a computeriz ed system to uniq uely 
identif y k ey attrib utes of  a user’ s voice and even their current emotional state demonstrating the 
ab ility of  a voice b iometric system to successf ully identif y and resist spoof  attack s.   
Voice b iometric systems, which have dif f erent modes of  operation, text-dependent, text-prompting 
and text-independent, can add or sub tract f rom the general level of  conf idence in the authentication. A 
text-dependent voice authentication application “is more or less lik e two f actor authentication, which 
adds an extra layer of  security to the system.” [ 22] Text-prompting is similar to text-dependent and 
adds the extra layer of  security b y creating a challenge-response mechanism, which is a f orm of  
liveness detection.  Text-independent applications, however, b y allowing the User to choose to say 
any word or phrase to authenticate themselves have decreased system security f or the higher user 
convenience.   
A text-dependent voice b iometric system, where the user has speak s a password to the system or a 
text-prompted system that uses KB A f actoids f or the prompts is a two-f actor authentication system 
employing b oth “something you are” (voice b iometric) and “something  you k now” (password, KB A) 
authentication f actors.  Such text-dependent systems also incorporate b oth static and dynamic 
authentication attrib utes: static attrib utes such as the spok en text (password, KB A responses) and 
dynamic attrib utes such as the way it is b eing spok en (f low, pitch, timb re, emotional state).  Such a 
system can ensure that the data sub mitted in any two authentication sessions will ever b e exactly the 
same.   
Another method of  preventing spoof ing in a b iometric system is multi-modal b iometric f usion.  
Multi-modal b iometric f usion involves comb ining multiple mono-modal b iometric systems; the 
example seen in Figure 2.4 comb ines a voice b iometric with f ace recognition.  In Figure 2.4 the 
b iometrics are associated together b y using lip movement as a visual speech f eature.  “Research into 
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the f usion of  visual and thermal f ace imageries has shown that the comb ination of  thermal IR image 
data with correlation f ilters has improved the perf ormance of  f ace recognition techniq ues.” [ 22]  The 
comb ination of  two b iometrics can mak e it more dif f icult f or a spoof ing attack  to b e successf ul 
b ecause the (in the example) relationship b etween speech and lip movement is b eing monitored. 
 
 
Fi g u r e 2.4 - M u lt i -m o d al bi o m et r i c  sy st em  [ 22]  
If  the two (or more) b iometrics used in multi-modal b iometric f usion are independent, f or example 
voice and f ingerprint, each f actor can b e tried independently and thus mak e the system “more or less 
lik e a two-f actor authentication such as password and b iometrics.” [ 22] and sensor f usion cannot b e 
perf ormed. 
 
2 .4  A u t h e n t i c a t i o n  R e q u i r e m e n t s  
The previous section explored weak nesses and attack s in the authentication process and how the main 
ob j ective of  estab lishing conf idence in a user’ s identity can b e def eated.  This section will estab lish 
resistance req uirements to these attack s and threats to estab lish measures of  conf idence in the 
resulting authentication.   
The United States Of f ice of  Management and B udget (OMB ) issued a memorandum [ 25] to all 
government agencies that containing E-Authentication Guidance f or Federal Agencies.  The OMB  E-
Authentication Guidance, applying to remote authentication of  human users, sought to help agencies 
to “identif y and analyz e the risk s associated with each step of  the authentication process” as well as 
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estab lishing f our identity authentication assurance levels f or e-government transactions.  The f our 
estab lished assurance levels, which were def ined in terms of  the conseq uences of  the authentication 
errors and misuse of  credentials, are:  
• L ev el 1 : Little or no conf idence in the asserted identity’ s validity. 
• L ev el 2 : Some conf idence in the asserted identity’ s validity.  
• L ev el 3 : High conf idence in the asserted identity’ s validity. 
• L ev el 4 : Very high conf idence in the asserted identity’ s validity.  
N IST in a special pub lication entitled Electronic Authentication Guidance [ 10] provides “technical 
guidelines to agencies f or the implementation of  electronic authentication,” as presented in the OMB  
E-Authentication Guidance.  Tab le 2.4 contains the threat resistance guidelines contained in the N IST 
special pub lication describ ing what threats the authentication protocol must b e resistant to in order to 
ob tain a certain assurance level.  Tab le 2.5 is a tab le summariz ing the N IST req uirements f or what 
tok en types can b e used to ob tain a certain assurance level.   
Table 2.4 - A u t h en t i c at i o n  P r o t o c o l Th r eat  R esi st an c e p er  A ssu r an c e L ev el [ 10 ]  
T h rea t  R es i s t a nc e R eq u i rem ent  A u t h ent i c a t i on Proc es s  
A t t a c ks / T h rea t s  L ev el 1  L ev el 2  L ev el 3  L ev el 4  
Online Guessing Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Replay Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Session Hij ack ing N o Yes Yes Yes 
Phishing/ Pharming  
(Verif ier Impersonation) 
N o N o Yes Yes 
Man in the Middle N o W eak  W eak  Strong 
Denial of  Service/ Flooding N o N o N o N o 
 
Table 2.5 - To k en  Ty p e by  A ssu r an c e L ev el [ 10 ]  
A s s u ra nc e L ev el T oken T y p e 
L ev el 1  L ev el 2  L ev el 3  L ev el 4  
Hard Cryptographic Tok en Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sof t Cryptographic Tok en Yes Yes Yes  
Z ero Knowledge Password Yes Yes Yes  
One-time Password Device Yes Yes Yes  
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Strong Password Yes Yes   
PIN  Yes    
 
It can b e ob served in Tab le 2.4 and Tab le 2.5 that f or Level 4 authentication, the highest assurance 
level, that the authentication protocol is resistant to all the attack s discussed previously and that a hard 
cryptographic tok en is req uired.  To achieve Level 1 authentication, the lowest assurance level, the 
minimum req uirements is resistance to Online Guessing and Replay attack s and that a password or 
PIN  may b e used as a tok en.   
N IST [ 10] sought to identif y the req uirements of  an authentication protocol to meet user-identity 
assurance levels req uired f or certain government systems; the assurance levels were predetermined 
b ased on the conseq uences of  authentication errors.  Using this inf ormation and the previously 
presented inf ormation regarding the GUAP and its weak nesses as well as the weak nesses of  Tok ens 
and authentication f actors this section will estab lish measures on the conf idence level in an 
authentication system.   
2.4 .1 A u t h e n t i c a t i o n  C o n f i d e n c e  
The goal of  an authentication system is to “estab lish conf idence in the user identities presented to an 
inf ormation system.” [ 10]  The GUAP is the process that is used to accomplish this goal; however, it 
has many weak nesses and points of  attack , b oth on the process itself  and the f actors used in 
verif ication.  Theref ore, f or an authentication system to b e conf ident in its authentication of  a user’ s 
identity it must b e conf ident in its own operation.   
The entities and transmission lines in the GUAP can b e divided into two sections: those within the 
immediate control of  the authentication system and those outside of  that control.  For example the 
Verif ier, CSP, RA and their communications are always inside the control of  the authentication 
system and the User/ Claimant entity is always outside its control.  In some situations the End Devices 
are inside the control of  the system, such as when all the entities except the Claimant are in a single 
tamper-proof  device, such as a retinal scanner attached to a saf e door.  In remote authentication, the 
End Devices are outside the control of  the system, such as the k eyb oard, or even a f ingerprint reader, 
on the User/ Claimant’ s personal computer, or perhaps the User/ Claimant’ s personal telephone.  Most 
commonly, in remote authentication systems, the points outside the direct control of  the 
authentication system are to the lef t of  the Verif ier and RA entities in Figure 2.1; this includes the 
End Devices, the transmission f rom the End Devices to the DPU and the transmission out of  the 
DPU.  
For an authentication system to have a measure of  conf idence in its authentication of  a user’ s 
identity the authentication system must have a measure of  conf idence in the parts of  the 
authentication process inside its control as well as conf idence in the parts of  the process that it does 
not control.  Conf idence in the parts that are inside the control of  the system means that the system 
has conf idence in its ab ility to protect the authentication process f rom the discussed weak nesses and 
attack s.   Conf idence in the parts of  the process outside the control of  the system means that the 
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system has conf idence that even if  at any point any of  these parts were compromised to an attack  the 
system is still conf ident in its ab ility to authenticate the identity of  a user.   
Tab le 2.6 illustrates the req uirements in inside and outside conf idence f or an overall authentication 
conf idence level.  
 
Table 2.6 - A u t h en t i c at i o n  C o n f i d en c e L ev el 
A u t h ent i c a t i on 
C onf i denc e L ev el ( % )  
C onf i denc e i n I ns i de Ent i t i es  
a nd T ra ns m i s s i on L i nes  
C onf i denc e i n O u t s i de Ent i t i es  
a nd T ra ns m i s s i on L i nes  
100 Conf ident Conf ident 
75 Conf ident Moderately Conf ident 
50 Conf ident N ot Conf ident 
25 Moderately Conf ident Don’ t Care 
0 N ot Conf ident Don’ t Care 
 
In order f or a system to have an authentication conf idence level ab ove f if ty percent it is necessary 
that the system has complete conf idence in the entities and transmissions lines inside its control.  If  
the system b elieves that the entities and their communications that it has control over are vulnerab le 
to any one attack  then the system should not have any reasonab le conf idence in its ab ility to 
authenticate an individual.   
Table 2.7 - Th r eat  R esi st an c e R eq u i r em en t  f o r  I n si d e E n t i t i es an d  Tr an sm i ssi o n  L i n es 
T h rea t  R es i s t a nc e R eq u i rem ent  A u t h ent i c a t i on Proc es s  A t t a c ks / T h rea t s  
C onf i dent  M odera t ely  C onf i dent  N ot  C onf i dent *  
Eavesdropping Yes Yes N o 
Replay Yes Yes N o 
Session Hij ack ing Yes Yes N o 
Man in the Middle Yes Yes N o 
RA Attack s Yes Yes* *  N o 
CSP Attack s Yes Yes N o 
Verif ier Attack s Yes Yes* *  N o 
*  f ailure to resist any one of  these attack s q ualif ies f or this level 




The situation where the system is Moderately Conf ident in the inside entities and transmission lines 
is a case where the system has inherent f laws due to its design b ut has insuf f icient check s and 
b alances to remove them.  These f laws arise not f rom an Attack er f rom the outside b reak ing into the 
system b ut f rom an Attack er on the inside that is ab le to ob tain < credential, tok en>  pairs f rom the 
system undetected.   
An example of  a moderate conf idence in the inside entities and transmission lines is an 
authentication system where the tok en is an Agent-operated KB A centre where the same q uestions 
are ask ed every authentication session: the Agent is ab le to record a Claimant’ s identity and responses 
and can use that inf ormation to b e f alsely authenticated at a later time.  In this example, the system is 
designed in such a way that it has no choice b ut to trust the operating Agent, b ut due to an Agent 
selection screening process the system has conf idence in the trustworthiness of  the Agent; however, 
there remains an intrinsic f law in the system design.   
For conf idence levels ab ove f if ty percent the system must have complete conf idence in its own 
operation b ut varying levels of  conf idence in the outside entities and transmission lines.  Conf idence 
in the outside entities and transmission lines is determined b y the threats and attack s the outside 
entities and transmission lines are vulnerab le to.  Tab le 2.8 contains the req uirements to determine the 
conf idence level of  the entities and transmission lines outside the immediate control of  the 
authentication system.  It should b e noted that in Tab le 2.8 resistance to a threat does not mean that 
the given attack  may not b e successf ul, j ust that the success of  the attack  will not lead to an Attack er 
b eing f alsely authenticated b y the Verif ier.   
Resistance to Tok en Threats ref erred to in Tab le 2.8 is the ab ility of  the system to maintain its 
conf idence that the tok en in the < credential, tok en>  pair is actually b eing sub mitted b y the owner of  
the credential.  This conf idence arises f rom verif ying b oth static and dynamic attrib utes inside the 
tok en.  For example in a text-dependent or text-prompted voice b iometric system verif ying b oth the 
spok en word as b eing correct as well as the voice doing the speak ing.  Resistance to Tok en Threats is 
conf idence that if  any of  the inf ormation used in verif ication was captured at any point in time b y an 
Attack er and sub mitted b y the Attack er to the verif ier the Attack er would not b e f alsely authenticated.   
Table 2.8 - Th r eat  R esi st an c e R eq u i r em en t  f o r  O u t si d e E n t i t i es an d  Tr an sm i ssi o n  L i n es 
T h rea t  R es i s t a nc e R eq u i rem ent  A u t h ent i c a t i on Proc es s  A t t a c ks / T h rea t s  
C onf i dent  M odera t ely  C onf i dent  N ot  C onf i dent  
Eavesdropping Yes Yes N o 
Replay Yes Yes N o 
Session Hij ack ing Yes Yes N o 
Man in the Middle Yes Yes N o 
Verif ier Impersonation Yes N o N o 
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End Device Attack s Yes N o N o 
Data Processing Unit Attack s Yes N o N o 
Tok en Threats (Capture) Yes N o N o 
 
N o conf idence in the outside entities and transmission lines arises f rom the inab ility of  the system 
to trust that the < credential, tok en>  pair sub mitted b y the Claimant is truly b eing sub mitted b y the 
User identity corresponding to that pair.  This lack  of  conf idence arises f rom the outside entities and 
transmissions b eing sub j ect to too many attack s and threats.  An example of  no conf idence in the 
outside entities and transmission lines is a simple password sent to the Verif ier unencrypted over a 
normal phone channel.  In this example the Verif ier has no conf idence that the password has not b een 
disclosed, intercepted, or guessed b y an Attack er.  To improve the conf idence in the outside entities 
and transmissions steps need to b e tak en b y the system to reduce the numb er of  threats and attack s 
possib le. 
Moderate conf idence in the outside transmission lines arise f rom the inab ility of  the system to truly 
verif y that the tok en sub mitted in the < credential, tok en>  pair is actually b eing sub mitted b y the 
owner of  the credential.  The inab ility to truly verif y arises f rom the nature of  the authentication 
f actors b eing used, f or example something you k now authentication, where the Verif ier is verif ying 
that the Claimant k nows some inf ormation, not the Claimant themselves.  An example of  moderate 
conf idence in the outside entities and transmission lines is a complex password sent encrypted to the 
Verif ier over the internet.  In this example the system has no conf idence that the User has disclosed 
their password to another person, an Attack er has captured the encrypted password, b rok en the 
encryption and recovered the password, or that the Attack er is successf ully guessing the password.   
Complete conf idence in the outside entities and transmission lines arises f rom the ab ility of  the 
system to verif y that the < credential, tok en>  pair is actually truly b eing sub mitted b y the 
corresponding user identity.  W hen completely conf ident in this verif ication ab ility it does not matter 
if  any attack  on the outside entities and transmission lines is successf ul or not since the system is 
actually authenticating the User.   
An example of  complete conf idence in the outside entities and transmission lines is a two-f actor 
authentication system utiliz ing a text-dependent or text-prompted voice b iometric system, where the 
voice sample is sent over a secured channel to the Verif ier.  This system estab lishes complete 
conf idence through the f ollowing: 
• The secured channel prevents transmission-b ased attack s and Verif ier Impersonations 
• A well constructed voice verif ication system with liveness detection can detect spoof  attempts 
such as a voice recording 
• Verif ication of  dynamic attrib utes (the physical traits of  the voice) ensure that if  all the 
inf ormation used f or verif ication in a single session (or multiple sessions) were captured an 
attack er could not use it to spoof  a user do the ever changing nature of  the attrib utes 
 
 63 
• Verif ication of  static attrib utes in the tok en (the spok en words) provide a second authentication 
f actor to strengthen the authentication 
• End Device and DPU Attack s are prevented since the capture of  the data used in the 
authentication session will not compromise f uture authentication sessions 
2 .5  C h a p t e r  S u m m a r y   
This chapter explored the GUAP identif ying threats, attack s and vulnerab ilities in the process.  
Following the discussion on attack s and weak nesses this chapter introduced measures f or an 
authentication system to provide a conf idence level to meet its ob j ective estab lishing conf idence in 
user identities presented to an inf ormation system.  The next section will examine currently existing 




Chapter 3  
A n al y s i s  o f  A u then ti c ati o n  S y s tem s  
3.1 S k y p e  
3 .1.1 O v e r v i e w  
The use of  Voice over IP (VoIP) telephony has greatly increased in recent years:  A 2004 study [ 26] 
that f ound that 1%  of  houses with b roadb and access were using some f orm of  VoIP service and that 
b y 2009 that numb er would increase to 17% ; while a 2007 study [ 27] f ound that 20%  of  United States 
b usinesses were using VoIP and predicted that two-thirds of  b usinesses will have some f orm of  VoIP 
service b y 2011.  This increasing use of  VoIP in home and b usiness has led to an increased use of  
VoIP in privacy critical systems; as a result it is of  interest to evaluate the authentication mechanism 
of  a well k nown and widely deployed peer-to-peer VoIP system: Sk ype [ 28].  
The Sk ype Client, which is installed on a standard personal computer is availab le f or f ree download 
at www.sk ype.com  The Client allows its users to place voice calls and send text messages to other 
Sk ype users and in addition to placing voice calls to any telephone accessed through the Pub lic 
Switched Telephone N etwork  (PSTN ).   
W hile the Sk ype Client is availab le f or f ree download the sof tware is proprietary and only 
compiled versions of  the sof tware client can b e ob tained, creating dif f iculties in analyz ing the 
authentication method.  Fortunately, several independent analyses of  Sk ype have b een perf ormed and 
the protocols used b y the sof tware are understood.  The analysis of  the User authentication portion of  
the Sk ype protocols contained in this case study b uild on some of  these analysis’ s of  the Sk ype 
protocol.   
3 .1.2 T h e  S k y p e  N e t w o r k  
The Sk ype network  is an overlay peer-to-peer network  that consists of  two types of  nodes: ordinary 
hosts and super nodes. An ordinary host is a Sk ype application that can b e used to place voice calls 
and send text messages to other applications.  A super node is an ordinary host’ s end-point on the 
Sk ype network ; any ordinary host with a pub lic IP address and having suf f icient computing resources 
and network  b andwidth can b ecome a super node. [ 29] 
To login to the Sk ype network  an ordinary host connects to a super node and then registers itself  
with the Sk ype Login Server.  The Sk ype Login Server is not a node on the network ; however, any 
connection to the network  must authenticate itself  to the Sk ype Login Server in order to operate on 
the network .  All user names and passwords are stored on the Login Server and user authentication is 
perf ormed at the Login Server.  The Login Server is the only “central server” on the Sk ype network .  






Fi g u r e 3.1 - S k y p e N et w o r k  [ 29]  
3 .1.3  T h e  S k y p e  A u t h e n t i c a t i o n  P r o c e s s  
3 . 1 . 3 . 1  E n r o l m e n t  P h a s e  
The Enrolment Phase of  the User Authentication process is perf ormed during registration.  During the 
registration process a new Sk ype user will select a username to use on the Sk ype network  as well as 
an accompanying password.  The complete registration process is illustrated in Figure 3.2.  The b elow 
understanding of  the Sk ype protocol is the result of  Tom B erson’ s analysis [ 30] which was perf ormed 




S e n d  K{ I C A}
S e n d  K{A,  H(p w d )}
U s e r C e n t r a l  L og i n  S e r v e r
Has:
1.  S e r v e r ’ s  P u b l i c  Ke y  (Ks+ )                 
2.  S HA-1 Ha s h  F u n c t i o n :  H()
C r e at e s:
1.  u s e r n a m e :  A
2.  P a s s w o r d :  p w d
G e n e r at e s:
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3.  C r e a t e s  a n d  s i g n s  a n  I d e n t i t y  C e r t i f i c a t e  
(I C A )  b i n d i n g  {A,  KA+}
 
Fi g u r e 3.2 - S k y p e E n r o lm en t  P h ase 
It can b e ob served f rom Figure 3.2 that the enrolment phase consists of  the f ollowing steps: 
1. The User selects a desired username, denoted A, and a password, denoted pw d 
2. The User’ s Client generates an RSA k ey pair: (KA+, KA-), computes a SHA-1 hash of  the 
password: H(pwd) and stores KA- and H(pwd) as securely as possib le on the User’ s 
platf orm.   
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3. The User’ s Client generates a 256-b it AES symmetric k ey (K) 
4. The User’ s Client encrypts K using KS+ and encrypts (A, H(pwd), KA+) with K.  
5. KS+{K}  and K{A, H(pwd), KA+ }  are sent to the central server 
6. The central server extracts K using its private k ey and decrypts (A, H(pwd), KA+) and 
determines if  A is uniq ue and acceptab le. 
7. The central server stores (A, H(pwd)) in its datab ase 
8. The central server creates and signs an identity certif icate f or A which contains the central 
servers RSA signature b inding A and KA+.   
9. The identity certif icate is sent to A. 
It can b e ob served that the authentication of  the Sk ype Login Server b y the Sk ye Client req uires 
that the Sk ype Client k now the pub lic k ey of  the Login Server.  To allow f or this the Login Server’ s 
pub lic k ey is installed in every Sk ype Client at b uild time. [ 30] 
Some simplif ication of  the authentication process has b een perf ormed ab ove. The central server in 
f act has two sets of  RSA k ey pairs: one with a 1536 b it modulus and another with a 2048 b it modulus.  
The central server chooses to use the longer k ey pair if  the User has sub scrib ed to any premium 
service.   Another simplif ication is that the central server is in f act many servers with dif f erent 
f unctions and replicated many times, however, security restrictions have b een put in place that can 
allow the devices that compose the central server to b e thought of  as a single server.  [ 30] 
3 . 1 . 3 . 2  A u t h e n t i c a t i o n  P h a s e  
During the Authentication Phase the Claimant is ask ed b y the Sk ype Client to provide a username and 
password, which is then used b y the central Login Server to authenticate the Claimant’ s identity.  The 
Authentication Phase is illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3 - Sk ype Authentication Phase 
 
It can b e ob served f rom Figure 3.3 that the enrolment phase consists of  the f ollowing steps: 
1. The Claimant enters their username, denoted A, and a password, denoted pw d 
2. The Claimant’ s Client generates an RSA k ey pair: (KA+, KA-), computes a SHA-1 hash of  
the password: H(pwd) and stores KA- and H(pwd) as securely as possib le on the User’ s 
platf orm.   
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3. The Claimant’ s Client generates a 256-b it AES symmetric k ey (K) 
4. The Claimant’ s Client encrypts K using KS+ and encrypts (A, H(pwd), KA+) with K.  
5. KS+{K}  and K{A, H(pwd), KA+ }  are sent to the central server 
6. The central server extracts K using its private k ey and decrypts (A, H(pwd), KA+) and 
determines if  A is uniq ue and acceptab le. 
7. The central server verif ies (A, H(pwd)) f rom an entry in the datab ase 
8. The central server creates and signs an identity certif icate f or A which contains the central 
servers RSA signature b inding A and KA+.   
9. The identity certif icate is sent to the Claimant. 
3.1.3.2.1 Peer-to-Peer Authentication 
Since the Sk ype network  is a peer-to-peer b ased network , meaning that a Sk ype user will connect 
directly to another user, there is another instance of  the authentication phase where the Users will 
authenticate each other at the start of  a conversation.  This peer-to-peer authentication is 
accomplished through the use of  the certif icates issued b y the Login Server during the login process 
where the Users authenticated themselves to the central Login Server.  
Users do not truly authenticate each other, merely authenticate the authenticity of  the certif icate 
issued b y the central Login Server and ensure that the other user does indeed poses the private k ey 
corresponding to the pub lic k ey contained in the certif icate.   
This method of  authentication is suf f icient provided that the cryptographic tools used in the 
certif icates, their issuance and their verif ication are properly implemented and the central Login 
Server can b e trusted to authenticate an individual correctly.   
3 .1.4  L e g a l  I s s u e s  
It should b e noted that while Sk ype is a widely deployed VoIP system it has b een under heavy 
scrutiny b y b usinesses and governments worldwide. The nature of  its encrypted peer-to-peer 
connection allows it to traverse corporate f irewalls and cause congestion on a corporate network  as 
well as creating a channel f or malware f or malware to inf ect the network  through.  
Additionally, the encrypted peer-to-peer nature of  Sk ype violates estab lished legal req uirements 
such as the mandatory req uirement f or telephony providers to provide a means f or legal wiretapping 
of  the phone channel.  An additional example is unsanctioned usage of  Sk ype b y security b rok ers 
violates the req uirement that they record and track  all telephone calls.   
Several countries, including the European Union and China, have passed laws that have declared 




3 .1.5  A n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  S k y p e  A u t h e n t i c a t i o n  P r o c e s s  
Many steps have b een tak en b y the developers of  the Sk ype application to protect the authentication 
process f rom attack s through the use of  cryptographic tools.  Tom B erson’ s analysis [ 30] of  the Sk ype 
sof tware revealed that all cryptographic tools were properly implemented and there did not appear to 
b e any attack s on the implementation of  the tools, thus f or the purpose of  this analysis the 
cryptographic tools used will b e assumed to b e properly implemented.   
The b elow analysis of  the Sk ype user authentication process f irst examines the entities and 
transmission lines that are inside the control of  the Sk ype authentication system b ef ore examining the 
entities and transmission lines outside the control of  the authentication system.  Following this 
analysis conclusions as to the conf idence level of  the authentication are made.   
 
3 .1.6 A n a l y s i s  o f  I n s i d e  E n t i t i e s  a n d  T r a n s m i s s i o n  L i n e s  
The entities and transmission lines inside the control of  the Sk ype authentication system consist of : 
the transmission of  the < username, password>  pair f rom the Sk ype Client to the central Login Server; 
the datab ase storing the < credential, password hash>  pairs of  user accounts (the CSP); the central 
Login Server (the Verif ier); and the transmission b etween the datab ase and the Login Server.  
The analysis in [ 30] f ound that the internal entities involved in the authentication process were 
properly implemented and secure. N o remote access to the Sk ype user datab ase has b een discovered 
and as a result is b elieved to b e secure and inaccessib le except f rom Sk ype administrative f acilities.  
W hile it is not k nown if  the datab ase is encrypted it is k nown that the datab ase stores a hash of  the 
password hash, resulting in the stored pair: < username, H(H(password)> . [ 30] 
N o remote access the Login Server except f or the verif ication of  credentials sub mitted b y the 
Sk ype Client has b een discovered and as a result the Login Server is a result is b elieved to b e secure 
and inaccessib le except f rom Sk ype administrative f acilities.  Additionally, the transmissions b etween 
the Login Server and the datab ase are also b elieved to b e inaccessib le b y remote connections outside 
of  the Sk ype administrative f acilities. 
3 .1.7  A n a l y s i s  o f  O u t s i d e  E n t i t i e s  a n d  T r a n s m i s s i o n  L i n e s  
The entities and transmission lines outside the control of  the Sk ype Authentication system consist of : 
the User’ s k eyb oard (End Device), the Sk ype Client (Data Processing Unit) and the transmission 
b etween the k eyb oard through the User’ s personal computer to the Sk ype Client.  In actuality the true 
“Data Processing Unit” is the personal computer of  the User where the k eystrok es are determined and 
there is an extra transmission b etween that module and the Sk ype Client process. 
The transmission of  the < username, password hash>  pair f rom the Sk ype Client to the Sk ype Login 
Server, which is of ten a transmission line outside the control of  the authentication system, is 
perf ormed through a secure and authenticated channel where the Login Server authenticates the 
Sk ype Client as legitimate b ef ore estab lishing a secure (encrypted) connection.  The secure and 
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authenticated connection b etween the Sk ype Client and the Sk ype Login Server ef f ectively 
estab lishes the transmission as inside the control of  the Sk ype authentication system.   
A password capture is perhaps the most ef f ective way f or an Attack er to spoof  a user.  Since the 
Sk ype Client operates on the application layer of  the OSI protocol stack  an attack er can install a 
k eystrok e monitoring tool onto a user’ s personal computer and capture the user’ s < username, 
password>  pair as it is inputted b y the user.  The attack er can then use their own Sk ype Client to 
present the pair to the central Login Server and b e f alsely authenticated.  
The Sk ype Client has a “Rememb er Me” f eature that if  selected b y the User the Sk ype Client will 
store the username and password hash locally on a user’ s machine.  The Sk ype Client uses the 
encryption algorithm availab le on the Operating System f or the secure storage of  the pair; f or instance 
on a W indows machine the local store of  the Username and password hash is stored using the 
W indows CryptProtectData API. [ 30]  W ith the “Rememb er Me” f eature in place any person ab le to 
access the User’ s machine can potentially either: 
1. If  logged onto the User’ s machine as the User simply open the Sk ype Client and sub mit the 
saved < username, password hash>  pair to b e f alsely authenticated as the legitimate Sk ype 
user. 
2. Recover the Operating System encrypted < username, password hash>  pair and b reak  the 
encryption to recover the Username and password hash.   
A password guessing attack  is also possib le.  In an attempt to thwart a guessing attack  if  there are 
seven consecutive f ailed login attempts Sk ype will lock  a user account f or one minute and prevent 
any f urther log in attempts, however, af ter that one minute has passed seven more attempts can b e 
perf ormed b ef ore the account is lock ed again f or one minute.   Lock ing the User account in this 
manner will limit the Attack er to only seven guesses per minute which will greatly increase the time 
tak en f or a guessing attack  to b e successf ul.  However, the guessing attack  is still f easib le in a 
reasonab le time f rame as there are no password rules (other than length) enf orced b y the Sk ype 
authentication system.    
Sk ype passwords can b e anywhere in length f rom 4 to 256 characters and with a 94 character 






k ) which means that a b rute-
f orce guessing attack  at a rate of  seven passwords a minute can b e considered impossib le.  However, 
since the passwords are user chosen and there are no rules governing the selection of  passwords, a 
guessing attack  is f easib le as the Attack er can f ollow the previous describ ed method of  password 
guessing attack  and may successf ully guess a password in a reasonab le time f rame.  The time tak en in 
the guessing attack  can b e greatly reduced if  the Attack er is f amiliar with the User they wish to 
impersonate.  Additionally the Attack er may b e ab le to perf orm an “over-the-shoulder attack ”; where 
the Attack er ob serves the User enter their password and discovers inf ormation ab out the password, 
such as its length and certain characters in it, or even the password itself .   
Sk ype also supports a “Forgot Password” f eature.  The f eature is designed so that a legitimate user 
who has f orgotten their password can enter their registered username and email address and req uest 
that the Sk ype service help them out.  The Sk ype service will then send an email to the User’ s email 
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address (it should b e noted that this email address was provided b y the User during registration) that 
contains a k ey.  The user then goes to the web site, enters their email address, username and the k ey 
f rom the email and creates a new password.   
An attack er can exploit the “Forgot Password” f eature of  Sk ype to reset a user’ s password and gain 
access to the user’ s account.  This exploitation, however, req uires the attack er to either have access to 
or the ab ility to intercept the legitimate user’ s email.   
 Perhaps the greatest weak ness in the Sk ype authentication process is the weak ness of  the 
authentication f actor employed b y the system.  The Login Server has no assurances that a claimant 
presenting a username and password is the true owner of  the username.  The Login Server assumes 
that since the claimant presents a username and the correct corresponding password the claimant 
possesses the claimed identity.  The login process is completely vulnerab le to these types of  attack s, 
where once an attack er has k nowledge of  a username and corresponding password they will b e f alsely 
authenticated. 
3 .1.8  C o n c l u s i o n s  
Tab le 3.1 and Tab le 3.2 summariz e the threat resistance of  Sk ype to attack s on the inside and outside 
entities and transmission lines.  It can b e ob served that Sk ype meets the req uirements f or complete 
conf idence in the inside entities and transmission lines b ut does not meet the req uirements f or 
complete conf idence in the outside entities and transmission lines.   
Table 3.1 - S k y p e Th r eat  R esi st an c e f o r  I n si d e E n t i t i es an d  Tr an sm i ssi o n  L i n es 
A u t h ent i c a t i on Proc es s  A t t a c ks / T h rea t s  R es i s t a nc e 
Eavesdropping Yes 
Replay Yes 
Session Hij ack ing Yes 
Man in the Middle Yes 
RA Attack s Yes 
CSP Attack s Yes 







Table 3.2 - S k y p e Th r eat  R esi st an c e f o r  O u t si d e E n t i t i es an d  Tr an sm i ssi o n  L i n es 
A u t h ent i c a t i on Proc es s  
A t t a c ks / T h rea t s  
R es i s t a nc e L oc a t i on of  A t t a c k 
Eavesdropping N o Transmission b etween k eyb oard and Sk ype Client 
Replay N o Attack er can replay data captured during transmission 
b etween k eyb oard and Sk ype Client 
Session Hij ack ing Yes  
Man in the Middle Yes  
Verif ier Impersonation N o A user could b e trick ed into attempting to use a 
f raudulent Sk ype Client 
End Device Attack s N o Attack er can perf orm an “over-the-shoulder-attack ” 
Keystrok e logger 
Data Processing Unit Attack s N o Sk ype Client “Rememb er Me” f eature 
Tok en Threats N o Determined and k nowledgeab le Attack er launched 
guessing or dictionary attack  
 




Tab le 3.2 that several attack s are possib le on the entities and transmission lines outside of  the 
control of  the Sk ype Authentication System.  Due to the numb er and type of  attack s possib le the 
Sk ype authentication system can have no conf idence in the entities and transmission lines outside of  
its control.   
W hile the Sk ype authentication process meets the req uirements to have complete conf idence in the 
entities and transmission lines inside of  its control it f ails to meet the req uirements to have any 
conf idence in the entities and transmission lines outside of  its direct control and as a result the Sk ype 
system can only have a 50%  Conf idence Level in the output of  its authentication process.  
3 .1.9  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  I m p r o v e m e n t  
Conf idence in the outside entities and transmission lines can b e improved b y eliminating the 
transmission b ased attack s b etween the k eyb oard and the Sk ype Client.  The main threat in these 
transmission attack s is monitoring sof tware installed b y the attack er on the user’ s personal computer 
that records k eystrok es: this attack  can b e eliminated b y incorporating a scheme that uses mouse 
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click s to enter some secret inf ormation, pref erab ly in addition to the existing < username, password>  
pair.  
An example improvement is one that maintains the static authentication attrib utes in the tok en f rom 
the password b ut also incorporates dynamic attrib utes as well. Dynamic attrib utes can b e added af ter 
the < username, password>  pair is verif ied b y the Sk ype Login Server b y having the server respond b y 
sending the Client several randomly selected images and an image that the  user as pre-selected as 
their own secret image.  The Client then displays the images randomly distrib uted in a grid and the 
user selects their secret image; b y having the Client display the images in a random order the 
possib ility of  an attack er process recording mouse location at the time of  the click  is eliminated. In 
this example the dynamic attrib ute that is thwarting monitoring sof tware is the ever changing location 
of  the secret image: thus if  an attack er were to capture b oth k eystrok es and mouse location the 
attack er would still b e unab le to pass authentication.   
B y eliminating the attack s on the transmission lines outside of  the control of  the Sk ype System the 
system can gain a 75%  Conf idence Level in the output of  the authentication process.  However, since 
attack s are still possib le on the revised scheme (such as monitoring sof tware that also captures the 
screen contents at the time of  the mouse click ) f urther enhancements are req uired.   
To gain a 100%  Conf idence Level resistance to attack s that capture the tok en must b e introduced.    
Since the success of  these attack s depends on the authentication f actor employed in the authentication 
tok en used in the Sk ype authentication process a good method of  eliminating these attack s is to 
switch to a b iometric-b ased tok en.    
A well implemented text-dependent voice b iometric system which incorporates spoof ing resistance 
and liveness detection is well suited to Sk ype as it does not req uire a Sk ype user to ob tain any 
additional hardware.  The proposed authentication process will proceed as f ollows: 
1. the Sk ype Client estab lishes a secured channel with the Sk ype Login Server as b ef ore 
2. the user enters his or her username into the Client 
3. the user speak s their password 
4. the < username, spok en password>  pair is sent over the secured channel to the Login Server 
5. the Login Server extracts b iometric data f or b iometric verif ication 
6. the Login Server uses speech recognition to determine the sub mitted password f or 
verif ication 
7. if  b oth the password and b iometric data pass verif ication the user is authenticated 
 
It can b e ob served that this new process is s two-f actor authentication system incorporating b oth 
“something you k now” and “something you are” authentication f actors.  Additionally the verif ication 
of  the tok en in this proposed authentication process involves the verif ication of  b oth static and 
dynamic attrib utes: static attrib utes such as the spok en password; and dynamic attrib utes such as the 
changing nature of  the human voice.   
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3.2  F i n a n c i a l  C a l l  C e n t e r s  
3 .2.1 O v e r v i e w  
Financial Call Centers is a very b road category with many dif f erent, independent f inancial companies 
operating their own call center and perf orming authentication of  their remote customers.  However, 
most call centers f ollow the same general process of  authentication and theref ore rather than evaluate 
the authentication process at each individual company’ s call center this evaluation examines the 
general authentication process perf ormed at the call centers.  The general authentication process 
describ ed b elow was determined through an examination of  the call centers of  several dif f erent 
f inancial services.  
3 .2.2 C a l l  C e n t e r  A u t h e n t i c a t i o n  P r o c e s s  
The caller authentication process at a f inancial call center dif f ers slightly f rom GUAP.  The 
Enrolment Phase, illustrated in Figure 3.4, is typically perf ormed completely of f line with the User 
and an employee of  the f inancial service, hereaf ter ref erred to as an Agent,  physically present at the 
same location.  The Authentication Phase, illustrated in Figure 3.6 occurs over the PSTN  and consists 
of  two Verif iers, one of  which is very of ten operated b y an Agent.  
 
 





Fi g u r e 3.5 - C all C en t er  E n r o lm en t  P r o c ess 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the process that is undergone during the Enrolment Phase, namely when a 
customer registers or creates an account and b ecomes a user of  f inancial service.  This registration is 
perf ormed physically b y an Agent of  the f inancial service while the customer is physically availab le 
to the Agent.  At this time in the Enrolment Phase, a credential is issued to the new user; a common 
example of  a credential is a b ank  card with an identif ying 16-digit numb er printed on it.  Af ter the 
Agent assigns the credential to the new account the User will secretly select a PIN  and enter it into the 
system; the secretly selected PIN  will hereaf ter act as the User’ s tok en in the authentication process.  
Af ter the PIN  is entered the < credential, PIN >  pair is stored securely in the f inancial institution’ s 
CSP.   
Additionally wealth of  personal inf ormation is collected b y the Agent f rom the new User.  Of ten 
this inf ormation relates directly to the service the User is ob taining f rom the f inancial institution, 
however, this personal inf ormation may not have any relation to the service and may j ust b e 
additional inf ormation collected b y the institution to b e used f or verif ication purposes as part of  the 
Authentication Phase.   
The Authentication Phase, illustrated in Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7, is typically composed of  two 
dif f erent Verif iers.  In the Authentication Phase the Claimant connects to the system using their 




Fi g u r e 3.6 - C all C en t er  A u t h en t i c at i o n  P h ase 
 
 
Fi g u r e 3.7 - C all C en t er  A u t h en t i c at i o n  P r o c ess 
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Immediately af ter connecting to the call center the Claimant is f orwarded to f irst Verif ier which 
req uests the < credential, PIN >  pair f rom the Claimant.  The pair is entered b y the Claimant using the 
touch-tone k eypad on their personal telephone.  The Verif ier will then perf orm a matching operation 
and if  the pair is verif ied as correct the Claimant is f orwarded to second Verif ier. 
The second Verif ier is very of ten operated b y an Agent of  the f inancial service and acts as a second 
level of  identity verif ication through the use of  KB A.  The Claimant is f orwarded to the second 
Verif ier f or the f irst Verif ier along with the claimed identity allowing the second Verif ier to 
automatically access the personal inf ormation corresponding to the claimed identity.  The second 
Verif ier will then generate a numb er of  random q uestions f rom the personal inf ormation; these 
q uestions are sub mitted to the Agent who repeats them to the Claimant and enters the Claimant’ s 
responses into the Verif ier.  If  the Claimant’ s responses to the q uestions are acceptab le to the Verif ier 
the Claimant will b e authenticated as having the claimed identity. 
 
3 .2.3  A n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  F i n a n c i a l  C a l l  C e n t e r  A u t h e n t i c a t i o n  P r o c e s s  
The b elow analysis of  the Financial Call Center User Authentication Process f irst examines the 
entities and transmission lines that are inside the control of  the authentication system b ef ore 
examining the entities and transmission lines outside the control of  the authentication system.  
Following this analysis conclusions as to the conf idence level of  the authentication are made.   
It should b e noted that it is during the Enrolment Phase f or f inancial institution call centers that 
identity thef t can occur through an Attack er f raudulently claiming the identity of  another person.  
This section will set aside the idea of  identity thef t and f raudulent users in the Enrolment Phase and 
will examine how an Attack er can exploit weak nesses in the Enrolment and Authentication Phases to 
b e f alsely authenticated as a legitimate user of  the f inancial service.     
3 . 2 . 3 . 1  A n a l y s i s  o f  I n s i d e  E n t i t i e s  a n d  T r a n s m i s s i o n  L i n e s  
The entities and transmission inside the control of  the call center are lab eled in Figure 3.6 as the 
Enterprise N etwork .  The interior entities consist of : Verif ier 1; Verif ier 2, which is of ten manned b y 
an Agent; and the CSP, which may consist of  multiple datab ases.  The interior transmission lines are 
f ormed b y the transmissions b etween these entities.   
Since this evaluation is f ocused on the general Financial Call Center authentication process an 
examination of  weak nesses in the interior entities and transmission lines at a particular call center is 
not signif icant.  A particular Financial Call Center may implement no measures to protect the inside 
entities and transmissions or it may implement the methods discussed in Chapter 2 to protect the 
entities and transmissions f rom the discussed attack s.  As a result it will b e assumed that the general 
call center b eing analyz ed has implemented prevention methods to secure the entities and 
transmission lines inside the control of  the call center.  The remainder of  this sub section will analyz e 
those entities and transmissions that dif f er f rom the GUAP in the Financial Call Center, most notab ly 
the Agent operating the KB A-b ased Verif ier.  
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In a Financial Call Center there is an interesting transmission-b ased attack  that can occur during the 
Enrolment Phase.  Typically, a User enrols in the system with the assistance of  an Agent while 
physically present at a b ranch of f ice of  the f inancial institution.  In this situation the Agent is tak ing 
inf ormation f rom the enrolling user and entering it into the CSP.    Of ten the inf ormation exchange 
b etween the User and the Agent is perf ormed verb ally or in some cases written documents.  An 
Attack er can try to mount a transmission attack  on this exchange b y installing eavesdropping and 
monitoring devices (sound recorders, video cameras, k eyb oard loggers, screen captures, etc.) in the 
f inancial center.  This Transmission Attack  has less to do with the technology used in the 
authentication system and more to do with the physical layout of  the f inancial institution.  The most 
successf ul way of  reducing this attack  is isolation in the enrolment phase, including isolation of  the 
terminal used to enter the inf ormation and isolation of  the customer and Agent during the inf ormation 
exchange.  
Due to the presence of  an Agent in the Enrolment and Authentication Phases in order to have any 
level of  conf idence in the interior entities it is necessary that the system have conf idence in the 
trustworthiness of  the Agents.  To have conf idence in the trustworthiness of  an Agent means that the 
Agent can b e trusted to b oth authenticate a Claimant properly and not to f alsely authenticate or rej ect 
them as well as b e trusted not to record a User’ s personal inf ormation to either mount their own 
attack s or f or sale to another Attack er.    
During the Enrolment Phase, with the exception of  the PIN  privately entered b y the new User all 
inf ormation in the Enrolment Phase passes through the Agent.  The Agent could possib ly record this 
inf ormation to mount an attack  at a later time.  Despite not having the PIN  portion of  the < credential, 
PIN >  pair it is possib le f or a k nowledgeab le Attack er to mount a successf ul attack ; how such an 
attack  can succeed is discussed in the next sub section.   
During the Authentication Phase an Agent could also record enough inf ormation f rom a legitimate 
User’ s responses to the KB A q uestions to mount an attack  at a later time.  If  the KB A system does not 
randomly vary the q uestion used b etween sessions, than the Agent has all the inf ormation req uired, 
however, if  the system suf f iciently varies the q uestions in the KB A phase the Agent may b e unab le to 
mount the attack . 
 
3 . 2 . 3 . 2  A n a l y s i s  o f  O u t s i d e  E n t i t i e s  a n d  T r a n s m i s s i o n  L i n e s  
The entities and transmission lines outside the control of  the Financial Call Center consist of  the 
User/ Claimant, their End Device and Data Processing Unit (personal telephone) and the transmission 
over the PSTN  b etween the telephone and the Financial Call Center’ s network .    
The User/ Claimant’ s End Device and their only interf ace with the remote system is a personal 
telephone that is connected to the f inancial institution over the Pub lic Switched Telephone N etwork  
(PSTN ).  In the general situation the Claimant’ s personal telephone is a standard touch-tone telephone 
eliminating the ab ility f or a secure, encrypted channel to b e estab lished with the f inancial institution; 
As a result all inf ormation exchanged b etween the Claimant and the f inancial institution is sent in the 
clear.   
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Attack s are possib le on the End Device (the telephone receiver) and the Data Processing Unit (the 
audio converting mechanism).  These attack s generally involve the Attack er capturing any portion of  
the inf ormation, such as the < credential, tok en>  pair and the KB A q uestions and responses.  End 
Device and Data Processing Unit attack s include b ut are not limited to: 
• A “same  room attack ” where the Attack er is ab le to listen in the conversation to ob tain KB A 
inf ormation 
• Installing a monitoring device in the phone receiver to capture k ey presses and voice activity 
Since the entire communication b etween the Claimant and the f inancial institution is unencrypted 
the authentication process is sub j ect to a transmission attack  b y an Attack er b etween the Claimant’ s 
personal telephone and the Verif ier.  An Attack er can install a device somewhere on the 
communication channel b etween the two entities to ob serve and record the inf ormation sent b y the 
Claimant to the Verif ier and recover all inf ormation passed b etween the entities during the 
Authentication Phase.  The Attack er can resub mit this recorded inf ormation at a later time and 
possib ly b e f alsely authenticated as a legitimate user.  
It is important to note that in addition to the Attack er capturing the < credential, PIN >  pair during 
the Claimant’ s interaction with the f irst Verif ier, the Attack er could also capture the q uestions and 
responses during the Claimant’ s KB A session with the second Verif ier.  Commonly, the KB A 
Verif ier attempts to thwart such transmission-b ased attack s b y randomly varying the q uestions 
q ueried to the Claimant.  W ith this variance in the q uestions in place an Attack er would have to 
monitor several authentication sessions b etween the Claimant and the service and b uild a datab ank  of  
responses to pass the KB A portion of  the Authentication Phase.  However, if  the same verif ication 
challenges are used f req uently or if  there is little, if  any, variation b etween the verif ication q uestions 
used per session an Attack er may b e ab le to pass the KB A portion with only having monitored as 
little as one authentication session. 
Another disadvantage with the PSTN  is that there is no means of  a user authenticating the Financial 
Call Center.  A user only has k nowledge of  the Financial Call Center’ s phone numb er and b y dialing 
that numb er assumes that they have connected to the Financial Call Center.  However, an Attack er 
may b e ab le to splice their own f raudulent service into the phone network  and intercept all calls 
destined to the Financial Call Center.  An Attack er who is ab le to intercept calls destined to the call 
center is ab le to perf orm b oth session hij ack ing and man in the middle attack s.  
If  the Attack er is unab le to intercept call destined to the call center they could possib ly register 
phone numb ers dif f ering f rom the call center b y a single digit and install a f raudulent call center 
similar to the one b elonging to the f inancial service.  In this Pharming attack  a legitimate user will 
accidentally enter the wrong phone numb er and will connect to the f raudulent call center and enter 
their < credential, tok en>  pair and respond to the Attack er’ s KB A q ueries b ef ore the Attack er reports a 
system error and disconnects the call.  A Phishing attack  is also possib le where an Attack er calls a 
user claiming to b e the f inancial service, reporting computer errors, and ask s f or the < credential, 
tok en>  pair and KB A inf ormation.   
Another weak ness in this authentication process is the employment of  the “something you k now” 
authentication f actor.   W hile the authentication system is using two dif f erent f orms of  this 
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authentication f actor to strengthen the authentication process the process is not truly two-f actor 
authentication.   
It can b e argued that since the credential in the < credential, PIN >  pair is very of ten a 16-digit 
numb er on the f ront of  a physical card issued b y the f inancial institution the authentication process is 
indeed two f actor authentication using b oth “something you have” (card numb er) and “something you 
k now” (PIN ) f actors.  However, since the 16-digit numb er is written on the f ace of  the card and the 
verif ication that occurs at the Verif ier only verif ies that the Claimant k nows this numb er and the 
corresponding PIN  and does not verif y the Claimant’ s actual possession of  the card the possib le 
“something you have” f actor reduces to the “something you k now” f actor. 
Since a PIN  is very of ten a f our digit, user-selected numb er the possib ility of  an Attack er mounting 
a successf ul guessing attack  against the f irst Verif ier is very real.  The success of  a guessing attack , 
however, depends on the Attack er’ s ab ility to gain access to the credential portion (ex. 16-digit card 
numb er) of  the < credential, PIN >  pair as well as to successf ully guess the PIN .  Since the credential is 
very of ten the 16-digit numb er on the f ront of  a card an Attack er who can gain access to this 
credential, f or instance b y stealing a user’ s wallet, may b e ab le to mount a successf ul guessing attack .   
To prevent a guessing attack , where the Attack er has k nowledge of  the credential, b ut not the PIN  
portion of  the < credential, PIN >  pair the f inancial service will suspend the account corresponding to 
that credential if  there are several consecutive f ailed verif ication attempts.  Most commonly an 
account is allowed three f ailed attempts b ef ore it is suspended and access to the system is denied, 
even if  a correct PIN  is entered f ollowing the suspension.  Once the account is suspended the Attack er 
or account owner must go through the PIN  reset procedure describ ed b elow to reactivate the account.   
To handle suspended user accounts and to provide a mechanism f or a legitimate user who has 
f orgotten their PIN , Financial Call Centers provide a means to reset a PIN .  There are generally three 
approaches to dealing with resetting a PIN :  
1. Authenticating the User over the phone using KB A and allowing a PIN  reset  
2. Receiving a PIN  reset req uest and creating a new PIN  which is delivered to the User using 
standard mail 
3. Req uiring the User to physically reset the PIN  at a b ranch of f ice 
In the f irst, and most common, method a legitimate user connects to the Financial Call Center over 
the PSTN  as usual, only instead of  immediately entering their < credential, PIN >  pair the User enters a 
pre-def ined option to enter the password reset procedure.  Af ter entering this option the User is 
f orwarded to an Agent who req uests the User f or their identity; af ter the Agent receives an identity 
claim the Agent will initiate the KB A procedure f or that identity.  If  the User passes the KB A the 
User is authenticated as having the claimed identity and f orwarded to the PIN  reset tool where the 
User is allowed to create a new PIN .   
B y allowing a PIN  reset to occur using the ab ove describ ed method, the authentication process is 
ef f ectively reduced to j ust a single authentication f actor: the KB A.  In this system, an Attack er who is 
ab le to pass the KB A will b e f alsely authenticated as a legitimate user. 
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In the second method of  resetting a PIN  a user will connect to the call center, mak e an identity 
claim (possib ly with using their credential) and notif y the call center that he or she has f orgotten their 
PIN .  The CSP will then invok e an automated process where a new PIN  is randomly created f or the 
claimed identity and stored in the datab ase.  The new PIN  is then printed on paper and physically 
mailed to the mailing address maintained in the records f or that identity.   
W hile physically mailing a new PIN  does not immediately reduce the authentication process to 
only KB A it creates a written version of  the PIN  that is vulnerab le to interception or seiz ure.  Since 
the strength of  PIN -b ased authentication relies on the secrecy of  the PIN  creating a written version of  
the PIN  ef f ectively eliminates the systems conf idence in that the secret is only k nown b y the 
individual. 
To def eat the authentication mechanism on a system employing the second PIN  reset procedure an 
Attack er would connect to the call center, mak e an identity claim, and claim a f orgotten PIN .  The 
Attack er would then, at any point b ef ore the legitimate user completely destroys the paper copy, 
intercept the new written PIN .  W ith the new PIN  in hand the Attack er would connect to the call 
center, enter the User’ s identif ying credential and new PIN  and b e f orwarded to the KB A phase of  the 
authentication process.  Thus the second f orgotten PIN  procedure reduces the authentication process 
to KB A and the ab ility to intercept a piece of  paper. 
The third, and least common, method of  resetting a PIN  is to req uire the User to physically b e 
present at a b ranch of f ice of  the f inancial institution.  In this method an individual goes to a b ranch 
of f ice and speak s to an Agent; the Agent verif ies the identity of  the individual, usually through 
government issued photo identif ication and possib ly KB A, and allows the individual to set a new 
PIN .   
Unlik e the previous two methods which relied on KB A to authenticate the individual’ s identity the 
third method relies on government issued photo identif ication.  Thus, the authentication phase can b e 
ef f ectively reduced to the ab ility of  an Attack er to provide adeq uate photo identif ication and to pass 
the KB A process. 
It should b e noted that in systems that use the numb er on the f ace of  an issued card as the credential 
similar procedures exist f or systems to replace a lost or stolen credential.  In these procedures a user 
can either req uest a new card and receive it in the mail or req uest and receive a new card at a b ranch 
of f ice.  These procedures open a new avenue of  attack  f or an Attack er who can possib ly ob tain the 
entire < credential, PIN >  pair f rom the f inancial institution itself . 
 
3 .2.4  C o n c l u s i o n s  
Tab le 3.3 summariz es the threat resistance of  a Financial call center f or its inside entities and 
transmission lines.  The inf ormation in Tab le 3.3 assumes protection of  the entities and transmissions 
in the GUAP, however, it does not assume Agent controls in place.  As a result, due to the presence of  
a potentially untrustworthy Agent, there is the potential f or attack s at either the RA or Verif ier entities 
and the system can have only moderate conf idence in the inside entities.   
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Table 3.3 – C all C en t er  Th r eat  R esi st an c e f o r  I n si d e E n t i t i es an d  Tr an sm i ssi o n  L i n es 
A u t h ent i c a t i on Proc es s  
A t t a c ks / T h rea t s  
R es i s t a nc e L oc a t i on of  A t t a c k 
Eavesdropping Yes  
Replay Yes  
Session Hij ack ing Yes  
Man in the Middle Yes  
RA Attack s N o Registration Agent collecting personal 
inf ormation of  new user 
CSP Attack s Yes  
Verif ier Attack s N o Verif ying Agent recording Claimant responses 
during KB A 
 
Tab le 3.4 summariz es the threat resistance of  the outside entities and transmission lines.  It can b e 
ob served that since the transmission b etween the User/ Claimant and the Enterprise N etwork  in the 
authentication phase is perf ormed completely in the clear and with no means of  the User verif ying the 
call center the authentication process is completely vulnerab le to any of  the transmission attack s as 
well as Verif ier Impersonation Attack s.  Furthermore, since the End Device is a personal telephone 
various methods of  intercepting their communications through the End Device can b e perf ormed.  
Since the entities and transmission lines outside the control of  the Financial Call Center have no 
resistance to any of  the attack s or threats the system can not have any conf idence that the Claimant 













Table 3.4 – Fi n an c i al C all C en t er  Th r eat  R esi st an c e f o r  O u t si d e E n t i t i es an d  Tr an sm i ssi o n  L i n es 
A u t h ent i c a t i on Proc es s  
A t t a c ks / T h rea t s  
R es i s t a nc e L oc a t i on of  A t t a c k 
Eavesdropping N o B etween User’ s telephone and Enterprise N etwork . 
Replay N o Attack er can replay data captured during previous 
eavesdropping attack  
Session Hij ack ing N o Attack er hij ack s connection af ter user passes 
authentication process 
Man in the Middle N o Attack er sits b etween user and enterprise network  
Verif ier Impersonation N o User trick ed into providing < credential, tok en>  pair and 
KB A inf ormation to a f raudulent call center 
End Device Attack s N o Attack er can simply listen in to the User’ s conversation 
to ob tain KB A inf ormation 
Data Processing Unit 
Attack s 
N o Listening device installed in phone receiver 
Tok en Threats N o • Guessing attack s 
• Out-of -wallet attack  
• Knowledgeab le or f riendly attack  
 
Since the system has only moderate conf idence in the inside entities and transmission lines and 
ab solutely no conf idence in the outside entities and transmission lines, overall, the system can only 
have a 25%  conf idence level in the output of  the authentication system.   
3 .2.5  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  
The conf idence level could b e increased to a 50%  conf idence level b y increasing the conf idence in 
the inside entities b y eliminating the untrustworthy Agent attack s in Tab le 3.3.  As was discussed in 
Section 2.3.2, the threat of  these Agent-b ased attack s can b e reduced b y not exposing Agents to all in 
the inf ormation necessary to pass KB A.  For example, in the enrolment phase, rather than have the 
personal inf ormation that will b e used f or KB A pass through the Agent to the CSP, the new user can 
enter this inf ormation in secret exactly as he or she does with their PIN .  In the authentication phase, 
the KB A system will randomly generate a numb er of  q uestions that are a sub set of  all possib le 
q uestions; this will prevent the Agent f rom learning all the inf ormation necessary to pass KB A since 
the next KB A session will have a dif f erent set of  q uestions.   
Some, b ut not all, Financial Call Centers already implement controls to prevent their Agents f rom 
learning all the inf ormation necessary to pass KB A as one of  their users.  These f inancial services can 
claim to have a 50%  conf idence level in the output of  the authentication system.   
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To increase the conf idence level to a 100%  conf idence level modif ication must b e made to the 
outside entities and transmission lines to increase conf idence in them.  Since a Financial Call Center 
must continue to operate on the PSTN  the transmission attack s will always remain possib le, meaning 
that an Attack er will always b e ab le to eavesdrop and intercept the communication b etween a user 
and the call center.  In order to increase conf idence in the outside entities and transmissions it must b e 
the case that if  an Attack er is ab le to capture all the inf ormation and data sent b y a legitimate user and 
resub mit it to the Verif ier at a later time the Attack er will not b e f alsely authenticated.   
W ithout installing special cryptographic hardware to estab lish a secured channel the 
communication channel b etween the user and the call center must remain an unsecure channel 
estab lished over the PSTN .  As a result the channel will always b e vulnerab le to monitoring and thus 
a tok en b ased on static attrib utes of  the “something you k now” and “something you have” 
authentication f actors can b e easily compromised b y an attack er monitoring the communication 
channel.  In order to increase conf idence in outside entities and transmission lines the verif ication 
must verif y dynamic attrib utes of  the tok en; these dynamic attrib utes are most easily derived f rom the 
tok en “something you are” f actor.  
Incorporating voice b iometrics as the “something you are” f actor req uires a user to possess no 
additional eq uipment since voice authentication can b e perf ormed using a standard personal 
telephone.  Additionally, voice b iometrics can incorporate “something you k now” authentication as 
an additional f actor, allowing the creation of  a two f actor authentication system. 
Since an attack er can eavesdrop on the voice communication the Verif ier must have some means of  
liveness detection in addition to spoof ing resistance.  A suitab le authentication system to this 
environment is a text-prompted voice b iometric system where the text is a KB A q uery.  In this 
b iometric system the system verif ies the static and dynamic attrib utes of  the voice sample as well as 
the correctness of  the response to the KB A q uery.  The presence of  the KB A in the system acts as a 
means of  liveness detection as well as providing a second f actor mak ing the authentication process a 
two-f actor one.  An attack er monitoring the channel would have to capture many dif f erent 
authentication sessions j ust to b e sure to pass the static verif ication of  the KB A b ut will b e unab le to 
pass the verif ication of  the dynamic attrib utes of  the voice samples.   
To reduce the threat of  session hij ack  and man-in-the-middle attack s voice verif ication should 
occur repeatedly throughout a user’ s session with the f inancial service.  If  at any time during the 
session it is f ound that the voice samples b eing provided b y the user do not match the voice print in 
the datab ase the user should not b e allowed to proceed with any transaction. B y introducing the 
repeated verif ication of  the voice sample even if  an attack er is ab le to sit completely in b etween the 
user and call center he or she is unab le to have any inf luence on the transactions that occur and can 
only passively monitor the session. 
Tab le 3.5 summariz es the new threat resistance of  the outside entities and transmission lines with 
the introduction of  a KB A text-prompted voice b iometric authenticator. 
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Table 3.5 - V o i c e B i o m et r i c  E n abled  Fi n an c i al C all C en t er  Th r eat  R esi st an c e f o r  O u t si d e E n t i t i es an d  Tr an sm i ssi o n  
L i n es 
A u t h ent i c a t i on Proc es s  A t t a c ks / T h rea t s  R es i s t a nc e 
Eavesdropping Yes 
Replay Yes 
Session Hij ack ing Yes 
Man in the Middle Yes 
Verif ier Impersonation Yes 
End Device Attack s Yes 
Data Processing Unit Attack s Yes 
Tok en Threats Yes 
 
It can b e ob served in Tab le 3.5 that b y changing the Verif ier to a KB A text-prompted voice 
b iometric verif ier the authentication process meets the req uirements to have conf idence in the outside 
entities and transmission lines.  Comb ined with the previously describ ed conf idence in the inside 





3.3 W e b  A u t h e n t i c a t i o n  
3 .3 .1 O v e r v i e w  
Multiple privacy-critical services, such as b ank ing, credit, loan and health services are now b eing 
conducted through the internet.  The most common method of  the User interacting with these web -
b ased services is through a HTTP-b ased web  b rowser.  Since HTTP was originally unsecured and not 
suitab le f or sensitive applications the Secure Sock ets Layer (SSL) and its successor Transport Layer 
Security (TLS) were designed to provide channel oriented security. [ 31]  Privacy sensitive web  
applications most commonly use HTTP over TLS, k nown as HTTPS, to secure their transactions with 
a customer.  This section will examine the User authentication process in HTTPS.  
3 .3 .2 T L S  H a n d s h a k e  P r o t o c o l  
TLS, specif ied in [ 32], consists of  two components: the handshak e protocol and the record protocol.   
The Handshak e protocol allows the server and client (the User’ s computer) to authenticate each other 
and to negotiate cryptographic k eys, while the Record protocol uses the k eys negotiated in the 
Handshak e protocol to encrypt and authenticate transmitted data.  This section will examine the 
security in the Handshak e protocol, and its ab ility to allow a client to authenticate a server as well as a 
server to authenticate a client.   
Figure 3.8 illustrates the f ull TLS handshak e protocol.  It can b e ob served that a client initiates a 
connection req uest to the server through a hello message.  The server then responds with its hello 
message, an optional certif icate, some cryptographic k eying material and a req uest f or the Client’ s 
certif icate.  The Client will then verif y the server’ s certif icate and respond with its own certif icate 
(optional), k eying material, and the cipher method to b e used in the Record protocol.  The server will 
then verif y the client’ s certif icate, if  applicab le, b ef ore setting the cipher method and initiating the 
TLS Record Protocol.   
The exchange of  k eying inf ormation and the cipher to b e used allows f or the estab lishment f or a 
secure channel to b e used in the Record protocol.  The exchange and verif ication of  certif icates is 
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Fi g u r e 3.8 - M essag e Flo w  f o r  a f u ll h an d sh ak e 
The certif icates mentioned in Figure 3.8 are issued b y a Root Certif icate Authority whose pub lic 
k ey is pre-installed in an internet b rowser.  A Client and Server can ob tain a certif icate f rom a Root 
CA f or a f ee; however, most users do no possess their own certif icate.  The k ey exchange in the TLS 
handshak e uses pub lic k ey encryption, using one of : RSA Key transport, Fixed Dif f ie-Hellman or 
Ephemeral Dif f ie-Hellman k ey exchange schemes. [ 32] 
In the case where the Client and Server b oth posses certif icates issued b y a Root CA, the 
authentication is mutually authenticated with b oth entities authenticating each other through the 
mutually trusted third party.  The authentication mechanism in this case is utiliz ing “something you 
have” authentication as b oth entities are demonstrating possession of  the third party issued certif icate 
and a corresponding private k ey.   
In the case where the Client does not possess a certif icate b ut the server does the authentication is 
only one-way with the Client authenticating the identity of  the Server.  In this situation the Server has 
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no method of  identif ying the Client through the TLS protocol and must resort to an additional method 
that will operate af ter the TLS connection.  In order f or a Server to authenticate a User who does not 
posses a certif icate the server must f irst estab lish a TLS connection with the User b ef ore req uesting 
the User to provide a < credential, tok en>  pair, most commonly this pair is a username and password.  
3 .3 .3  A n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  W e b  A u t h e n t i c a t i o n  P r o c e s s  
W eb -b ased Authentication can b e b rok en into two distinct processes: mutually authenticated TLS, 
where the Client and Server authenticate each other using the TLS handshak e; and one-way 
authenticated TLS where the Client authenticates the Server using the TLS handshak e and the Server 
authenticates the User through their own authentication process in their application.  This analysis 
will f irst examine the security in the one-way authenticated TLS process b ef ore analyz ing the 
mutually authenticated TLS process. 
 
3 . 3 . 3 . 1  O n e -W a y  A u t h e n t i c a t e d  T L S  
Figure 3.9 illustrates the authentication process in one-way authenticated TLS.  It can b e ob served 
that the process is similar to the GUAP except that the entity lab eled as the “Enterprise N etwork ” has 
b een issued a certif icate b y the Root CA and the Data Processing Unit component of  the 
User/ Claimant entity has received a copy of  the pub lic k ey of  the Root CA.  Assuming again the 
correct operation of  the Root CA, the entities and transmission lines inside the control of  the 
authentication process are inside the Enterprise N etwork ” rectangle; while the entities and 
transmission lines outside the control of  the authentication process are those inside the User/ Claimant 




Fi g u r e 3.9 - O n e-W ay  A u t h en t i c at ed  TL S  
3.3.3.1.1 Analysis of  the Inside Entities and Transmission Lines 
The entities and transmission lines inside the control of  the authentication system are those entities 
and transmission lines inside the Enterprise N etwork  rectangle in Figure 3.9.  Since this analysis is 
f ocused on the general case of  web  authentication and the security of  the components inside the 
enterprise network  is implementation specif ic this sub section will describ e an example 
implementation that addresses the threats to these components.   
Figure 3.10 illustrates an example conf iguration of  the entities and transmission lines inside the 
control of  the Authentication System.  In Figure 3.10 the Verif ier, RA and CSP entities and the 
transmissions b etween them have b een comb ined into a single logical unit.  A connection f rom 
outside will connect to either the Verif ier Interf ace or the RA Interf ace.   
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Fi g u r e 3.10  - E x am p le W eb-B ased  A u t h en t i c at i o n  E n t er p r i se N et w o r k  - I n si d e E n t i t i es an d  Tr an sm i ssi o n  L i n es 
B y comb ining the Verif ier, RA and CSP into a single logical unit the authentication system is 
ensuring that a < credential, tok en>  pair is never availab le outside of  that unit.  A User will register in 
the system through the RA interf ace which will communicate with the actual RA inside the comb ined 
unit; a Claimant will req uest verif ication through the Verif ier Interf ace, which will f orward the 
sub mitted < credential, tok en>  pair to the actual Verif ier inside the comb ined unit.   
The comb ined unit, through the use of  internal encryption and authentication mechanisms is ab le to 
ensure that communications are perf ormed only with the system installed interf aces.  Additionally, 
the only inf ormation sent out of  the comb ined unit is an enrolment response (successf ul or 
unsuccessf ul) and a verif ication decision (successf ul or unsuccessf ul).  
The two interf aces ensure that inf ormation sub mitted b y the User/ Claimant is valid, meaning that it 
does not contain malicious code, in addition to ensuring that no outside, unauthoriz ed connection are 
possib le to the comb ined unit.   
Tab le 3.6 summariz es the threat resistance of  this example implementation of  the entities and 
transmission lines inside the control of  the authentication system.  It can b e ob served that this 







Table 3.6 - W eb-B ased  A u t h en t i c at i o n  Th r eat  R esi st an c e f o r  I n si d e E n t i t i es an d  Tr an sm i ssi o n  L i n es 
A u t h ent i c a t i on Proc es s  A t t a c ks / T h rea t s  R es i s t a nc e 
Eavesdropping Yes 
Replay Yes 
Session Hij ack ing Yes 
Man in the Middle Yes 
RA Attack s Yes 
CSP Attack s Yes 
Verif ier Attack s Yes 
 
3.3.3.1.2 Analysis of  the Outside Entities and Transmission Lines 
The entities and transmission lines outside the control of  the authentication system are those inside 
the User/ Claimant rectangle in Figure 3.9 and the transmission f rom that rectangle to the Enterprise 
N etwork  rectangle.  It is important to note that the transmission f rom the User/ Claimant to the 
Enterprise N etwork  occurs af ter the TLS handshak e has b een estab lished.   
Since the transmission b etween the User/ Claimant and the Enterprise N etwork  happens af ter the 
TLS handshak e, assuming that the TLS Handshak e has b een implemented correctly, the transmission 
line b etween the two entities can b e considered secure against eavesdropping and replay attack s.  
However, very real threats on one-way authenticated TLS W eb -b ased authentication session are 
Verif ier Impersonation attack s, including Phishing and Pharming attack s as well as Session Hij ack ing 
and Man-in-the-Middle attack s.  W hile it is true that through the use of  TLS the User/ Claimant should 
b e ab le to correctly authenticate the Verif ier it has b een f ound that this is not always the case. [ 33] 
In a TLS connection the web  application itself , such as the web  b rowser, handles the verif ication of  
the certif icate and usually will only notif y the User if  something is wrong.  It is the User’ s 
responsib ility to ensure that the certif icate b eing authenticated is valid.   
The generic phishing attack  where the Attack er sends a f raudulent email link ing to a f raudulent 
Verif ier is a possib le attack .  In this example the User click s the link  to the f raudulent web site and 
there is no certif icate to b e verif ied, in which case the User, who did not check  the certif icate 
themselves, has no idea they are interacting with a f raudulent site.  The f raudulent site may even have 
a legitimate certif icate that was issued to it b y a k nown and trusted Root CA; however, in this case the 
certif icate would contain inf ormation ab out the certif icate owner which would not match the 
inf ormation contained in the certif icate b elonging to the actual authentic web site.  
In the generic Pharming attack , similar to the generic phishing attack  ab ove, the web site may or 
may not have a certif icate.  The attack  is possib le b ecause the User does not manually check  the 
authenticity of  the certif icate.    
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Session Hij ack ing and Man-In-The-Middle attack s are possib le if  the User does not verif y the 
certif icate received during the TLS handshak e.  In these attack s an Attack er can sit b etween the actual 
verif ier and the User and act as a relay point f or inf ormation b etween the two: the Attack er will 
estab lish a TLS session with the User and a TLS session with the web  service.   Once the 
authentication process has f inished the Attack er can choose to hij ack  the session at any time and/ or 
view/ modif y the contents of  the transactions.  
In the general web  application the User/ Claimant’ s End Device is the k eyb oard attached to their 
personal computer while the personal computer and the web  application operating on it f orm the Data 
Processing Unit.  Additionally, in the general web  application, the < credential, tok en>  pair is very 
of ten a < username, password>  pair.    
The attack s and threats on these entities are similar to those discussed in the Sk ype evaluation.  The 
Attack er’ s ob j ective is to somehow intercept the < username, password>  pair at some point b etween 
the End Device (k eyb oard) and the transmission out of  the Data Processing Unit (web  application) 
and resub mit this pair to b e f alsely authenticated at a later time.  Various attack s can b e perf ormed to 
accomplish the Attack er’ s ob j ective such as an over-the-shoulder attack  or a k eyb oard logger.   
Many web  applications also incorporate a “Rememb er Me” option which will save the < username, 
password>  pair on the User’ s personal computer; the saved data may o may not b e encrypted.  An 
Attack er can reverse engineer the web  application and determine how to recover the < username, 
password>  pair.  
Tab le 3.7 summariz es the threat and attack  resistance of  the entities and transmission lines outside 
the control of  the authentication system.  It can b e ob served that there is no resistance to any of  the 
threats on the authentication process, and thus no conf idence can b e had that the Claimant possesses 














Table 3.7 - W eb-B ased  A u t h en t i c at i o n  Th r eat  R esi st an c e f o r  O u t si d e E n t i t i es an d  Tr an sm i ssi o n  L i n es 
A u t h ent i c a t i on Proc es s  
A t t a c ks / T h rea t s  
R es i s t a nc e L oc a t i on of  A t t a c k 
Eavesdropping N o Transmission b etween k eyb oard and W eb  Application 
Replay N o Attack er can replay data captured during transmission 
b etween k eyb oard and W eb  Application 
Session Hij ack ing N o • An Attack er can tak e over the User’ s personal computer 
af ter the authentication phase is complete and interact 
with the web  application through the TLS connection 
• Fraudulent verif ier operates b etween the User/ Claimant 
and the W eb  Service and hij ack s the session at an 
appropriate time 
Man in the Middle N o • An Attack er can tak e over the User’ s personal computer 
af ter the authentication phase is complete and interact 
with the web  application through the TLS connection 
• Fraudulent verif ier operates b etween the User/ Claimant 
and the W eb  Service 
Verif ier Impersonation N o Phishing and Pharming attack s 
End Device Attack s N o • Attack er can perf orm an “over-the-shoulder-attack ” 
• Keystrok e logger 
Data Processing Unit 
Attack s 
N o “Rememb er Me” f eature allowing to < username, password>  
recovery 
Tok en Threats N o guessing or dictionary attack s 
 
3 . 3 . 3 . 2  M u t u a l l y  A u t h e n t i c a t e d  T L S  
Figure 3.11 illustrates the authentication process that occurs in a Mutually Authenticated TLS 
connection.  It can b e seen that Figure 3.11 dif f ers greatly f rom the GUAP, due entirely to the reliance 
on a mutually-trusted third party f or authentication.  In the Mutually Authenticated TLS connection 
b oth the Server and Client accept each other’ s identities if  the certif icates exchanged during the TLS 





Fi g u r e 3.11 - M u t u ally  A u t h en t i c at ed  TL S  
The Enrolment Phase, seen in Figure 3.11, consists of  the Root CA issuing a certif icate to b oth the 
Client and the Server.  It is up to the Root CA to verif y the identities of  b oth during certif icate 
issuance.  An additional enrolment phase that is not shown is when the User registers f or a service 
of f ered b y the enterprise and mak es their identity k nown to the enterprise.   
The authentication phase occurs entirely within the TLS protocol.  The Client authenticates the 
Server’ s pub lic-k ey certif icate and the Server verif ies the Client’ s pub lic k ey certif icate; verif ication 
of  the certif icates is perf ormed using the pub lic k ey of  the Root CA.   
Assuming the TLS protocol is properly implemented on the b oth the Client and Server the resulting 
weak nesses are in the components and transmission lines inside the entities lab eled as the 
User/ Claimant and the Enterprise N etwork  in Figure 3.11.  An additional weak ness is the Root CA 
itself : it must maintain the proper secrecy of  its private k ey in order f or the TLS scheme to operate; 
the remainder of  this analysis assumes the correct operation of  the Root CA. 
Authentication in this process is b ased on the “something you have” f actor.  The Client and Server 
b oth possess a pub lic k ey certif icate and a corresponding private k ey.  As long as the Client and 
Server can k eep their private k ey private the TLS authentication is genuine, assuming that pub lic k ey 
cryptography is secure and that the Root CA has not compromised its own private k ey.  If  an 
Attack er’ s ob j ective is to pass authentication at the server as a legitimate user his or her task  would b e 
to ob tain the certif icate and private k ey b elonging to the User; if  an Attack er’ s ob j ective was to 
f raudulently represent the enterprise the Attack er would have to ob tain the certif icate and private k ey 
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b elonging to the server. Theref ore the conf idence in the output of  the authentication process depends 
on the conf idence in the secure storage of  the private k ey.   
Due to the reliance on the third party the only threat on the inside entities and transmission lines is 
threat of  a Verif ier Impersonation attack  that is the result of  an Attack er gaining the Enterprise’ s 
certif icate and private k ey.  This attack  can b e prevented b y the Enterprise b y ensuring that various 
check s and measures are in place to ensure the secure storage of  their private k ey.  Providing that an 
Enterprise is ab le to have conf idence in the secure storage of  its private k ey Tab le 3.8 illustrates that 
the Enterprise can have complete conf idence in its inside entities and transmission lines. 
Table 3.8 - M u t u ally  A u t h en t i c at ed  TL S  Th r eat  R esi st an c e f o r  I n si d e E n t i t i es an d  Tr an sm i ssi o n  L i n es 
A u t h ent i c a t i on Proc es s  A t t a c ks / T h rea t s  R es i s t a nc e 
Eavesdropping Yes 
Replay Yes 
Session Hij ack ing Yes 
Man in the Middle Yes 
RA Attack s Yes 
CSP Attack s Yes 
Verif ier Attack s Yes 
 
It can b e ob served in Figure 3.11 that the entities outside the control of  the Enterprise network  are 
the User/ Claimant entity and the transmission line f rom that entity through the internet to the 
Enterprise network .  In order to have conf idence that the User/ Claimant entity and the transmission 
lines can not compromise the conf idence in the authentication output the enterprise must have 
conf idence that the User’ s certif icate and private k ey cannot b e ob tained b y an Attack er at any point 
b ef ore, af ter or during the authentication process.   
As in the one-way authenticated TLS the transmission b etween the User/ Claimant and Enterprise 
N etwork  is encrypted and secure af ter the TLS Handshak e.  However, the TLS handshak e is 
susceptib le to the same Verif ier Impersonation attack s, Session Hij ack ing and Man-in-the-Middle 
attack s if  the certif icates are not manually verif ied.  
 W hile the Enterprise can assume that the User would want to k eep his or her private k ey secret, 
particularly in a privacy-critical system, the Enterprise has no assurances that it is indeed k ept secret.  
If  the trusted third party were to periodically perf orm evaluations of  the User’ s k ey storage 
mechanisms and pass the evaluations and the Enterprise had conf idence in the third party’ s ab ility to 
evaluate the secrecy of  the private k ey than there may b e a level of  assurance availab le to the 
Enterprise.  However, without such a system, the Enterprise can have no reasonab le conf idence in the 
outside entities and transmission lines, as summariz ed in Tab le 3.9. 
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Table 3.9 - M u t u ally  A u t h en t i c at ed  TL S  Th r eat  R esi st an c e f o r  O u t si d e E n t i t i es an d  Tr an sm i ssi o n  L i n es 
A u t h ent i c a t i on Proc es s  
A t t a c ks / T h rea t s  
R es i s t a nc e L oc a t i on of  A t t a c k 
Eavesdropping N o Transmission b etween k ey storage and web  b rowser 
Replay N o Attack er can reuse private k ey captured during 
eavesdropping attack  
Session Hij ack ing N o • An Attack er can tak e over the User’ s personal computer 
af ter the authentication phase is complete and interact 
with the web  application through the TLS connection 
• Fraudulent verif ier operates b etween the User/ Claimant 
and the W eb  Service and hij ack s the session at an 
appropriate time 
Man in the Middle N o • An Attack er can tak e over the User’ s personal computer 
af ter the authentication phase is complete and interact 
with the web  application through the TLS connection 
• Fraudulent verif ier operates b etween the User/ Claimant 
and the W eb  Service 
Verif ier Impersonation N o Phishing and Pharming attack s 
End Device Attack s N o Process that locates stored private k eys 
Data Processing Unit 
Attack s 
N o Virus exploiting a f ault in the web  b rowser recovers private 
k ey 
Tok en Threats N o An Attack er in possession of  b oth private k ey and certif icate 
will b e f alsely authenticated 
 
3 .3 .4  C o n c l u s i o n s  
The ab ove analysis assumed the correct operation and security of  the Root CA and the TLS protocol 
is always properly implemented.  These assumptions allowed the evaluation of  the entities b oth inside 
and outside the control of  the authentication system.   
The analysis f ound that with properly implemented security considerations that the authentication 
system could have conf idence in the entities and transmission lines inside its control.  However, it 
was f ound that in b oth mutually-authenticated TLS and one-way authenticated TLS the authentication 
system could have no reasonab le conf idence in the entities and transmission lines outside of  its 
control.  Resulting in the conclusion that web  b ased authentication can only have a 50%  conf idence 
level in the output of  the authentication system.  Tab le 3.10 summariz es the f indings and conclusions 
regarding web -b ased authentication.  
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Table 3.10  - C o n f i d en c e L ev el i n  W eb-B ased  A u t h en t i c at i o n  
T L S  S c h em e C onf i denc e i n I ns i de 
Ent i t i es  a nd 
T ra ns m i s s i on L i nes  
C onf i denc e i n O u t s i de 
Ent i t i es  a nd 
T ra ns m i s s i on L i nes  
A u t h ent i c a t i on 
C onf i denc e L ev el 
( % )  
Mutually-
Authenticated 
Conf ident N ot Conf ident 50%  
One-W ay 
Authenticated 
Conf ident N ot Conf ident 50%  
 
3 .3 .5  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  
The lack  of  conf idence in the outside entities and transmission lines arose f rom the susceptib ility of  
the authentication system to every attack  and weak ness considered, despite the estab lishment of  an 
encrypted channel b etween the User and the W eb  Service through TLS.  This susceptib ility indicates 
that in order f or the authentication system to have conf idence in the outside entities and transmission 
lines rather than adding more security and encryption the entities and transmissions it should b e 
assumed that the Attack er is ab le to completely capture any data sub mitted to the Verif ier.  
W ith the assumption that the any data sub mitted to the Verif ier b y a user could b e replayed b y an 
attack er the verif ication cannot rely solely on either the static attrib utes of  the “something you k now” 
or “something you have” f actors and should instead verif y a tok en b ased on b oth static and dynamic 
attrib utes.  Keeping everything else the same in the system b ut changing the verif ier to one that 
verif ies b oth static and dynamic attrib utes of  a tok en many of  these threats to the outside entities and 
transmission lines could b e removed.  To completely remove the threat of  the session hij ack ing and 
man-in-the-middle attack s the system should also incorporate periodic re-authentication in addition to 
the verif ication of  dynamic attrib utes.  W ith these improvements Tab le 3.11 highlights the new threat 
resistance in the outside entities and transmission lines. 
It is recommended that a text-dependent voice b iometric verif ier is used in the improved system.  
Voice b iometrics are recommended in this situation as it can easily incorporate b oth the static and 
dynamic attrib utes desired through the secret passphrase b eing spok en and the way that it is spok en 
b y the user.  Additionally, the use of  voice b iometrics will req uire little or no additional hardware to 









Table 3.11 – I m p r o v ed  W eb-B ased  A u t h en t i c at i o n  Th r eat  R esi st an c e f o r  O u t si d e E n t i t i es an d  Tr an sm i ssi o n  L i n es 
A u t h ent i c a t i on 
Proc es s  
A t t a c ks / T h rea t s  
R es i s t a nc e I m p rov em ent  t o p rev i ou s  a t t a c k 
Eavesdropping Yes W hile an Attack er may b e ab le to record the b iometric 
b etween the sensor and the application on the user’ s PC due 
to the verif ication of  dynamic attrib utes it cannot b e replayed 
successf ully 
Replay Yes See ab ove 
Session Hij ack ing Yes Prevented b y periodical re-authentication 
Man in the Middle Yes Prevented b y Periodical re-authentication 
Verif ier Impersonation Yes Phishing and Pharming attack s prevented since any data 
captured f rom a legitimate user can not b e used successf ully 
b y an Attack er.  
End Device Attack s Yes W hile an Attack er may b e ab le to record the b iometric 
b etween the sensor and the application on the User’ s PC due 
to the verif ication of  dynamic attrib utes it cannot b e replayed 
successf ully 
Data Processing Unit 
Attack s 
Yes Rememb er me f eature removed 
Tok en Threats Yes Reduced through liveness detection and spoof ing resistance 
within the Verif ier and the verif ication of  b oth static and 





Chapter 4  
Co n c l u s i o n s ,  R ec o m m en d ati o n s  an d  F u tu re W o rk  
4 .1 O v e r v i e w  
Chapter 1 introduced the notion of  User Authentication, def ined the GUAP and explored the f actors 
of  authentication while Chapter 2 explored the GUAP including its weak nesses and threat and the 
weak nesses and threats associated with the f actors used in authentication tok ens.   Chapter 2 went on 
to def ine measures through resistance to attack s and threats on the entities and transmissions f orming 
GUAP to estab lish the conf idence level in the output of  the authentication system.  Chapter 3 
analyz ed several authentication systems and using the measures estab lished in Chapter 2 assigned a 
conf idence level to the output of  these authentication systems, and as necessary, made 
recommendations as to how to improve the conf idence level.  This chapter will f irst summariz e the 
f indings of  Chapter 3 and highlight the f ailings of  the analyz ed authentication systems b ef ore 
describ ing and analyz ing an example authentication system that meets the req uirements f or a 100%  
Conf idence Level in the output of  the authentication process.   
4 .2  C o n c l u s i o n s  
Tab le 4.1 summariz es the authentication conf idence level of  the analyz ed systems as compared to the 
ideal authentication system.  It can b e ob served that, with the exception of  the Financial Call Center 
without Agent Controls, the analyz ed authentication systems all received a conf idence level of  50% ; 
The Financial Call Center without Agent Controls received a conf idence level of  25%  due to its 













Table 4.1 - C o n f i d en c e L ev els o f  A n aly z ed  A u t h en t i c at i o n  S y st em s S u m m ar y  
A u t h ent i c a t i on S y s t em  A u t h ent i c a t i on 
C onf i denc e L ev el 
( % )  
C onf i denc e i n I ns i de 
Ent i t i es  a nd 
T ra ns m i s s i on L i nes  
C onf i denc e i n O u t s i de 
Ent i t i es  a nd 
T ra ns m i s s i on L i nes  
Ideal 100%  Conf ident Conf ident 
Sk ype 50%  Conf ident N ot Conf ident 
Financial Call Centers – 
without Agent Controls 
25%  Moderately Conf ident N ot Conf ident 
Financial Call Centers – 
with Agent Controls 
50%  Conf ident N ot Conf ident 
One-W ay Authenticated 
TLS W eb -B ased 
Authentication 
50%  Conf ident N ot Conf ident 
Mutually-Authenticated 
TLS W eb -B ased 
Authentication 
50%  Conf ident N ot Conf ident 
 
It can b e f urther ob served in Tab le 4.1 that none of  the authentication systems have any conf idence 
in the entities and transmission lines outside of  their control.  Tab le 4.2 summariz es the resistance to 














Table 4.2 - Th r eat  R esi st an c e S u m m ar y  f o r  O u t si d e E n t i t i es an d  Tr an sm i ssi o n  L i n es 
T h rea t  R es i s t a nc e A u t h ent i c a t i on Proc es s  
A t t a c ks  a nd T h rea t s  I dea l  S ky p e F i na nc i a l C a ll 
C ent ers  ( B ot h )  
W eb -B a s ed 
A u t h ent i c a t i on ( B ot h )  
Eavesdropping Yes N o N o N o 
Replay Yes N o N o N o 
Session Hij ack ing Yes Yes N o N o 
Man in the Middle Yes Yes N o N o 
Verif ier Impersonation Yes N o N o N o 
End Device Attack s Yes N o N o N o 
Data Processing Unit Attack s Yes N o N o N o 
Tok en Threats Yes N o N o N o 
 
All of  the analyz ed authentication systems have very little, if  any, resistance to the attack s and 
threats on the entities and transmission lines outside of  their control.  Some of  the systems, Sk ype and 
W eb -B ased Authentication, have even tak en steps to ensure the estab lishment of  a secured channel 
b ef ore authentication inf ormation is exchanged; however, these steps have not protected the 
authentication process.  The inab ility of  the authentication systems to provide adeq uate threat 
resistance arises f rom the ab ility of  an attack er to somehow, at some point during the process, capture 
the < credential, tok en>  pair and sub mit the captured pair in a separate authentication session to b e 
f alsely authenticated as the owner of  the credential.  
All of  the analyz ed authentication systems use a tok en b ased on some f orm or comb ination of  the 
“something you k now” or “something you have” authentication f actors and verif y only the static 
attrib utes of  the authentication tok en.  B y authenticating only the static attrib utes in the tok en the 
authentication systems merely verif y that the Claimant is in possession of  the inf ormation that 
comprises the tok en and if  the Claimant can demonstrate as such he or she will b e authenticated as 
possessing the claimed identity.  Thus, once an attack er is ab le to possess the static inf ormation 
contained in the tok en, or the tok en itself , the attack er is ab le to f raudulently pass the authentication 
process and b e f alsely authenticated as a legitimate user.  
4 .3 R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  
As previously mentioned the examined authentication systems f ailed f rom an inab ility to operate 
correctly once the tok en itself  or the static inf ormation comprising the tok en was compromised.  The 
examined systems would verif y that a claimant was in possession of  some static inf ormation that 
comprised the authentication tok en and that once an attack er had that inf ormation in his or her 
possession was ab le to successf ully masq uerade as a legitimate user.  
 
 103 
The security of  the examined authentication systems assumed that the static inf ormation comprising 
the authentication tok en was not ob tainab le b y an attack er once it was out of  the direct control of  the 
system.  However, it was determined that there exists f easib le points of  attack  in the portions of  the 
authentication process where an attack er can capture the < credential, tok en>  pair itself  or at the very 
least the static inf ormation comprising the tok en.  It is theref ore recommended that to have complete 
conf idence in the output of  the authentication process the design of  an authentication system should 
assume that the entire < credential, tok en>  pair can b e ob tained b y a determined attack er.   An ideal 
authentication system, which has complete conf idence in its output, must b e ab le to correctly 
authenticate a claimant in the f ace of  a compromised tok en.   
Once the assumption is made that the tok en, or the authenticating inf ormation contained within it, 
can b e compromised outside of  the direct control of  the authentication system it b ecomes necessary to 
incorporate dynamic inf ormation into the tok en.  Verif ication of  dynamic attrib utes add an ever 
changing structure to the inf ormation contained within the tok en meaning that if  an attack er was ab le 
to capture the tok en and resub mit it, the Verif ier would recogniz e the tok en as a previously sub mitted 
tok en and not authenticate the attack er.  This ever changing structure was not possib le in the 
examined systems which would verif y only static inf ormation stemming f orm the “something you 
k now” and “something you have” authentication f actors; dynamic attrib utes, on the other hand, are 
more readily availab le in the “something you are” authentication f actor.  
Recommendations f or improvements to the examined systems were to incorporate the verif ication 
of  dynamic attrib utes into the systems with minimal changes to the authentication process.  In each 
recommendation, verif ication using voice b iometrics was recommended as the source f or the dynamic 
attrib utes.  Voice b iometrics was recommended b ased on its many strengths discussed in Chapter 1.  
The remainder of  this section will expand on these recommendations b y describ ing an authentication 
system which meets the req uirements f or an ideal system which has complete conf idence in the 
correctness of  it output.   
 
4 .3 .1 A n  I d e a l  A u t h e n t i c a t i o n  S y s t e m  
In this section an authentication system that meets the req uirements to have complete conf idence in 
its output will b e describ ed.   This system will f irst b e describ ed in terms of  the entities that comprise 
the system, the authentication f actors used in the authentication tok en and the steps involved in the 
enrolment and the authentication phases.  A complete analysis of  the system will then b e perf ormed in 
order to demonstrate its ab ility to resist the identif ied attack s and threats to the authentication process 
and have complete conf idence in its output.   
Figure 4.1 illustrates the entities involved in the proposed authentication system.  It can b e noted 
the maj or dif f erence b etween Figure 4.1 and the GUAP, f irst illustrated in Figure 1.10, is that the end 
device in the proposed system consists of  a microphone.  The proposed system utiliz es an 
authentication tok en b ased on voice b iometrics and thus the microphone will b e the only device the 





E nrol m ent Ph ase
A u th entication Ph ase
DecisionU s e r  /  Cl a i m a n t
V e r i f i e r
V oicep rint 
Datab ase
Passp h rase
Datab aseE nrol m ent Processing
M atch ing
 
Fi g u r e 4.1 - I d eal A u t h en t i c at i o n  S y st em  P r o c ess 
4 . 3 . 1 . 1  E n r o l m e n t  P h a s e  
Figure 4.2 illustrates the enrolment phase of  the proposed system.  Once the enrolment phase has 
b een initializ ed b y a system administrator and a user id has b een created, the user will provide voice 
samples through their microphone and the attached Data Processing Unit over a secured channel to 
the Registration Authority which will compute a voice print f rom the samples b ef ore storing the voice 
print in the datab ase. The complexity of  estab lishing a voice print, such as the numb er of  phrases and 
sounds the user must speak  b ef ore a voice print is created, depends on the nature of  the voice 
b iometric verif ication system employed.   
 
Fi g u r e 4.2 - E n r o lm en t  P h ase 
In the proposed authentication system enrolment, however, is not complete once a voiceprint f or 
the new user has b een estab lished.  Immediately f ollowing the estab lishment of  the voiceprint the user 
will b e ask ed to create and speak  an identif ying phrase that the user will use in the authentication 
phase f or identif ication.  This phrase will b e the user’ s secret passphrase, however, instead of  typing it 
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through a k eyb oard the user will speak  it when authenticating to the system.  The use of  this 
passphrase and the voiceprint comb ines b oth the “something you k now” and “something you are” 
authentication f actors into the authentication tok en mak ing the proposed system a two-f actor 
authentication system.   
Once the user’ s voiceprint and their secret passphrase have respectively b een recorded in the 
voiceprint datab ase and the passphrase datab ase the enrolment process is complete.  The user now 
possesses a credential (an assigned user id) and a tok en (their voice and a secret passphrase) which 
will b e used in the authentication process.   
 
4 . 3 . 1 . 2  A u t h e n t i c a t i o n  P h a s e  
Figure 4.3 illustrates the authentication phase of  the proposed system.  In the authentication process 
the Claimant will mak e an identity claim b y sub mitting their user id to the system and speak ing their 
secret passphrase through the microphone.  The Data Processing Unit will then digitiz e the analog 
voice sample and transmit the voice sample over a secured channel to the Verif ier.  The Verif ier will 
then perf orm a matching operation on the voice sample; matching the voice sample against b oth the 
template voiceprint and the template passphrase and compute a matching score.  If  the matching score 
is inside the acceptab le range the Claimant will b e authenticated as possessing the claimed identity.   
 
 
Fi g u r e 4.3 - A u t h en t i c at i o n  P h ase 
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The verif ication that occurs in the proposed authentication system verif ies b oth static and dynamic 
attrib utes of  the authentication tok en.  The tok en in this system is the digitiz ed sample of  the claimant 
(user) speak ing their secret passphrase.  The voice b iometric verif ication will f irst perf orm check s on 
the voice sample to resist spoof  attempts through previously discussed methods b ef ore perf orming 
verif ication on b oth static and dynamic attrib utes of  the tok en.  The system will verif y the voice 
sample b ased on the f ollowing static attrib utes: 
• correctness of  the passphrase 
o Does the sub mitted passphrase match the template passphrase? 
• correctness of  the voice 
o Are the physical traits of  the voice sample produced f rom the voice def ined b y the 
template voice print? 
If  the static attrib utes are verif ied as correct, the system will then verif y the voice sample b ased on the 
f ollowing dynamic attrib utes: 
• the wavef orm of  the voice sample does not match a previously sub mitted sample 
o It is extremely improb ab le that the sub mitted sample is identical to a previously 
sub mitted sample if  it had b een spok en f or this authentication session.  If  the current 
sample matches a previous sample then it is lik ely that the sample was not spok en b y the 
user during this session. 
• uniq ue voice attrib utes are dif f erent than a previous session 
o Human traits such as emotional state and comf ort level which can b e extracted f rom the 
human voice [ 24] will change b etween authentication sessions 
B y verif ying the ab ove static attrib utes the system is ab le to identif y and verif y the identity of  the 
claimant and the verif ication would b e suf f icient if  the integrity of  the tok en was assured.  However, 
as it must b e assumed that the tok en can b e compromised, the verif ication of  the dynamic attrib utes 
ab ove ensure that captured authenticating inf ormation can not b e used to pass authentication in a 
dif f erent authentication session.   
4 . 3 . 1 . 3  A n a l y s i s  
Following the same procedure as the examined authentication systems the b elow analysis of  the 
proposed authentication system f irst examines the entities and transmission lines that are inside the 
control of  the authentication system b ef ore examining the entities and transmission lines outside the 
control of  the authentication system.  Following this analysis f inal summariz ing remark s ab out the 
proposed authentication system will b e made.   
4.3.1.3.1 Analysis of  the Inside Entities and Transmission Lines 
The entities inside the control of  the proposed authentication system are lab elled in Figure 4.1 as the 
RA, CSP and the Verif ier while the transmission lines inside the control of  the system are the 
transmissions b etween those entities.   An example implementation to minimiz e threats and attack s on 





Fi g u r e 4.4 - P r o p o sed  A u t h en t i c at i o n  S y st em  - I n si d e E n t i t i es an d  Tr an sm i ssi o n  L i n es I m p lem en t at i o n  
The comb ined unit ensures that template inf ormation is never availab le outside of  the unit.  A user 
will register in the system through the RA interf ace which will communicate with the actual RA 
inside the comb ined unit; a claimant will req uest verif ication through the Verif ier Interf ace, which 
will f orward the sub mitted < credential, tok en>  pair to the actual Verif ier inside the comb ined unit.   
The comb ined unit, through the use of  internal encryption and authentication mechanisms is ab le to 
ensure that communications are perf ormed only with the system installed interf aces.  Additionally, 
the only inf ormation sent out of  the comb ined unit is an enrolment response (successf ul or 
unsuccessf ul) and a verif ication decision (successf ul or unsuccessf ul). 
The two interf aces ensure that inf ormation sub mitted b y the User/ Claimant is valid, meaning that it 
does not contain malicious code, in addition to ensuring that no outside, unauthoriz ed connections are 
possib le to the comb ined unit.  Tab le 4.3 illustrates that the proposed system can b e implemented in 









Table 4.3 - P r o p o sed  A u t h en t i c at i o n  S y st em  Th r eat  R esi st an c e f o r  I n si d e E n t i t i es an d  Tr an sm i ssi o n  L i n es 
Authentication Process Attack s/ Threats Resistance 
Eavesdropping Yes 
Replay Yes 
Session Hij ack ing Yes 
Man in the Middle Yes 
RA Attack s Yes 
CSP Attack s Yes 
Verif ier Attack s Yes 
 
4.3.1.3.2 Analysis of  the Outside Entities and Transmission Lines 
The entities and transmission lines outside the direct control of  the proposed authentication system 
consist of  the entity lab elled as the User/ Claimant in Figure 4.1 and the transmission out of  that 
entity.  The components f orming the User/ Claimant entity are the microphone that the user uses to 
provide voice samples and the Data Processing Unit which digitiz es the voice samples and 
communicates with the next entity in the process.   
In Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 the transmission out of  the User/ Claimant entity to the RA and 
Verif ier entities respectively is lab elled as a secured channel.  This is an open channel that has b een 
secured through the correct use of  cryptographic tools as describ ed in Section 1.2.6.  Since the 
transmission b etween the User/ Claimant entity and the authentication system is perf ormed over a 
secured channel this transmission can b e considered secure against eavesdropping, replay, man-in-
the-middle and session hij ack ing attack s f rom the def inition of  a secured channel.   
There are a variety of  attack s that can b e attempted inside of  the User/ Claimant entity.  The 
transmission b etween the microphone and the Data Processing Unit is vulnerab le to any of  the 
transmission-b ased attack s and the Data Processing Unit is also vulnerab le.  An attack er can install a 
listening device on the transmission line or inside the Data Processing Unit and capture the 
< credential, tok en>  pair as it is sub mitted b y a legitimate user.   
Phishing and Pharming attack s are also f easib le.  In the proposed system it is still the user’ s 
responsib ility to ensure that they are correcting to the actual authentication server and not a f raudulent 
server b ef ore providing authenticating inf ormation.  It is f easib le that an attack er utiliz ing previously 
describ ed Phishing or Pharming techniq ues can manage to ob tain a < credential, tok en>  pair.  
However, due to the nature of  the verif ication of  the tok en a captured < credential, tok en>  pair does 
not compromise the authentication system.  The verif ication of  the tok en relies on the verif ication of  
b oth static and dynamic attrib utes of  the tok en: while a compromised tok en may compromise those 
static attrib utes it will not compromise the dynamic attrib utes.   
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For example, if  an attack er were to capture the < credential, tok en>  pair (the user id and a voice 
sample) during an authentication session and resub mit the pair the verif ier will f ind that: 
• The voice pattern is correct 
• The passphrase is correct 
• The voice sample wavef orm matches a previously sub mitted sample 
Since the sub mitted sample was f ound to match a previously sub mitted sample the authentication 
system will rej ect the authentication claim and req uire the legitimate User to choose a new 
passphrase.   
An interesting session hij ack ing or man-in-the-middle attack  is possib le through sof tware operating 
on the Data Processing Unit.  In this attack  the attack er installs sof tware on the Data Processing Unit 
which will allow the attack er to tak e control of  the entity at some point.  The attack er then waits until 
immediately f ollowing the authentication process (af ter the legitimate user is authenticated) b ef ore 
tak ing control of  the user’ s system and hij ack ing the session; the attack er can then at as the legitimate 
user through the user’ s system.    
The describ ed session hij ack ing attack  can b e prevented through periodic re-authentication in the 
proposed system.  In periodic re-authentication either at random times or b ef ore changes are 
committed b y the user the system will re-authenticate the user.  In systems where the user interacts 
with the system through a voice channel (such as a call center) re-authentication can b e perf ormed 
unob trusively using the user’ s voice, perhaps even without the user’ s k nowledge, to verif y the user’ s 
identity.   
W ith the describ ed hij ack ing attack  prevented through the use of  periodic re-authentication and the 
ab ility of  the system to operate correctly in the f ace of  compromised tok ens Tab le 4.4 illustrates the 
threat resistance of  the outside entities and transmission lines. 
Table 4.4 - P r o p o sed  A u t h en t i c at i o n  S y st em  Th r eat  R esi st an c e f o r  O u t si d e E n t i t i es an d  Tr an sm i ssi o n  L i n es 
Authentication Process Attack s/ Threats Resistance 
Eavesdropping Yes 
Replay Yes 
Session Hij ack ing Yes 
Man in the Middle Yes 
Verif ier Impersonation Yes 
End Device Attack s Yes 
Data Processing Unit Attack s Yes 




4.3.1.3.3 Analysis Summary 
Using the inf ormation in Tab le 4.3 and Tab le 4.4, Tab le 4.5 illustrates the conf idence level that the 
proposed system as in b oth the entities and transmission lines inside and outside of  its direct control.   
It can b e ob served in Tab le 4.5 that the proposed authentication system meets the req uirements f or a 
100%  Conf idence Level in the output of  the authentication process.   
Table 4.5 - C o n f i d en c e L ev el o f  t h e P r o p o sed  A u t h en t i c at i o n  S y st em  
Conf idence in Inside Entities and 
Transmission Lines 
Conf idence in Outside Entities and 
Transmission Lines 
Authentication 
Conf idence Level (% ) 
Conf ident Conf ident 100%  
 
4 .4  F u t u r e  W o r k  
Future work  will f ocus on the continued development of  a secure and authenticated VoIP system 
where the user authentication in the system incorporates the f indings of  this thesis.  N amely, the VoIP 
system in development will employ a voice b iometric system which incorporates b oth static and 
dynamic attrib utes into the authentication tok en.  It is thought that this approach will ensure that the 
authentication process will b e ab le to resist attack s and operate correctly in the f ace of  a compromised 
authentication tok en.   
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A ppen d i x  A  
P as s w o rd  G u es s i n g  E n tro py  
Tab le A.2 was created b y N IST [ 1] and contains rough estimates “of  the average entropy of  user 
chosen passwords as a f unction of  length.”  The logic used b y N IST [ 1] in Tab le A.1 is as f ollows f or 
user-selected passwords drawn f rom the f ull k eyb oard alphab et: 
• The entropy of  the f irst character is tak en to b e 4 b its; 
• The entropy of  the next 7 characters are 2 b its per character; this is roughly consistent with 
Shannon’ s estimate that “when statistical ef f ects extending over not more than 8 letters are 
considered the entropy is roughly 2.3 b its per character;” 
• For the 9th through the 20th character the entropy is tak en to b e 1.5 b its per character; 
• For characters 21 and ab ove the entropy is tak en to b e 1 b it per character; 
• A “b onus” of  6 b its of  entropy is assigned f or a composition rule that req uires b oth upper case 
and non-alphab etic characters. This f orces the use of  these characters, b ut in many cases thee 
characters will occur only at the b eginning or the end of  the password, and it reduces the total 
search space somewhat, so the b enef it is prob ab ly modest and nearly independent of  the length of  
the password; 
• A b onus of  up to 6 b its of  entropy is added f or an extensive dictionary check . If  the Attack er 
k nows the dictionary, he can avoid testing those passwords, and will in any event, b e ab le to 
guess much of  the dictionary, which will, however, b e the most lik ely selected passwords in the 
ab sence of  a dictionary rule. The assumption is that most of  the guessing entropy b enef its f or a 
dictionary test accrue to relatively short passwords, b ecause any long password that can b e 
rememb ered must necessarily b e a “pass-phrase” composed of  dictionary words, so the b onus 
declines to z ero at 20 characters.  For user selected PIN s the assumption of  Tab le A.1 is that such 
pins are sub j ected at least to a rule that prevents selection of  all the same digit, or runs of  digits 
(e.g., “1234” or “76543”). This column of  Tab le A.1 is at b est a very crude estimate, and 
experience with password crack ers suggests, f or example, that users will of ten pref erentially 
select simple numb er patterns and recent dates, f or example their year of  b irth. 
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A ppen d i x  B  
K B A  G u es s i n g  E n tro py  
The guessab ility of  KB A depends on who the guesser is and what the f actoid is.  Figure B .1 contains 
a f ormula f or calculating the prob ab ility of  compromising KB A and Tab le B .1 which contains actual 
values was ob tained f rom [ 22]. 
 
Fi g u r e B .1 – G u essabi li t y  o f  K B A  [ 22]  
Table B .1 – K B A  G u essabi li t y  M et r i c s ( p i, j) [ 22]  
 S p ou s e F a m i ly  F ri end Em p loy er Prof es s i ona l O t h ers  
Date of  B irth  1 1 1 1 1 1 in 18250 
or 
2-14 
Place of  B irth  1 1 ? 1 1 ? 
Credit Card  1 10-8 = 2-24 10-8 = 2-
24 
10-8 = 2-24 10-8 = 2-24 10-8 = 2-24 
Home Address  1 1 1 1 1 1 
Phone N umb er  1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cell Phone  1 1 1 1 in 16,000 
= 
2-14 




Maiden N ame  
1 1 ? ? ? ? 
AGI  1 1 in 10,000 = 
2-13 
1 in 10,000 
= 
2-13 
1 in 10,000 
= 
2-13 





Tax  1 1 in 1,000 = 
2-10 
1 in 1,000 
= 
2-10 
1 in 1,000 = 
2-10 





N umb er  
1 2-15 2-15 1 1 2-15 
B ank  
Statement 
B alance  
1 1 in 1,000 = 
2-10 
1 in 1,000 
= 
2-10 
1 in 1,000 = 
2-10 
1 in 1,000 = 
2-10 
1 in 1,000 = 
2-10 
Credit Card 
B alance  
1 1 in 1,000 = 
2-10 
1 in 1,000 
= 
2-10 
1 in 1,000 = 
2-10 
1 in 1,000 = 
2-10 
1 in 1,000 = 
2-10 
N ot es  t o T a b le B . 1 : 
• Last Pay Stub  Inf ormation is not a good candidate since the inf ormation may not b e easily 
availab le to the Verif ier.  
• W 2 inf ormation could include other inf ormation such as state income tax. Gross income, social 
security tax, Medicare tax are not good candidates since they are guessab le f rom gross income. 
Even retirement plan deduction will have very low entropy.  
• Year of  B irth = someone can b e assumed to b e b etween 20 and 70 years of  age  
• Date of  B irth = year *  days = 50 *  365 = 18,250  
• Credit Card guessing = Middle 8 digit  
• Home Address Anyone may get f rom phone b ook   
• Phone N umb er listed  
• Cell Phone N umb er k nows the areas code: N o more than 16 exchanges  
• Some may k now AGI to nearest 10,000. Once that is k nown, tax may b e guessed within 1,000  
• AGI N ot k nown b ut less than 100,000  
• Tax not k nown b ut less than 10,000  
• Social Security N umb er -- f irst three digits are b ased on place of  issuance, which are well k nown 
and can b e guessed b ased on the place of  b irth assuming SSN  is ob tained at or around time of  
b irth.  Assumes one check  digit. Could b e more. Thus entropy more ak in to 5 digits = 105 = 215.  




L i s t o f  A c ro n y m s  
AES  Advanced Encryption Standard 
CA  Certif icate Authority 
CSP  Credential Service Provider 
DES  Data Encryption Standard 
DL  Discrete Logarithm 
DN S  Domain N ame Service 
DPU  Data Processing Unit 
EC  Elliptic Curve 
ECDLP  Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Prob lem 
EER  Eq ual Error Rate 
FAR  False Accept Rate 
FRR  False Rej ect Rate 
FTE  Failure to Enroll 
GUAP  Generaliz ed User Authentication Process 
HTTP  Hypertext Transf er Protocol 
KB A  Knowledge B ased Authentication 
OSI  Open Systems Interconnection 
PIN   Personal Identif ication N umb er 
PKI  Pub lic Key Inf rastructure 
PSTN   Pub lic Switched Telephone N etwork  
RA  Registration Authority 
RSA  Rivest, Shamir and Adleman Pub lic-Key Cryptosystem 
SSL  Secure Sock ets Layer 
TLS  Transport Layer Security 





L i s t o f  Cry pto g raphi c  F u n c ti o n s  
Enc ry p t i on K ey   e 
D ec ry p t i on K ey    d 
   
Encryption f unction  cmEe =)(  
Decryption f unction  mcDd =)(  
Hash f unction   yxh =)(  
   
Digital Signature signing 
f unction  
 )(mS A  
Digital Signature verif ication 
f unction  
 ),( smVA  
Digital Signature signing 
f unction in a pub lic-k ey 
cryptosystem  
 )()( mDmS
AdA =  
Digital Signature verif ication 







   
Certif icate f unction comb ining 
an ID and k ey into a well-
k nown structure  
 ),( BobBob eIDf  
Certif icate generation f unction   )),(( BobBobd eIDfDCERT CA=  
Certif icate verif ication 




eIDfCERTEiftrueCERTeIDV AAAeAAAe CACA ,
),()(:,),(  
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